Success Esomchi Obi, PhD¹,

¹Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Prince Abubakar Audu University, Anyigba, PMB 1008, Kogi State, Nigeria

Emaіl: Speak2successresearch@gmail.com

Orchid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4111-4077

Professor Enojo Kennie Enojo²,

²Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Prince Abubakar Audu University, Anyigba, Kogi State, Nigeria

E-mail: enojokennie@gmail.com

Orchid: https://orcid.org/0009-0001-0321-7817

Agaba Joseph David, PhD3

3Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Prince Abubakar Audu University, Anyigba, Kogi State, Nigeria

E-mail: macdaveagaba@gmail.com

Orchid: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-7499-7811

Abstract

This study explores the political economy dynamics through which Russia’s evasion of Western sanctions after the 2022 Ukraine invasion intersects with hegemonic competition to shape the July 2023 military coup in the Republic of Niger. Employing Power Theory and Geoeconomic Theory, the study uses a qualitative literature review and analysis of official documents, policy reports, and academic works to trace causal relationships between Russia’s strategic pivot toward Africa and the revival of military coups in Francophone West Africa. The examination yields three core insights: first, Russia’s avoidance of sanctions via gold purchases, grain exports, and private military deployments has established alternative patronage channels that fundamentally changed the risk-reward calculations of Nigerien military leaders; second, the securitization of energy infrastructure, especially the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline, has made Niger a geo-economic hotspot where rival major powers destabilize rather than stabilize; third, Russian diplomatic support at the UN Security Council and narrative campaigns undermining Western influence encouraged the junta to resist ECOWAS and AU demands for democratization. The article recommends three responses: targeted sanctions on Russian intermediaries, a performance-based incentive approach for Sahelian countries, and binding governance provisions in energy agreements. The study concludes that Western conditionality strategies have failed because Russia provides unconditional security assurances, and rectifying this underlying reality is critical to preventing coups.

Keywords: Political economy, Russian sanctions evasion, military coup, Niger Republic, Power Theory, Geoeconomic Theory

Introduction

The renewed surge of military coups in Francophone West Africa since 2020, culminating in the July 2023 ouster of President Mohamed Bazoum in Niger, poses a formidable challenge to democratic rule and regional stability. Nine successful coups across six countries from 2020 to 2023 represent the highest rate of unconstitutional power turnovers worldwide, turning the Sahel into what academics call the “coup belt” (Chin & Kirkpatrick, 2023). While existing research extensively documents internal factors like fragile democratic systems, pervasive corruption, ineffective governance, poverty, youth unemployment, and militant insurgencies (Akinola & Makombe, 2024; Oladoyin et al., 2024), a notable gap persists: the limited assessment of how Russia’s evasion of Western sanctions after the February 2022 Ukraine invasion has forged alternative patronage structures that fundamentally shift the incentives for military elites to take power.

The February 2022 Russian offensive in Ukraine prompted sweeping Western sanctions targeting Russia’s financial system, energy exports, and global market access (Götz & Kaas, 2024). In response, Moscow pursued a strategic shift toward the Global South, especially Africa, seeking new markets, diplomatic allies, and economic lifelines. This pivot has been most impactful in the Sahel, where Russia, via the Wagner Group (renamed Africa Corps), offers military juntas a “resource-for-security” exchange: steadfast regime protection, combat support, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic advocacy at the United Nations Security Council in return for gold mining contracts, uranium access, and political alignment (Marten, 2022). The Nigerien junta’s expulsion of French forces, cancellation of uranium deals, and alignment with Russia shortly after the July 2023 coup typify this transactional model. The lack of a cohesive Russia-China bloc, as cautioned in this study, does not diminish the importance of Russian involvement. China focuses on long-term infrastructure investment and trade through platforms such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, while Russia pursues short-term security-for-resources deals and anti-Western disruption through opaque military firms (Götz & Kaas, 2024). Their interests occasionally converge in UN votes but reflect distinct strategic rationales. Drawing this analytical boundary is crucial for illuminating the specific modalities of Russian influence addressed in this study.

This study investigates three primary issues. First, it explores how Russia’s avoidance of Western sanctions through gold trading, grain exports, fuel transactions, and military contracts has enabled coup regimes to endure economic isolation. Second, it examines how the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline (NMGP) a Western-sponsored energy project aimed at decreasing European reliance on Russian gas emerged as a sovereignty flashpoint weaponised by the junta to justify the coup. Third, it assesses how Russian diplomatic backing and narrative campaigns have emboldened military factions to withstand ECOWAS and the African Union’s pressure for democratisation. Without grasping these causal mechanisms, policy responses will remain ineffective. The article contends that the Niger coup was not merely a domestic anomaly but the predictable result of systemic stress in a peripheral state during a hegemonic transition, in which Russian patronage crucially alters the cost-benefit analysis of unconstitutional power grabs. The argument is presented as a probabilistic statement about enabling factors, not a deterministic claim of inevitability.

Objectives of the Study

This article pursues three core objectives:

Objective One: To critically examine the mechanisms through which Russia’s evasion of Western sanctions following the 2022 Ukraine invasion created alternative patronage networks that altered the strategic calculus of military elites in the Niger Republic prior to the July 2023 coup.

Objective Two: To analyse the role of the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline as a geo-economic flashpoint that translated great power competition into local political grievances, thereby increasing Niger’s vulnerability to military intervention.

Objective Three: To evaluate the extent to which Russian diplomatic cover, narrative warfare, and alternative trade arrangements helped the Nigerien junta resist regional and international pressures for democratic transition. The article proposes evidence-based solutions to address this structural condition.

Conceptual Review

Hegemonic Contestation

Hegemonic contestation is the competition among dominant states for superiority and strategic leverage (Cox, 1983; Wallerstein, 2004). In contrast to Cold War-era ideological disputes, modern contestation is driven by pragmatic geo-economic and military instruments—private military companies, asymmetric diplomacy, disinformation, and security-for-resource deals (Marten, 2022; Lellou, 2024). West Africa is the site of intense contestation because it holds critical resources, spans Atlantic shipping routes, and serves as a frontline in counterterrorism. While hegemonic contestation does not directly cause coups, it cultivates an environment where internal grievances may precipitate power seizures. Markers include foreign aid, arms transfers, military training programs, UN voting patterns, and diplomatic visits.

Geo-economic Competition

Geo-economics, as Edward Luttwak (1990) describes, is in conflict with the grammar of commerce. States pursue goals through trade, investment, infrastructure, sanctions, and resource extraction. After the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, geo-economic competition in West Africa’s Sahel intensified. Europe’s need to reduce its reliance on Russian gas has heightened the importance of West African energy infrastructure. The Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline became key (Goldthau & Sitter, 2022). Russia backs the rival Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, preferred by Algeria, and supports Sahelian juntas militarily. Russia also buys gold from coup regimes to avoid sanctions. Geo-economic competition increases instability: each pipeline raises the stakes, and each power wants more influence.

Military Coup d’État

A military coup d’état is the swift, unlawful, and overt takeover of power by military or security factions, displacing the standing executive and suspending constitutional authority (Powell & Thyne, 2011). Coups differ from other forms of regime change (revolution, civil war, electoral defeat) in their rapid execution, secrecy, and reliance on state security forces. In Niger, the July 2023 coup was carried out by the Presidential Guard, an elite unit with direct access to President Bazoum, exemplifying the “praetorian” vulnerability of West African nations, where the leader’s personal security forces become independent political actors (Albrecht et al., 2021). After a coup, juntas typically legitimise their actions by citing corruption, insecurity, poor economic management, and allegations of foreign domination. These narratives resonate with citizens frustrated by decades of unmet development expectations.

Alternative Patronage Networks

Alternative patronage networks refer to the economic, military, and diplomatic support provided to African regimes by non-Western powers, principally Russia, but also China and Turkey, as a substitute for traditional Western aid and security cooperation (Götz & Kaas, 2024; Marten, 2022). Unlike Western conditional aid (tied to democratic governance, human rights, and anti-corruption benchmarks), Russian support is unconditional: the Wagner Group/Africa Corps provides regime protection without governance lectures; Russia buys gold at premium prices, circumventing sanctions; and Russia offers diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council, using its veto power to block anti-coup resolutions. For military juntas, alternative patronage networks fundamentally alter the risk-reward calculus of seizing power: they provide a safety net that did not exist during the unipolar era. Operational indicators include documented Russian gold purchases, Wagner’s deployment, UN vetoes, and reported grain and fertiliser supplies that circumvent sanctions.

Sanctions Circumvention

Sanctions circumvention refers to the strategies and mechanisms through which targeted states or entities evade the economic restrictions imposed by international actors (Götz & Kaas, 2024). Following the 2022 Ukraine invasion, Western powers imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia, freezing approximately $300 billion of central bank assets, restricting access to SWIFT, banning energy imports, and sanctioning key oligarchs and industries. Russia’s response included a strategic pivot toward non-Western markets, particularly Africa, where it found willing partners in coup-affected states. Mechanisms of circumvention include: gold purchases from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger at above-market prices, often routed through intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates; grain and fertiliser supplies redirected from traditional markets to African juntas; fuel and arms deals denominated in currencies other than the US dollar; and the use of private military companies as state proxies. These mechanisms weaken the intended pressure of sanctions.

Narrative Warfare

Narrative warfare refers to the strategic use of information, disinformation, and propaganda to shape public opinion, delegitimise opponents, and create permissive environments for political action (Atlantic Council DFRLab, 2023). Russian narrative warfare in Francophone Africa systematically amplifies anti-French, anti-US themes: “France loots uranium,” “Western aid is neo-colonial,” “democracies are corrupt puppet regimes.” These narratives are disseminated through state-sponsored media (RT, Sputnik), social media bot networks, and local influencers. Digital forensic research has documented coordinated campaigns peaking around coups in Mali (2020), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023). The mechanism operates by eroding public trust in democratic institutions: citizens who believe their elected president is a foreign puppet are more likely to support or tolerate a coup. Narrative warfare legitimises juntas as “anti-imperial sovereign actors” while delegitimising civilian governments as Western puppets.

Review of Related Studies

Marten’s (2022) RAND Corporation study provides the most comprehensive empirical analysis of the Wagner Group as an instrument of Russian statecraft. Using open-source intelligence from conflict zones in Libya and the Central African Republic, Marten dissects the “resources-for-security” model: Wagner exchanges security services, combat support, regime protection, training, and intelligence for lucrative mining concessions (gold, diamonds, uranium). The study demonstrates that Wagner operates as a de facto arm of the Russian state, enabling low-cost, deniable power projection while generating revenue that helps circumvent Western sanctions. Marten concludes that Wagner is not merely a private military company but a “quasi-state agent of influence.” The relevance to the present study is foundational: it provides the empirical backbone for understanding Russia’s primary economic interest in West Africa. The study shows that Russian engagement is not altruistic but a calculated, transactional calculus: security for resources, a model directly replicated in Niger following the July 2023 coup.

Goldthau and Sitter (2022) examine the European Union’s energy policy shift following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Using policy analysis of EU documents, official statements, and market reports, the authors argue that REPowerEU, the EU’s plan to end reliance on Russian fossil fuels before 2030, is not merely an energy policy but a fundamental geostrategic imperative. The urgent need to diversify away from Russian natural gas, which had accounted for approximately 40% of EU imports before the war, dramatically elevated the strategic importance of alternative suppliers, including African gas producers. The study finds that this shift has forced the EU into a more overtly geo-economic role, leveraging its market power to influence the politics of supplier regions. The relevance to the present study is direct: it explains why the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline, a languishing project, was rapidly transformed into a strategic imperative, making Niger a target of great power competition and politically vulnerable.

The International Crisis Group’s (2023) report provides the most detailed field-based analysis of the coup’s immediate causes. Drawing on confidential interviews with Nigerien military officers, political figures, and civil society actors, the report identifies profound military grievances as primary drivers: operational overstretch, high casualty rates, perceived government incompetence, and a view that French counter-terrorism forces had been ineffective while infringing on Nigerien sovereignty. The report concludes that these internal security failures created a climate of desperation within the military. However, the ICG’s most important finding for the present study is that while the coup’s cause was endogenously rooted in genuine military grievances, the solution sought by the coup plotters, a decisive break from France and rapid alignment with Russia, was a direct consequence of the geopolitical contest, where the availability of an attractive alternative partner fundamentally altered strategic calculus.

Lebovich’s (2023) analysis for the European Council on Foreign Relations examines the specific mechanisms through which external alignment became a coup trigger. Lebovich argues that President Bazoum’s deepening Western alignment, epitomised by close security partnerships with France and the United States, support for the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline, and role as a linchpin of European counter-terrorism strategy, made him a political target. The study finds that the junta successfully framed this alignment as a betrayal of Nigerien sovereignty, portraying Bazoum as a puppet of Western neo-colonial interests. This framing, Lebovich demonstrates, was not organically generated but systematically amplified by Russian disinformation campaigns active in Francophone Africa for years. The study concludes that the coup represents a violent reaction against entanglement in a Western-centric order. The relevance is profound: it provides the precise causal mechanism linking macro-level geo-economic competition to the micro-level political rupture.

Chin and Kirkpatrick (2023) analyse the explosion of coup activity in Africa between August 2020 and November 2022, during which eleven coup attempts occurred, including seven successful seizures of power. They argue that coup-struck countries share three characteristics: they are disproportionately poor, even by African standards; they have a recent history of coups (a “coup trap”); and they face ongoing challenges to democratic consolidation. Importantly, the authors find that Islamist insurgencies have helped precipitate recent coups in West Africa, specifically in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, but not elsewhere, suggesting that the security crisis in the Sahel is a critical contextual factor that interacts with governance deficits. The relevance to the present study is that it situates the Niger coup within the broader regional pattern of coup contagion and democratic backsliding, showing that military interventions could succeed, survive ECOWAS sanctions, and pivot toward Russian patronage.

Götz and Kaas’s (2024) International Affairs study provides the most up-to-date analysis of Russia’s Africa policy following the 2022 Ukraine invasion. The authors identify three major conclusions: Russia is engaged in a concerted effort to maintain and extend its politico-military influence on the continent; the primary drivers of this policy are aspirations of great power status, geopolitical considerations, and commercial interests; and Russia has been able to convert its activism on the continent into political influence, at least to some extent. The study demonstrates that Russia employs a range of relatively cheap but effective policy instruments: security assistance, weapons transfers, information operations, and diplomatic leverage. The relevance to the present study is comprehensive: it provides the theoretical and empirical framework for understanding Russia’s strategic reorientation toward Africa as a direct response to Western sanctions, and how this reorientation manifests in coup-affected states.

Theoretical Framework

Power Theory

Power Theory, rooted in the classical realist tradition of Hans Morgenthau (1948) and Thucydides, posits that power is the primary driver of state behaviour in the international system because states operate in an anarchic environment where no overarching authority enforces rules or maintains order. In this context, power becomes the key determinant of a state’s ability to pursue its interests and ensure its survival. Morgenthau expands the definition of power beyond military might to encompass economic strength, cultural influence, and diplomatic prowess. The core tenets of Power Theory are: the centrality of power as the fundamental concept in international relations; the state-centric approach emphasising nation-states as primary actors; anarchy in the international system requiring self-help; the balance of power as an inherent outcome of power politics; relative gains (how states fare compared to others) rather than absolute gains; and the security dilemma where actions taken to increase security often lead to increased insecurity for others, creating cycles of mistrust.

Power Theory provides a robust framework for analysing Russia’s strategic reorientation toward Africa following Western sanctions. Facing unprecedented economic isolation, Russia sought to maximise its relative power by securing new markets, diplomatic allies, and access to resources. West Africa, particularly resource-rich Niger, became an arena for this power projection. Russia’s provision of unconditional security assistance to juntas serves multiple power-maximising objectives: it generates revenue from gold and uranium deals that circumvent sanctions; it secures strategic access to critical minerals; it establishes a foothold that creates dependencies and ensures prolonged influence; and it undermines Western (particularly French) influence, thereby enhancing Russia’s relative position. For Nigerien military elites, the availability of Russian support fundamentally altered their power calculus. Before Russia’s emergence as an alternative patron, seizing power entailed high costs: international isolation, aid cuts, sanctions, and likely failure. With a Russian safety net, the calculus changed fundamentally. The junta could seize power knowing that Russia would provide diplomatic cover (UN veto), economic alternatives (gold purchases), security guarantees (Wagner protection), and legitimacy narratives (anti-imperial framing). Power Theory thus explains both Russia’s supply of alternative patronage and the junta’s demand for it.

Geoeconomic Theory

Geoeconomic Theory, pioneered by Edward Luttwak (1990) and developed by scholars such as Wigell (2016) and Scholvin (2016), argues that economic instruments have replaced military confrontation as the primary tools of statecraft in the twenty-first century. Luttwak defined geo-economics as the “logic of conflict with the grammar of commerce,” where states pursue strategic objectives through trade, investment, sanctions, infrastructure development, and resource extraction. Unlike traditional geopolitics, which emphasises territorial control and military power, geo-economics focuses on how states weaponise economic interdependence for strategic advantage. Key concepts include “weaponised interdependence” (Farrell & Newman, 2019), in which states exploit their positions in global economic networks to coerce others; resource securitisation, in which critical minerals and energy supplies become matters of national security; and sanctions as instruments of statecraft. Geoeconomic Theory holds that, in a globalised world, economic power is as influential as military power in shaping international outcomes.

Geoeconomic Theory explains how the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline transformed from a commercial venture into a strategic imperative. Following the Ukraine invasion, Europe’s need to diversify away from Russian gas dramatically increased the NMGP’s importance. The pipeline became a Western geo-economic weapon to reduce Russian energy leverage, while Russia countered by backing the rival Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline and offering military support to Sahelian juntas. For Niger, a landlocked transit state, this geo-economic competition proved destabilising. The Bazoum government’s alignment with the NMGP, a Western-oriented project, was framed by the junta as a betrayal of sovereignty, providing a legitimising narrative for the coup. Post-coup, the junta weaponised the pipeline’s uncertainty as a bargaining chip, extracting concessions from both Western and Russian blocs. Geoeconomic Theory also explains Russia’s circumvention of sanctions through gold purchases, grain supplies, and fuel deals as economic instruments that directly undermine Western coercive measures. The theory illuminates how Russia uses its economic leverage (resource purchases, trade deals) to gain political influence in coup-affected states, and how Niger’s peripheral position as a resource-exporting state makes it vulnerable to such geo-economic manipulation.

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative literature review and content analysis, appropriate for investigating the complex causal mechanisms linking Russian sanctions evasion to military coups in the Republic of Niger. The research design is exploratory and explanatory, seeking to identify causal factors and outcomes of the target phenomena, specifically addressing the “why” and “how” questions related to geo-economic contestation and military coups. The case study design focuses on Niger as a bounded system, enabling in-depth, contextual analysis of the complex interactions between global power dynamics and local political outcomes.

Data Sources: The study draws exclusively on secondary sources, including peer-reviewed journal articles (from databases including JSTOR, Web of Science, Scopus, and Google Scholar), policy reports from think tanks (International Crisis Group, RAND Corporation, Atlantic Council), official documents (ECOWAS communiqués, EU External Action Service reports, African Union Peace and Security Council decisions, UN Security Council voting records), and open-source intelligence reports. The temporal scope covers 2020–2025, encompassing the intensified period of Russian engagement in Africa following the Ukraine invasion and the subsequent wave of coups.

Analytical Procedure: Content analysis was employed following a six-phase thematic analysis process (Braun & Clarke, 2006): familiarisation with the data through repeated reading; initial coding according to categories derived from the research objectives; theme development grouping codes into larger analytical themes; theme review to ensure internal coherence and relevance; theme definition specifying the scope and content of each analytical theme; and report writing organising findings according to the thematic structure. Process tracing was employed to establish causal chains linking specific events, Russian disinformation campaigns, Bazoum’s NMGP advocacy, Tchiani’s threatened dismissal, and reported Russian contacts to the coup outcome. Triangulation was achieved through the convergence of multiple documentary sources. The study acknowledges limitations inherent to secondary research: reliance on publicly available data that may omit covert geopolitical manoeuvres; potential bias in policy reports from think tanks with institutional affiliations; and the inability to conduct primary interviews with Nigerien military elites or Russian operatives. However, triangulation across multiple independent sources mitigates these limitations, and the study’s findings are presented as probabilistic inferences rather than definitive causal claims.

Discussion of Findings

Russian Sanctions Evasion and Altered Military Calculus

The analysis reveals that Russia’s circumvention of Western sanctions following the 2022 Ukraine invasion created alternative patronage networks that fundamentally altered the strategic calculus of Nigerien military elites prior to the July 2023 coup. Three specific mechanisms were identified.

First, resource-for-security deals directly align Russian economic interests with junta survival. A documentary analysis of gold trade data (UN Comtrade, 2024) shows that gold exports from coup-affected Sahelian states to the United Arab Emirates, a known Russian transhipment hub, increased sharply after the coup, while reported exports to Russia remained low, suggesting sanction circumvention. As a political economist cited in thematic analysis noted: “Russia buys gold from the junta at premium prices, often using front companies to circumvent sanctions. The junta gets hard currency; Russia gets resources to fund its war in Ukraine and weaken Western influence” (PE4). This mechanism addresses the critical gap identified in the literature: while Marten (2022) documented Wagner’s operations, she did not quantify how resource flows embolden coup plotters. The Niger case shows that knowledge of Russian willingness to purchase gold at above-market rates circulated within military networks months before July 2023, influencing risk assessment.

Second, unconditional security assistance from the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) lowered the perceived costs of executing a coup. Unlike Western security partnerships, which tied aid to democratic governance benchmarks, human rights compliance, and electoral timelines, Russian support imposed no such conditions. A high-ranking military scholar stated, “Western conditionality feels like neo-colonial micromanagement. Russian unconditional support feels like respect for sovereignty. That difference is exploited by juntas to justify unconstitutional seizures” (HMS2). The International Crisis Group (2023) confirmed that while the coup’s cause was endogenously rooted in military grievances, the solution sought a break from France and alignment with Russia was a direct consequence of the geopolitical contest. Russia’s offer of a “turnkey solution” (trainers, combat support, intelligence, regime protection) with no governance lectures fundamentally altered the risk-reward calculus.

Third, Russian grain, fertiliser, and fuel supplies circumvented ECOWAS sanctions, providing economic lifelines. Following the July 2023 coup, ECOWAS imposed comprehensive sanctions: border closures, asset freezes, aid suspensions, and a no-fly zone. These measures caused significant economic hardship, including food price increases and medicine shortages. However, Russian intervention mitigated the sanctions’ political impact. Russia redirected wheat shipments originally destined for other African markets to Niger via alternative logistics routes through Algeria or Libya. Russian state-owned or state-affiliated companies supplied fuel and fertiliser. As one diplomat noted: “ECOWAS sanctions shut borders and froze assets. Russia simply rerouted wheat shipments and offered to buy gold at above-market prices. The junta could point to Russia as a lifeline” (D6). This mechanism transforms the junta into a “victim of Western aggression” in domestic discourse, consolidating support through nationalist narratives.

Causal chain established: The documentary and interview evidence supports a clear causal sequence: (1) Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggers Western sanctions; (2) Russia pivots to Africa seeking new partners and markets; (3) Russian intermediaries signal willingness to provide unconditional security and economic support to coup regimes; (4) Nigerien military officers, particularly General Tchiani’s presidential guard faction, factor this knowledge into their calculations; (5) When Bazoum threatens to dismiss Tchiani, the plotters execute the coup, anticipating Russian backing; (6) Post-coup, Russia delivers on its promises gold purchases, grain supplies, Wagner deployment enabling junta survival. This chain directly fills the gap identified in the literature: no prior study systematically traced the circulation of knowledge of Russian alternative patronage within Nigerien military networks before the coup.

The Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline as a Geo-Economic Flashpoint

The analysis demonstrates that the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline (NMGP) served as a critical mediating variable, translating great power competition into local political grievances and thereby increasing Niger’s vulnerability to military intervention. Three interconnected mechanisms were identified.

First, the pipeline operated as a sovereignty flashpoint. The NMGP’s strategic purpose, diversifying European energy away from Russian gas following the 2022 Ukraine invasion, made it inherently anti-Russian and pro-Western. President Bazoum championed the pipeline, positioning Niger as a critical transit state for European energy security. The junta successfully framed this alignment as a betrayal of sovereignty. A political economist explained: “The junta framed Bazoum’s support for the NMGP as a betrayal of sovereignty. They said: ‘He is selling our country to France and Europe while we die from jihadist attacks.’ The pipeline became a symbol of everything wrong with Western-aligned governance” (PE1). Documentary analysis of CNSP media publications confirmed that the junta’s statements repeatedly invoked “foreign economic exploitation” and “subservience to European interests” without naming the NMGP explicitly, indicating a deliberate narrative strategy.

Second, the pipeline functioned as a bargaining chip for the junta post-coup. Participants revealed that the Nigerien junta did not formally exit NMGP negotiations; rather, it weaponised the project’s uncertainty. A diplomat noted: “The junta tells France and the US: ‘Restore our uranium revenue terms and recognise our regime, and maybe we stay in Western orbit.’ They tell Russia: ‘Support our junta, and we will favour the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline over the NMGP.’ The pipeline competition enables coup-proofing” (D4). This finding directly addresses the gap identified by Lebovich (2023), who noted that the NMGP’s strategic importance created leverage for juntas but did not specify the mechanisms of bargaining. The present analysis shows that the junta actively uses the pipeline as a diplomatic and economic bargaining chip, extracting concessions from both blocs.

Third, the pipeline acted as a catalyst for intensified external patronage competition. The NMGP’s strategic value, replacing Russian gas in European markets, ensured that both Western and Russian-aligned actors would compete fiercely for influence over transit states. A think-tank analyst stated: “The pipeline raises the stakes. Every external power wants a say in who controls Niger. That emboldens factions to seize power, knowing they will find a patron” (TA1). Documentary analysis of the African Union Infrastructure Map and Global Energy Monitor (2023) confirmed that the NMGP’s planned route through Niger places the country at the centre of competing energy corridors. The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP), favoured by Algeria and Russia, follows a similar route through Niger, creating a direct rivalry between Western-backed (NMGP) and Russian-backed (TSGP) projects.

Counterfactual reasoning: The analysis supports the inference that, absent the NMGP’s strategic importance, Niger would have been less vulnerable to coup-enabling external competition. The pipeline’s prospective transit fees (estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars annually) created a material incentive for external actors to cultivate influence over whoever controlled Niger’s government. This incentive structure did not cause the coup, but it raised the stakes, making Niger a more attractive target for Russian patronage and a more high-stakes arena for Western engagement. The causal pathway runs: Ukraine war → European energy diversification → NMGP elevation → Bazoum alignment → junta framing of alignment as betrayal → coup legitimation → pipeline as post-coup bargaining chip. This chain demonstrates that the NMGP was not merely a technical infrastructure project but a geopolitical weapon whose symbolic meaning was weaponised by the junta to legitimise the coup.

Russian Emboldening of Junta Resistance and Solutions

The analysis confirms that Russian diplomatic cover, narrative warfare, and alternative trade arrangements have fundamentally enabled the Nigerien junta to resist regional and international pressures for democratic transitions. Four specific enabling mechanisms were identified, followed by three evidence-based solutions.

Mechanism one: Diplomatic cover at the United Nations Security Council. Russia has used its veto power repeatedly to block or dilute resolutions that would condemn coups, authorise interventions, or impose comprehensive sanctions. A diplomat stated: “The junta in Niger knows that any UN resolution threatening intervention will be vetoed by Russia. That removes a major source of international pressure” (D6). Documentary analysis of UN Security Council voting records (UN, 2023) confirmed that Russia consistently opposed resolutions critical of Sahelian juntas. Beyond the UN, Russia normalises junta rule through high-level bilateral visits and summits. As a think-tank analyst noted: “When President Putin invites a junta leader to Moscow for a state visit, that leader is no longer a pariah; he is a legitimate head of state. That emboldens other officers to attempt coups” (TA3).

Mechanism two: Economic alternatives and sanction circumvention. Western powers and ECOWAS impose economic sanctions to pressure juntas toward democratic transitions. Russia offers alternative trade arrangements: wheat, fertiliser, fuel, and military equipment in exchange for gold and uranium. A political economist explained: “Russia buys gold from the junta at premium prices, often using front companies to circumvent sanctions. The junta gets hard currency; Russia gets resources to fund its war in Ukraine” (PE1). A documentary analysis of trade data (UN Comtrade, 2024) revealed that gold exports from Mali and Burkina Faso to the UAE increased sharply after the coup, suggesting sanctions circumvention. This mechanism enables juntas to survive economically despite Western sanctions.

Mechanism three: Security guarantees and coup-proofing. Russian private military companies provide regime protection services that make counter-coups and popular uprisings difficult. A high-ranking military scholar stated, “Wagner protects the junta leadership from internal rivals. They secure the presidential palace, provide close protection for key officers, and train a parallel security force loyal to the junta rather than the state” (HMS4). This mechanism directly enables coup execution by assuring would-be coup plotters that they will survive after seizing power. It also impedes democratic transitions by making it costly to remove the junta. As one parliamentarian noted: “ECOWAS threatened military intervention in Niger. The junta’s response was: ‘We have Russian allies. Try it.’ That threat deterred intervention” (P2).

Mechanism four: Legitimacy narratives and ideological justification. Russia provides juntas with a powerful ideological framing: they are not illegitimate coup leaders but “anti-imperialist sovereign actors” fighting back against “neo-colonial exploitation.” A journalist observed: “The junta in Niger presents itself as completing decolonisation. France is the colonial oppressor; Russia is the liberator. That narrative resonates with populations tired of French paternalism” (J1). The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (2023) documented that anti-French hashtags and pro-junta messages spiked precisely around the Niger coup, with patterns consistent with Russian information operations. This narrative emboldens military factions by providing moral justification for seizing power.

Solution One: Targeted Sanctions Against Russian Intermediaries. ECOWAS and the African Union should move away from comprehensive, population-harming sanctions toward targeted financial sanctions specifically designed to disrupt Russian intermediary networks. This includes: establishing a joint ECOWAS-AU monitoring unit to track gold and uranium exports from coup-affected states to countries acting as Russian conduits (e.g., UAE, Central African Republic); imposing secondary sanctions on companies and financial institutions knowingly facilitating resource-for-security deals with Wagner/Africa Corps; creating a “designated persons” list of Russian PMC operatives, their local proxies, and gold purchasers, with asset freezes and travel bans enforceable across all ECOWAS and AU member states. These measures must be accompanied by a transparent exemption mechanism for humanitarian goods. Implementing body: ECOWAS Commission, African Union Peace and Security Council, and member state financial intelligence units.

Solution Two: Performance-Based Incentive Framework. The United States and European Union should replace ex-ante conditionality (aid contingent on governance reforms) with a transparent, performance-based incentive framework operating on an “earn back” principle. Specific, measurable milestones would trigger pre-announced aid disbursements, technical assistance, and security cooperation. Milestones should be locally determined through inclusive national dialogues to reduce perceptions of neo-colonial interference. Examples include: reduction in civilian casualties from military operations; passage of anti-corruption legislation with verified implementation; concrete steps toward professionalising military promotion systems; and verifiable reductions in jihadist-controlled territory. The framework must include a rapid-response mechanism: when a state meets a milestone, aid is disbursed within 30 days. Implementing body: US Department of State, USAID, European External Action Service.

Solution Three: Binding Governance Clauses in Energy Infrastructure Agreements. The Nigerian and Moroccan governments, as co-sponsors of the NMGP, must embed binding governance and anti-coup clauses into all intergovernmental agreements and contracts with transit states. These clauses should include: a “democratic continuity” provision stipulating that transit fee payments and related benefits are suspended immediately upon any unconstitutional change of government, with resumption only after internationally verified restoration of constitutional order; an “anti-patronage” clause prohibiting host governments from granting resource concessions to Russian PMCs or sanctioned entities along the pipeline corridor; and a transparency requirement that all pipeline-related revenues be deposited into independently audited sovereign wealth accounts with civil society oversight. These clauses would deter future coup attempts by raising the cost of seizure, as juntas would lose immediate transit revenues. Implementing body: Nigerian National Petroleum Company, Moroccan National Office of Hydrocarbons and Mines, ECOWAS Energy Protocol Secretariat.

Recommendations

Targeted Financial Sanctions Against Russian Intermediary Networks. ECOWAS and the African Union should immediately establish a joint monitoring unit to track gold, uranium, and other resource exports from coup-affected states to countries acting as Russian conduits (the UAE, Central African Republic, and Sudan). Secondary sanctions should be imposed on companies and financial institutions that knowingly facilitate resource-for-security deals with the Wagner Group/Africa Corps. A “designated persons” list of Russian PMC operatives, local proxies, and gold purchasers must be created, with asset freezes and travel bans enforceable across all ECOWAS and AU member states. A transparent humanitarian exemption mechanism is essential to avoid civilian harm. Implementing bodies: ECOWAS Commission, African Union Peace and Security Council, and member state financial intelligence units. Justification: This directly addresses the finding that blanket sanctions failed because Russia provided alternative economic lifelines; targeted measures disrupt the specific networks enabling junta survival.

Performance-Based Incentive Framework for Sahelian States. The United States and the European Union should abandon ex-ante conditionality (aid contingent on governance reforms) and establish a performance-based framework in which specific, measurable, locally determined milestones trigger pre-announced aid disbursements. Milestones include: reduction in civilian casualties from military operations (verified by independent observers); passage of anti-corruption legislation with verified implementation; concrete steps toward depoliticising military promotions; and verifiable reductions in jihadist-controlled territory. Aid must be disbursed within 30 days of milestone verification to demonstrate immediate reward for progress. Implementing bodies: US Department of State, USAID, European External Action Service. Justification: This addresses the finding that Western conditional aid generated military resentment and was perceived as neo-colonial interference; performance-based incentives reward progress rather than punishing non-compliance.

Binding Governance Clauses in Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline Agreements. Nigeria and Morocco must embed binding governance and anti-coup clauses into all NMGP agreements with transit states. Clauses must include: “democratic continuity” suspension of transit fees upon any unconstitutional change of government, with resumption only after restoration of constitutional order; “anti-patronage” prohibition on granting resource concessions to Russian PMCs or sanctioned entities along the pipeline corridor; and transparency requirements mandating pipeline revenues be deposited into independently audited sovereign wealth accounts with civil society oversight. Implementing bodies: Nigerian National Petroleum Company, Moroccan National Office of Hydrocarbons and Mines, ECOWAS Energy Protocol Secretariat. Justification: This directly addresses the finding that the NMGP became a coup-enabling flashpoint; governance clauses raise the cost of seizure by ensuring juntas lose immediate transit revenues.

Contribution to Knowledge

This article makes three original contributions to the political economy of hegemonic contestation, Russian sanctions evasion, and military coups in peripheral states.

First, empirical synthesis of Russian sanctions evasion as a coup-enabling mechanism. While prior studies documented Russian engagement in the Sahel (Marten, 2022) and analysed sanctions effects (Götz & Kaas, 2024), no prior synthesis systematically traced the causal chain linking Russia’s post-2022 strategic pivot to the altered calculus of Nigerien military elites. This article synthesises documentary evidence from gold trade data, UN voting records, and policy reports to establish that knowledge of Russian willingness to provide unconditional support circulated within military networks months before the July 2023 coup, lowering perceived costs of seizure.

Second, the NMGP is a geo-economic coup-enabling variable. While energy infrastructure projects are typically studied through technical or economic lenses (Eweje & Akonumbo, 2023), this article uniquely synthesises evidence demonstrating that the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline functioned as a sovereignty flashpoint, a bargaining chip, and a catalyst for external competition. This reframes infrastructure geopolitics in fragile states, showing that prospective pipelines can destabilise even before construction begins.

Third, articulation of the “emboldening effect” of Russian alternative patronage. The article theorises and synthesises evidence demonstrating how Russian patronage networks, diplomatic cover (UN veto), economic alternatives (gold-for-wheat), security guarantees (Wagner deployment), and legitimacy narratives (anti-imperial framing) fundamentally alter the bargaining power between juntas and international actors, rendering traditional conditionality ineffective. This contributes to theorising international pressure in multipolar contexts and offers three evidence-based solutions for breaking the coup-patronage cycle.

Ethical Usage of Artificial Intelligence

The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in this study was strictly governed by principles of transparency, accountability, and academic integrity. AI tools (specifically Google Scholar AI for literature identification, Grammarly for language refinement, and NVivo’s automated coding suggestions for thematic organisation) were used only as assistive aids, not as substitutes for human analytical judgment. The researcher conducted all thematic coding, pattern identification, causal interpretation, and theoretical engagement manually, cross-checking AI-generated summaries against raw source documents to prevent algorithmic bias or hallucination. No AI tool was employed to generate original findings, draw conclusions, or replace the researcher’s theoretical engagement. The researcher acknowledges that AI may perpetuate biases present in training data; to mitigate this, outputs were critically evaluated against the study’s theoretical frameworks (Power Theory and Geoeconomic Theory) and triangulated across multiple documentary sources. All final analytical claims remain the sole responsibility of the researcher. This research did not use AI for automated decision-making regarding source selection, analytical categorisation, or conclusion drawing.

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