Talya İşcan

PhD Candidate
Professor and Researcher
Universidad Iberoamericana
Mexico City, Mexico
ORCID: 0009-0008-7622-6424
E-mail: talyaiscan@politicas.unam.mx

Abstract

This article analyzes Georgia-Türkiye cooperation as a case of pragmatic connectivity governance and asks what Latin America can learn from it in a fragmented international order. The study combines qualitative document analysis with descriptive trade and policy evidence from official sources, international organizations and secondary literature. It argues that the political relevance of the Georgia-Türkiye relationship lies not only in bilateral trade, but also in the cumulative interaction of strategic dialogue, free trade rules, mobility facilitation, customs cooperation, transport routes and the Middle Corridor. The findings show that Türkiye has remained Georgia’s leading trade partner, that the bilateral relationship is supported by a free trade agreement and passport-free mobility through national identity documents, and that both governments frame cooperation around transport, energy, customs, and regional connectivity. For Latin America, the lesson is not to imitate the South Caucasus mechanically, but to develop non-polarized economic diplomacy based on technical cooperation, corridor governance, trade facilitation, institutional continuity and productive upgrading. The article contributes to international relations and economic diplomacy by conceptualizing pragmatic connectivity governance as a form of cooperation that allows small and middle states to build development-oriented partnerships without reducing foreign policy to ideological blocs.

Key Words: connectivity diplomacy, economic diplomacy, Georgia, Latin America, Türkiye.

 

Introduction

The international economy is increasingly organized around resilience, diversification and the search for reliable routes. These pressures do not only affect large powers. Small and middle states also use trade, infrastructure, mobility and diplomatic coordination to expand their room for maneuver. Georgia and Türkiye offer a useful case because their cooperation has developed around practical connectivity rather than a single ideological project. The relationship includes trade, free movement, transport corridors, energy routes, customs cooperation, tourism, cultural exchange and high-level political dialogue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2026; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-a).

This article studies the relationship as an example of pragmatic connectivity governance. The concept refers to a mode of international cooperation in which states pursue concrete benefits through infrastructure, market access, mobility, technical coordination and sectoral agreements, while avoiding the reduction of foreign policy to rigid geopolitical blocs. This is important because the South Caucasus is often analyzed mainly through conflict, security competition and great-power rivalry. A connectivity approach does not deny those tensions; it asks how cooperation can persist through institutional routines and measurable development projects (Blackwill & Harris, 2016; Keohane & Nye, 2012).

The article asks a comparative question: what lessons can Latin America draw from the Georgia-Türkiye cooperation model? The answer is not that Latin American states should copy the South Caucasus experience. Geography, history and regional institutions differ. Rather, the case suggests that Latin America could benefit from more technical, corridor-based and non-polarized economic diplomacy. In a region where trade facilitation, logistics and regional productive integration remain persistent challenges, the Georgia-Türkiye experience offers a compact example of how political dialogue, mobility rules, customs procedures and infrastructure can reinforce one another (ECLAC, 2024a, 2024b).

The argument develops in three steps. First, Georgia-Türkiye cooperation works because it combines political trust with a practical architecture of trade and connectivity. Second, this architecture changes the economic value of territory, borders and routes. Third, its relevance for Latin America is methodological rather than ideological: it shows how governments can build cooperation through functional projects without turning every external relationship into a pro-Western, pro-Russian or anti-Chinese statement (Okano-Heijmans, 2011; Van Bergeijk & Moons, 2018).

Literature Review

The article draws on three strands of literature: economic diplomacy, geoeconomics and regional connectivity. Economic diplomacy is commonly defined as the use of diplomatic instruments to promote trade, investment, market access and international economic interests. It includes negotiations, commercial representation, trade agreements, intergovernmental commissions and public-private coordination. In this article, it is treated not only as export promotion, but also as the political construction of channels through which goods, people, capital, energy and information move with greater predictability (Okano-Heijmans, 2011; Van Bergeijk & Moons, 2018).

Geoeconomics adds a power dimension to this discussion. Economic instruments such as trade, investment, sanctions, infrastructure and finance are not neutral; they can shape the bargaining position of states and firms. Blackwill and Harris (2016) argue that economic tools have become central instruments of statecraft. Luttwak (1990) similarly described a shift from classical geopolitics toward a grammar of commerce, where rivalry is increasingly expressed through markets, routes and technological capacity.

Connectivity scholarship introduces the spatial dimension. Roads, railways, ports, customs systems, digital platforms, energy lines and transit corridors do not simply move goods. They reorder dependence, vulnerability and opportunity. The World Bank’s study of the Middle Corridor, for example, emphasizes that the route’s success depends not only on physical infrastructure, but also on border procedures, logistics performance, digitalization, port efficiency and coordinated investment priorities (World Bank, 2023).

The adjective pragmatic is important because cooperation does not require the absence of political disagreement. It requires the capacity to maintain limited, measurable and mutually useful projects across specific sectors. This logic resembles complex interdependence, where multiple channels connect societies and governments and where issue areas are not always subordinated to military hierarchies. The Georgia-Türkiye case illustrates this dynamic because trade, mobility, energy and transport cooperation have deepened in a regionally complex environment (Keohane & Nye, 2012; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2024a).

For Latin America, the concept helps avoid two analytical traps. The first is the assumption that external cooperation must be interpreted primarily as geopolitical alignment. The second is the belief that regional integration depends only on ambitious declarations. Pragmatic connectivity governance suggests a more operational agenda: customs simplification, border infrastructure, multimodal logistics, corridor governance, standards recognition and technical cooperation. ECLAC has repeatedly emphasized that these issues are central for Latin America’s insertion in a changing global economy (ECLAC, 2024a, 2024b).

Methodology

The article uses a qualitative case-study design supported by descriptive trade and policy evidence. The case-study strategy is appropriate because the objective is not to estimate causal effects econometrically, but to identify mechanisms linking political dialogue, trade rules, mobility arrangements and infrastructure. The analysis is based on official documents from the ministries of foreign affairs and trade of Georgia and Türkiye, public trade data from the National Statistics Office of Georgia, reports from the World Bank and ECLAC, and secondary literature on economic diplomacy and geoeconomics (George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2018).

The research proceeds in three steps. First, it reconstructs the institutional architecture of Georgia-Türkiye cooperation. Second, it identifies the main findings regarding trade, mobility, transport, customs cooperation and corridor governance. Third, it translates these findings into policy lessons for Latin America. The article treats the Georgia-Türkiye case as an analytical analogy rather than a model to be copied. Its purpose is to extract transferable mechanisms that may be adapted to specific Latin American contexts (Sartori, 1991; Van Bergeijk & Moons, 2018).

Table 1. Research design and evidence base

Dimension	Evidence used	Analytical function
Institutional cooperation	Official statements, strategic partnership references, high-level consultations	Identifies how political trust is routinized
Trade and rules	Free trade agreement information and 2024 trade data	Measures economic density and asymmetry
Mobility and borders	Visa-free and national-ID travel arrangements, customs cooperation	Assesses reduction of transaction costs
Connectivity governance	Middle Corridor, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and World Bank corridor evidence	Links infrastructure to regional political economy
Comparative lessons	ECLAC reports and Latin America-Türkiye institutional relations	Translates the case into policy lessons

Source: Author’s elaboration based on George and Bennett (2005), Yin (2018), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia (2024a, 2026), Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.-a, n.d.-b), National Statistics Office of Georgia (2025), World Bank (2023) and ECLAC (2024a, 2024b).

Analysis

Institutional and Trade Architecture

Türkiye recognized Georgia’s independence on 16 December 1991, and diplomatic relations were established on 21 May 1992. Since then, the relationship has acquired strategic partnership status. Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasizes that Türkiye has been Georgia’s largest trade partner since 2007 and among the leading investor countries in Georgia. It also notes the establishment of a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council to further develop bilateral relations (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-a).

This institutional history matters because economic cooperation did not emerge only from market forces. It was supported by diplomatic recognition, embassies, consular presence, high-level visits and intergovernmental mechanisms. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has similarly described recent consultations as part of a strong strategic partnership, with particular attention to trade, transport, energy, customs and regional connectivity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2026).

The trade pillar is especially visible. The free trade agreement between Türkiye and Georgia was signed on 21 November 2007 and entered into force on 1 November 2008. According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Trade, the agreement abolished customs duties on industrial products and regulates areas such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, rules of origin, competition, safeguards, anti-dumping and balance of payments. Later adjustments linking rules of origin to the pan-Euro-Mediterranean framework illustrate how bilateral trade can be connected to broader regulatory spaces (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, n.d.).

Descriptive trade data confirms the economic density of the relationship. In 2024, Georgia’s total external merchandise trade was approximately USD 23.4 billion. Türkiye was Georgia’s largest trade partner by turnover, with USD 3.228 billion, or 13.8 percent of total turnover. Georgia exported USD 458.4 million to Türkiye and imported USD 2.770 billion from Türkiye, indicating a large Georgian deficit but also a high level of commercial integration (National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2025).

The asymmetry should not be ignored. A cooperation model based mainly on imports can create dependence and limit domestic upgrading. Yet the relationship also shows that trade asymmetry does not automatically prevent deeper cooperation if it is paired with infrastructure, transit, tourism, investment and diplomatic mechanisms. For Latin America, this point is crucial: the objective should not be trade growth alone, but trade plus productive capability, standards, financing, logistics and local development (ECLAC, 2024b; National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2025).

Mobility and Corridor Governance

The mobility pillar is another distinctive feature of the relationship. Türkiye and Georgia have visa-free travel for tourism, and citizens of both countries can travel using national identity documents without a passport. This arrangement reduces friction in tourism, business travel, family mobility and everyday cross-border contact. Mobility does not automatically generate development, but it lowers transaction costs and gives the partnership a social base beyond official diplomacy (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-a, n.d.-b).

The most significant feature of the relationship is the way bilateral cooperation is embedded in a wider regional corridor logic. Georgian and Turkish officials have repeatedly highlighted transport, energy and customs cooperation. In 2024, the Georgian foreign minister’s official visit to Türkiye included discussion of strategic transit and energy projects, the transit potential of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Türkiye, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and the Middle Corridor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2024a).

The World Bank defines the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, as a multimodal route linking Chinese and European markets through Central Asia and the Caucasus. Its 2023 report argues that, with the right policies and investments, the corridor could triple trade volumes and halve travel time by 2030. The same report emphasizes logistics solutions, simplified border procedures, digitalization, stronger port performance and uniform investment prioritization (World Bank, 2023).

These recommendations help explain why the Georgia-Türkiye case is not merely bilateral. The value of a corridor depends on the weakest link. A railway is less useful if customs clearance is slow; a port is less competitive if digital tracking is fragmented; a free trade agreement is less effective if logistics costs remain high. Connectivity therefore requires a chain of complementary reforms rather than a single prestige project (ECLAC, 2024a; World Bank, 2023).

The tripartite format with Azerbaijan reinforces this corridor logic. In March 2024, the foreign ministers of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Türkiye met in Baku and emphasized cooperation in politics, trade, economy, energy, agriculture, transportation, culture and humanitarian activities. This format shows that regional projects often require a minimum coalition of states that can coordinate across borders and sectors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2024b).

Lessons for Latin America

For Latin America, the first lesson is to frame external cooperation through practical outcomes rather than bloc identity. Türkiye’s outreach to Latin America and the Caribbean has been described by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of a multidimensional foreign policy. The 1998 Action Plan for Latin America and the Caribbean, the 2006 revision of that plan, and Türkiye’s economic and trade cooperation agreements with countries in the region show that Ankara has sought institutionalized engagement beyond its immediate neighborhood (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-c).

This creates an opening for Latin American states to engage Türkiye and, indirectly, the South Caucasus through economic diplomacy. The objective would not be to replace existing relationships with the United States, China, Europe or regional partners. It would be to diversify cooperation in areas where Türkiye and Georgia have experience: logistics, customs, construction, tourism, aviation, trade offices, technical training, corridor planning and cultural cooperation (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-c; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-d).

The second lesson is to use regional platforms without overloading them ideologically. Türkiye maintains dialogue with CELAC, and the first Türkiye-CELAC Troika meeting was held on the margins of the UN General Assembly in 2013. Such mechanisms can be used for technical agendas: trade facilitation, digital customs, port modernization, disaster logistics, food corridors, health supply chains and academic cooperation (ECLAC, 2024a; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-d).

The third lesson is to evaluate corridor projects with development criteria. Latin America has corridors linking the Atlantic and Pacific, agricultural zones to ports, energy regions to industrial centers and Caribbean islands to continental supply chains. The Georgia-Türkiye case suggests that corridors should be assessed not only by kilometers of infrastructure but also by travel time, customs predictability, digital tracking, local employment, supplier development and resilience to shocks (ECLAC, 2024b; World Bank, 2023).

The fourth lesson is to manage asymmetry openly. In the Georgia-Türkiye case, Georgia’s deficit with Türkiye is substantial. Latin America should therefore approach cooperation with Türkiye and Eurasian partners through negotiated benefits: technology transfer, local content, training, financing conditions, port governance, SME access and export diversification. Connectivity should not become a synonym for importing more. It should become a platform for producing and exporting better (ECLAC, 2024b; National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2025).

Findings

The first finding is that Georgia-Türkiye cooperation converts geography into policy through institutionalization. Proximity alone does not create integration. What matters is the combination of strategic partnership, high-level councils, regular consultations, embassies, consulates and sectoral cooperation. Institutions transform proximity into routines, and routines reduce uncertainty for firms and public agencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2026; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-a).

The second finding is that trade rules and mobility rules reinforce each other. The free trade agreement lowers barriers for goods, while visa-free and national-ID travel lower barriers for people. This combination supports tourism, small business exchange, services and social familiarity. Latin American integration debates often separate trade policy from mobility policy; the Georgia-Türkiye case suggests that both are part of the same connectivity ecosystem (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-b; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade, n.d.).

The third finding is that pragmatic connectivity is compatible with geopolitical complexity. The partnership exists in a sensitive regional environment, yet official discourse repeatedly frames cooperation around trade, transport, energy, customs, peace and sustainable development. This does not remove security concerns, but it prevents the economic agenda from being entirely consumed by geopolitical polarization (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2024a, 2026).

The fourth finding is that infrastructure projects require governance, not only investment. The Middle Corridor debate shows that route competitiveness depends on border procedures, digital systems, port performance and coordination across multiple states. This finding is particularly relevant for Latin America, where the political symbolism of integration is often stronger than the technical implementation of customs, logistics and standards harmonization (ECLAC, 2024a; World Bank, 2023).

Table 2. Findings and relevance for Latin America

Finding from Georgia-Türkiye case	Why it matters	Transferable lesson for Latin America
Institutions convert proximity into cooperation	Strategic councils and consultations reduce uncertainty	Create permanent, technical and sectoral mechanisms rather than summit declarations
Trade and mobility work together	Goods, business travel, tourism and people-to-people links reinforce each other	Pair trade agreements with mobility, customs and service-sector facilitation
Connectivity can be non-polarized	Projects can be framed as development and logistics rather than bloc alignment	Use neutral language: corridors, resilience, trade facilitation and local development
Corridors require governance	Infrastructure fails when customs and digital systems are weak	Invest in single windows, interoperable data and border coordination
Asymmetry remains a risk	Trade growth can coexist with deficits and dependence	Link connectivity to local suppliers, SMEs, technology and productive upgrading

Source: Author’s elaboration based on Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Trade (n.d.), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia (2024a, 2026), National Statistics Office of Georgia (2025), World Bank (2023) and ECLAC (2024a, 2024b).

Discussion

A central value of the Georgia-Türkiye case is that it permits analysis without forcing a binary geopolitical narrative. The relationship can be understood through development, connectivity and mutual economic interest. Türkiye’s support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is part of the political relationship, but the practical cooperation agenda is broader: trade, customs, energy, transport, culture, humanitarian issues and regional projects (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2024a, 2026).

For Latin America, this is analytically useful because the region often faces pressure to interpret external partnerships through great-power competition. Cooperation with China may be read as anti-Western; cooperation with the United States as dependent alignment; cooperation with Russia as controversial; cooperation with Europe as normative; cooperation with Türkiye or the Caucasus as peripheral. A pragmatic connectivity framework avoids these simplifications by asking what each partnership can deliver in practical terms (ECLAC, 2024b; Keohane & Nye, 2012).

This does not mean that values, security or conflicts disappear. It means that economic diplomacy can be designed around a limited and transparent agenda. Latin American states can cooperate with Türkiye on trade facilitation, logistics, construction, humanitarian assistance, education and tourism without adopting positions on all South Caucasus or Eurasian disputes. Similarly, engagement with Georgia can focus on academic cooperation, transit studies, tourism, digital governance and small-state diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2026; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-c).

The model also has relevance for middle-power studies. Türkiye’s foreign policy is multidimensional, while Georgia uses its location and partnerships to increase strategic relevance. Latin American states can draw from both experiences. Some countries have scale but weak regional coordination; others have smaller economies but useful niche capacities. The lesson is to identify practical interdependencies that can survive political cycles and ideological change (Cooper et al., 1993; Söderbaum, 2016).

Conclusion

Georgia-Türkiye cooperation demonstrates how a bilateral relationship can acquire regional significance through trade, mobility, institutional dialogue and connectivity projects. Its importance lies not only in the fact that Türkiye is Georgia’s leading trade partner, but also in the way the relationship connects free trade, national-ID mobility, strategic consultations, energy, transport, customs cooperation and the Middle Corridor. The result is a compact example of pragmatic connectivity governance (National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2025; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-a).

The case offers Latin America a practical lesson. In a fragmented global order, countries do not need to reduce every partnership to ideological alignment. They can build cooperation through corridors, customs simplification, technical agreements, mobility, academic exchange, sectoral diplomacy and productive integration. Türkiye’s existing outreach to Latin America and CELAC provides one possible channel for such engagement, while Georgia and the South Caucasus offer a useful comparative laboratory for studying small-state and corridor diplomacy (ECLAC, 2024b; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-d).

The main policy implication is that connectivity should be evaluated by development outcomes rather than symbolism. Latin America should not simply seek more roads, ports or trade agreements. It should seek faster borders, reliable logistics, local suppliers, better standards, SME participation, human mobility, technical training and export diversification. If designed in this way, cooperation with Türkiye and Georgia can become part of a broader Latin American strategy of non-polarized economic diplomacy (ECLAC, 2024a; World Bank, 2023).

The main academic contribution is the concept of pragmatic connectivity governance. It bridges economic diplomacy, geoeconomics and regional cooperation by showing how states can pursue practical integration in politically complex environments. The Georgia-Türkiye case does not resolve the dilemmas of the international order. It does, however, show that cooperation remains possible when it is organized around concrete, cumulative and mutually intelligible projects (Blackwill & Harris, 2016; Keohane & Nye, 2012).

Acknowledgements

The author thanks the journal editors and reviewers for their consideration. Any errors remain the author’s responsibility.

Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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Authors

Talya İşcan – PhD candidate and researcher, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, Mexico. ORCID: 0009-0008-7622-6424. E-mail: [insert e-mail address].

Correspondence Author – Talya İşcan, [insert e-mail address], [insert phone number if desired].