Davit Khutsishvili

Master’s student in International Relations

Georgian Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA)

Tbilisi, Georgia

Abstract

This article explores the transformation of Russia’s foreign policy under Vladimir Putin’s rule and its connection to the internal political dynamics of the Russian Federation, particularly in the context of relations with the “collective West.” The research argues that Putin’s foreign policy actions are driven not only by structural shifts within the international system, as suggested by the neorealist theoretical approach, but also by the need for domestic legitimation, the balancing of elite interests, and the maintenance of authoritarian regime stability. The thesis examines the evolution of Putin’s foreign policy across four key phases: 2000-2007, 2007-2012, 2012-2020, 2020-2022 The methodological framework is based on qualitative, content-based, comparative, and contextual analysis. The distinctiveness of this study lies in its departure  from the classical neorealist paradigm, viewing foreign policy instead as a tool for domestic legitimation within an authoritarian regime. This complex approach enables a deeper understanding of Putin’s foreign policy strategy and the motivations behind Russia’s behavior in its confrontation with the Western liberal order.

Keywords: revisionism, legitimacy, “siloviki”, multipolar world order, authoritarianism, Putin, sphere of influence, Russian World, special path, elites, social contract, Geopolitical Contract, Collective West.

Introduction

The transformation of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy particularly during Vladimir Putin’s time in power has become one of the most important topics in contemporary international politics, maintaining its relevance to this day. Putin’s foreign policy can be divided into several key phases: The first phase, from 2000 to 2007, can be described as a period of stabilization and pragmatic cooperation with the collective West. Despite some fundamental disagreements (for example the Iraq War in 2003) there was clear strategic alignment between Russia and the West on several major issues, including the fight against terrorism and energy security. The second crucial phase spans the years 2007 to 2012 and can be confidently characterized as a prelude to a more aggressive foreign policy. This was followed by the period from 2012 to 2020, marked by the consolidation of Putin’s autocratic rule and the beginning of overt foreign interventions. The years 2020 to 2022 represent a kind of culmination of both domestic and foreign political developments. It was during this time that all of Putin’s political moves, which had been gradually unfolding since his rise to power in 2000, converged. An openly anti-Western course was finally consolidated, Putin’s autocratic control was fully established and the preconditions emerged that ultimately led Russia down an irreversible path toward full-scale war and international isolation.Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy bears a distinctly revisionist character(Tsygankov, 2016). This is confirmed not only by widely accepted international relations theories and systemic approaches but also by the specific features of Russia’s domestic political landscape such as the need for internal legitimacy and the balancing of Russian “elite” interests. This article does not seek to dismiss the influence of international structures and theoretical frameworks on Russia’s foreign behavior. Rather, it aims to broaden that framework by integrating domestic political dynamics. A complex analytical approach one that combines external, systemic, and internal political perspectives offers a more comprehensive understanding of the unique characteristics of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy behavior.

Stabilization and Pragmatic Cooperation with the West (2000 – 2007)

In terms of foreign policy thinking, Russian political elites have historically been divided into three broad categories: “Westernizers,” “Statists,” and “Civilizationists”(Tsygankov, 2016). Based on this typology, Vladimir Putin, during the early stage of his presidency, can be classified as a “Statist” leader who employed relatively pro-Western rhetoric while grounding foreign relations in pragmatic national interests. At this stage, Putin prioritized domestic political stabilization and economic modernization, which naturally led to a more balanced and cooperation-oriented foreign policy. During this period, despite some strategic disagreements with the (West such as over the Iraq War) Russia and Western Nations shared important common interests, particularly in areas such as counterterrorism, energy security, and so on. Putin’s pro-Western, pragmatic stance was clearly visible in his first presidential address to the State Duma, where he emphasized his commitment to building equal and productive partnerships with all countries, with a specific focus on the West. In his words: “We support equal and fruitful cooperation with all nations of the world and want predictable and friendly relations with the West”(Kremlin.ru, 2000).This approach was officially reflected in the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept the first such document under Putin’s presidency. Although the document advocated for a multipolar world order, it did not present the collective West as a threat but rather as a potential partner. It emphasized three key directions of cooperation: Russia – EU, Russia – NATO, and Russia – USA. The document highlighted particularly positive expectations regarding relations with the European Union, stating: “The Russian Federation considers the European Union one of its key political and economic partners and strives to develop intensive, stable, and long-term cooperation with it“(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,2000). Putin’s seemingly pro-Western rhetoric was not driven by ideological commitment but rather by strategic necessity. At the beginning of his presidency, Russia faced severe economic fragility, still recovering from the 1998 financial default. Oligarchic elites held excessive influence, limiting the central government’s capacity to govern effectively. The state had only partial control over the security structures and separatist movements in the Chechen Republic posed an ongoing threat. In this context, cooperation with the West was not a matter of value-based alignment but a strategic tool to consolidate statehood and ensure internal stability. Putin understood that without Western support, these domestic problems could not be resolved. This domestic context shaped Putin’s strong support for the United States following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Vladimir Putin was the first world leader to express solidarity with the U.S. Putin used the global anti-terrorism discourse as an opportunity to frame the Chechen conflict as part of the broader fight against international terrorism, ultimately aiming to reassert control over the region and strengthen Russia’s territorial integrity. Economic interaction with the West also intensified, especially in the energetic sector. The oil and natural gas industries became central tools for Kremlin consolidation. Western capital, technology, and access to markets were crucial. Putin’s administration enhanced cooperation with major Western corporations such as BP, Royal Dutch Shell, and Total. The involvement of Western firms such as Shell and Mitsui in the notable Sakhalin II project illustrated how Putin utilized foreign capital and expertise to strengthen the Russian economy. Another early priority of Putin’s rule was to replace the so-called “oligarchic anarchy” with centralized authority. His strategy was to ensure that economic elites particularly the powerful oligarchs who held political and financial sway would play a politically loyal role. Under this approach, access to Western markets and foreign capital was conditional upon corporate loyalty to the Kremlin. However, even in this period of pragmatic cooperation, tensions with the West began to emerge. The first flashpoint was the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which Russia criticized as a violation of international law. Further friction arose over the so-called “Color Revolutions.” In 2003, Georgia’s Rose Revolution, backed by Western institutions, marked the beginning of a perceived campaign of regime change in Russia’s neighborhood(Service,2019). This was followed by Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004 a much more serious challenge in the Kremlin’s eyes, given Ukraine’s deep historical and strategic importance to Russia’s identity and also regional security. Russia feared that these revolutions would trigger a “domino effect.” If a pro-Western revolution could overthrow a government in Kyiv, why couldn’t the same happen in Moscow?(Service,2019). This fear fueled increasing suspicion toward the West. Meanwhile, NATO’s 2004 enlargement, which included several Eastern European states and all three Baltic countries, brought the alliance directly to Russia’s borders. While Putin publicly acknowledged that every state had the right to choose its own security arrangements, he also stressed that NATO expansion undermined mutual trust in Europe and ignored Russia’s security interests. In response, Russia began revising its own military doctrine, where for the first time, the “Western threat” was formally recognized. The symbolic end of “harmonious” relations with the West came at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, where Putin openly criticized the unipolar world order led by the United States and outlined a new vision based on a multipolar balance of power(Putin, 2007). In this new order, countries like Russia and China were to be equally respected as global players. From that moment on, pragmatic cooperation gave way to an openly confrontational stance toward the West one rooted in domestic legitimization needs and an ambition to change the international system.

2007 – 2012: Prelude to an Aggressive Foreign Policy

The period from 2007 to 2012 marked a critical turning point in Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy. It was during these years that Russia began taking its first concrete steps toward a more assertive and aggressive international posture. Although Dmitry Medvedev formally assumed the presidency in May 2008, while Vladimir Putin became prime minister, it was clear that the real levers of power remained firmly in Putin’s hands. This stage cannot be fully understood without considering the internal political dynamics of Russia. It was during this time that the informal “social contract” between the state and the public began to come under pressure. In the Russian context, the social contract implied an implicit agreement: the government would provide economic stability, relative social welfare, and order primarily in the form of autocratic stability in exchange for the public’s political passivity and abandonment of democratic demands. Compared to the chaos of the 1990s, this arrangement was broadly acceptable to most Russian citizens. However, the 2008 global financial crisis had a serious impact on the Russian economy, compounded by a decline in global oil prices. These developments began to undermine the foundations of the existing social contract. At the same time, tension within the political elite grew around Medvedev’s presidency. The influential “siloviki” (the security and military elite) viewed Medvedev with suspicion(Medvedev himself was part of the technocratic loyalist elite), seeing him as too conciliatory toward the West and not one of their own(Zygar, 2016). In the West, Medvedev was widely perceived as a liberal-leaning so-called “Zapadnik“(Westernizer). Faced with economic pressure and elite fragmentation, the Kremlin sought to reframe the basis of its legitimacy. The so-called “social contract” was gradually replaced by a “geopolitical contract” instead of prosperity, the state now offered society a sense of national, patriotic pride grounded in global power and russian imperial revival. National identity and the image of a resurgent Russia became central elements of the russian state narrative. This shift was institutionalized in the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, adopted in July of that year. The document presented the United States and NATO as expansionist actors and reflected growing skepticism about deepening cooperation with the West. A clear symptom of this new course was Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008. This move sent a dual message – internationally, that Russia remained a major power capable of projecting influence across the post-Soviet space and domestically, that the Kremlin would defend “its people” in this case, Russian passport holders in South Ossetia. The war significantly strengthened Putin’s political authority and marginalized opposition forces in Russia. It was also followed by a wide-ranging reform of Russia’s armed forces. While this reform was not aimed exclusively at external threats, it did serve to bolster Russia’s image as a state capable of mobilizing against foreign adversaries. Internally, it helped reinforce Putin’s vertical power structure and consolidate control over the military. The reforms included purges of the officer corps, reducing the influence of old generals and corrupt networks that were not loyal to Vladimir Putin. In parallel, security service personnel(FSB) were promoted within the military structure, reflecting a broader process often described as the “FSB-zation” of the armed forces. Figures such as Lieutenant General Aleksandr Matovnikov and deputy minister of defence Aleksey Dyumin, both with backgrounds in the Federal Security Service(FSB) were appointed to senior military positions. This process illustrated the structural consolidation of Putin’s “siloviki“- based governance. Equally significant during this period was the emergence of an ideological counter-narrative to the West. This counter-narrative was not merely reactive, it was a deliberately constructed ideological platform designed to legitimize and promote Russia’s “special path” (‘Особый путь’) and Russia’s civilizational uniqueness. Through this lens, Putin increasingly aligned himself with “Eurasianist“ thinking, rejecting the universality of Western liberal norms and promoting a vision of Russia as a distinct geopolitical and cultural pole(Tsygankov, 2012). The development of this ideological discourse was also a reaction to dissatisfaction with Medvedev’s foreign policy. His pro-Western rhetoric and support for the “reset” in relations with the United States were seen by Putin and the conservative elite as ideological concessions. From their perspective, this approach had failed to deliver any tangible structural benefits, politically or economically. On the contrary, the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, which Russia had effectively allowed by abstaining from a UN Security Council veto, reinforced the belief within the Kremlin that the West exploited Russian weakness rather than reciprocated goodwill. These developments set the stage for Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012. His third term was not just a routine transfer of formal power, it was a clear signal that Moscow was no longer interested in pursuing liberal reforms or continuing cooperation with the West.

2012 – 2020: Consolidation of Power and Foreign Interventions

In May 2012, Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin and once again presented himself to Russia and the world as the nation’s crowned leader. The period from 2012 to 2020 is critically important in the development of relations between Russia and the collective West. From his inaugural speech in 2012, Putin’s rhetoric became noticeably more patriotic and openly anti-Western. Particularly significant is his speech at the Valdai Club on September 20, 2013, where he made several bold and, for many, controversial statements regarding both domestic and foreign policy. This speech can be compared in importance to his famous Munich address in 2007, where Putin first openly embraced a sharply anti-Western tone. At Valdai, Putin openly criticized the Western liberal order and emphasized that Russia should follow a traditional and conservative agenda. He claimed that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had lost its “political identity“(Putin, 2013). By this, he meant that the USSR once had a clearly defined ideological stance that served as a counterbalance to Western democratic ideals, and Russia was its stronghold. In some periods, even communism itself could be considered a form of Russian soft power especially since it had a degree of popularity among Western youth and academic circles. After the Soviet collapse, however, Russia found itself in an identity crisis. “We must find and develop a national identity based on tradition, culture, and moral values”(Putin, 2013),  Putin declared. He also touched upon topics such as family, religion, morality, spirituality, and historical memory concepts that gained particular relevance for domestic politics, as they were intended to revive national identity and mobilize patriotic sentiment among Russian citizens. Furthermore, Putin openly declared Western values to be immoral and incompatible with Russia. Most importantly, he introduced themes like a “multipolar world order” and “Eurasianism,” also referred to as “civilizationalism”(Putin,2013). He also touched upon topics such as family, religion, morality, spirituality, and historical memory concepts that gained particular relevance for domestic politics, as they were intended to revive national identity and mobilize patriotic sentiment among Russian citizens. Furthermore, Putin openly declared Western values to be immoral and incompatible with Russia(Putin,2013). Most importantly, he introduced themes like a “multipolar world order” and “Eurasianism,” also referred to as “civilizationalism.”This stage of Putin’s rule marked another turning point in Russian politics. It was during this period that the state vertical of power grew stronger, and Putin consolidated his authority. One of the main instruments of this consolidation was the so-called “foreign agent” law, adopted in 2012, allegedly in the name of national security(Greene,2014). According to this law, any NGO receiving funding from abroad especially from the West had to register as a “foreign agent.” The law clearly aimed to eliminate what little Western influence remained and to suppress the already weak civil society in Russia. Another turning point was the Ukrainian crisis of 2013–14. President Yanukovych’s refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union sparked the Euromaidan protests, which led to a change of government, the annexation of Crimea, and war in the Donbas. The Kremlin presented these events as a Western – organized coup and a threat to national security framing them for domestic audiences as justification for patriotic consolidation. The concept of the “Russian World,” which emphasizes language, religion, and shared historical roots, officially became a part of Russia’s geopolitical strategy. It was included in the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation marking a significant departure from previous versions, such as that of 2013(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016). While earlier documents still aimed at cooperation with the West, the 2016 concept explicitly described the “collective West” as a strategic threat. In this sense, the concept institutionalized the new course of confrontation. The document also emphasized the importance of alternative international institutions. According to the 2016 concept, Russia had made a practical decision to reject cooperation with the West, due to the “futility” of such efforts. This shift meant increased focus on structures such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016). Thus, the declaration of the West as an adversary, the official formulation of the “Russian World” doctrine, the push for a multipolar world order, and the strengthening of alternative institutions all reflected a fundamental change in Russia’s foreign policy paradigm from cooperation to confrontation. This shift ultimately culminated in the full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022. During this same period, the Syrian conflict and Russia’s military involvement in it played a particularly important role. Russia’s direct engagement in the Syrian civil war began in September 2015, a move consistent with the Kremlin’s foreign policy trajectory. The intervention was presented as a fight against terrorism, but it also had deep geopolitical and ideological significance for Russia, both externally and domestically. By intervening, Putin helped to save the Assad regime and the ruling Ba’ath Party from collapse. Moreover, Russia secured long-term military bases in the Middle East namely the Khmeimim Air Base and the Tartus Naval Base(Kozhanov, 2018). This intervention can be seen as a symbolic return to global politics with the status of a “great power,” which the Kremlin successfully used to bolster both its foreign and domestic legitimacy. Putin himself stated: “Our goal is not to protect Assad’s presidency, but to preserve Syria’s statehood. We do not want to see another Libya, Somalia, or Afghanistan”ავღანეთში“(Charap, Treyger, & Geist, 2019). In this statement, Putin addressed two major themes central to his domestic political strategy and ideological confrontation with the West. By referencing these failed states, he directly blamed Western interventions for the chaos and instability they produced. At the same time, he sought to present Russia as a stabilizing force and a defender of state sovereignty. He further emphasized this perspective by stating that the fall of the Assad regime would be perceived as a victory for transnational terrorist forces and as legitimization of Western-backed regime change something he portrayed as a direct threat to Russia’s national security(Charap, Treyger, & Geist, 2019). This reference to “regime change” resonates with events in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, which Putin also interprets as Western – engineered coups. A major domestic concern in this context is the threat posed by radical Islamism and terrorism. With around 25 million Muslims living in the Russian Federation particularly in regions such as Dagestan, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan internal unrest remains a real risk. Ultimately, through the annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and the Syrian intervention all of which involved gross violations of international law Putin’s Russia found itself under unprecedented Western sanctions. These sanctions deepened the confrontation with the collective West and led to the development of a so-called “sovereign economy” or “fortress economy,” aimed at reducing Russia’s dependence on the West, especially in technology and industry(Åslund, 2020). The government launched an import substitution policy (‘импортозамещение’), further isolating the country while allowing Putin to consolidate power and portray the West as an enemy. The Kremlin effectively politicized these challenges, presenting them to domestic audiences as yet more evidence that the collective West is constantly trying to weaken or “bring Russia to its knees.”

Full Consolidation of Power and the Path to Conflict: Russia’s Domestic and Foreign Policy, 2020-2022

The years 2020–2022 represent the culmination of Russia’s internal and external political trajectory under Vladimir Putin. During this period, the key trends that began with Putin’s rise to power in 2000 became fully consolidated. It was in these years that Russia’s anti-Western course was clearly finalized, Putin’s autocratic rule was fully institutionalized, and the foundations were laid for the country’s path toward full-scale war and international isolation. A major event that marked the beginning of this period was the constitutional reform of 2020. Among its most notable results was the removal of term limits for presidential re-election, allowing Vladimir Putin to remain in office potentially until 2036(Constitution of the Russian Federation, 2020). While this was the most visible change, the amendments also introduced far-reaching shifts with serious implications for both domestic and foreign policy. The new constitution incorporated what may be described as “value-based” clauses, rooted in a narrative of traditionalism. One article, for example, states that “the Russian Federation, united by a thousand-year history, preserves the memory of its ancestors who passed on ideals and faith in God,” and emphasizes “the historical continuity of the Russian state”(Constitution of the Russian Federation, 2020, Art. 67.1).  Another article highlights the special role of the Russian language as a guarantor of national unity. Particularly significant is the new Article 79, which reshapes the relationship between Russian and international law(Constitution of the Russian Federation, 2020, Art. 79.1). It states that decisions of international organizations that contradict the Russian constitution shall not be executed on Russian territory. These changes entrenched the legal and institutional basis of Putin’s authoritarian system. The revised constitution further limited the already fragile principles of federalism in Russia, reducing them to little more than a formal facade. The second major theme of this period was Ukraine. Beginning in 2021, Russia and President Putin personally intensified efforts to justify a future war against Ukraine on ideological grounds. On July 12, 2021, Putin published an article titled On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians, in which he questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state(Putin, 2021). In the article, Putin described Ukraine as an inseparable part of Russia’s historical, cultural, and political space. “Unfortunately,” he wrote, “a wall has emerged in recent years between Russia and Ukraine’s shared spiritual and historical space this is a tragedy, a shared catastrophe. The West deliberately divided ‘one people’ into two parts”(Putin, 2021). The narrative presented Ukraine as a historical mistake and served several functions – domestically, it reinforced national unity and the Kremlin’s identity-building efforts through a revived imperial discourse; internationally, it sought to justify territorial claims and prepare Russian society for confrontation, while presenting Russia’s future actions in moral and historical terms. The third key development was Russia’s demand for so-called security guarantees from the West. On December 17, 2021, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published two draft agreements: one with the United States (Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Security Guarantees), and the other with NATO (Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). These proposals clearly amounted to open ultimatums, demanding, among other things, that NATO cease its expansion, revoke the 2008 Bucharest formula, and withdraw its military infrastructure to its 1997 configuration(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2021). Unsurprisingly, both NATO and the United States rejected these demands. On February 2, 2022, during a meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, President Putin declared: “It is already obvious… that Russia’s fundamental concerns have been ignored”(Zinets & Soldatkin, 2022).  He also accused the West of trying to drag Russia into war. From this point onward, the path toward military confrontation became irreversible. Russia’s goal became clear: to block NATO expansion, prevent NATO infrastructure from approaching its borders, and ultimately to stop Ukraine from continuing to exist as a sovereign state. On February 21, 2022, Russia officially recognized the independence of the two separatist regions in Ukraine the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Just three days later, on February 24, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. That morning, President Putin addressed the nation in a long televised speech. The core message was that Russia was beginning a “special military operation” to protect the people of Donbas from “genocide” allegedly carried out by the “Kyiv regime,” to stop NATO’s expansion into Ukraine, and to pursue the “denazification” and “demilitarization” of the country(Putin,2022). This marked the beginning of a fundamentally new stage in Russia’s confrontation with the collective West.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the transformation of Putin’s foreign policy cannot be explained solely through systemic or theoretical approaches. While the international system, shifts in the balance of power, and Western policies have indeed shaped important external conditions, it was ultimately the domestic political dimension that played the most significant role. This kind of perspective allows us to go beyond the classical analytical frameworks and to assess Russian behavior on a deeper level. The core idea is that, in authoritarian regimes like Russia, foreign policy is often not simply a response to external threats, but also a reflection of internal political challenges such as declining legitimacy or domestic crises. During the first stage of Vladimir Putin’s rule, the pragmatic cooperation with the West and the pro-Western rhetoric were largely driven by internal political needs. These efforts were directly linked to ensuring domestic stabilization and economic consolidation. Thus, Putin’s pro-Western discourse and his initiatives for cooperation should be seen as instrumental choices rather than ideological or value-based ones. Over time, as the internal political structure changed with the consolidation of Putin’s vertical power, the growing loyalty of the elite, and the full control over the media these shifts began to shape the country’s foreign policy. As Russia’s internal stability became more firmly established, its foreign policy turned increasingly assertive, with the collective West being framed as the primary threat. Foreign policy became one of the main tools for strengthening domestic power. Therefore, the evolution of Putin’s foreign policy toward the West should not be viewed merely as a reaction to external pressures. On the contrary, it was primarily an expression of internal power logic. Each new foreign policy step was guided by the Kremlin’s domestic political needs, the regime’s resilience, and its goal of maintaining political control. Ignoring this factor may prove extremely detrimental when it comes to making strategic decisions within the collective West.

Bibliography

  1. Åslund, A. (2020). Russia’s crony capitalism: The path from market economy to kleptocracy. Yale University Press.
  2. Charap, S., Treyger, E., & Geist, E. (2019). Understanding Russia’s intervention in Syria. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3180.html
  3. CBS News. (2022, January 27). Russia’s reaction to U.S. and NATO leaves Ukraine crisis to fester on. CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-reaction-united-states-nato-ukraine-crisis-war
  4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2020). Constitution of the Russian Federation: Adopted by national referendum on December 12, 1993, with amendments approved on July 1, 2020 [PDF]. https://mid.ru/upload/medialibrary/fa3/xwhwumdwunawy9iprvhcxdqds1lzxqdx/CONSTITUTION-Eng.pdf 
  5. Dawisha, K. (2014). Putin’s kleptocracy: Who owns Russia? Simon & Schuster.
  6. DW. (2022, January 26). US, NATO respond to Russia’s security demands. Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/us-nato-send-written-response-on-russias-security-demands/a-60567276 
  7. Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. (n.d.). BITS Europe–Russia Archive. Retrieved July 18, 2025, from https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/EuropeanSecurity/ForeignPolicyConceptExcerpt.htm 
  8. Galeotti, M. (2017). Hybrid war or gibridnaya voina? Getting Russia’s non-linear military challenge right. Mayak Intelligence Report.
  9. Galeotti, M. (2017). We need to talk about Putin: How the West gets him wrong. Ebury Press.
  10. Goldman, M. I. (2008). Petrostate: Putin, power and the new Russia. Oxford University Press.
  11. Götz, E. (2015). Putin, the State, and War: The Causes of Russia’s Near Abroad Assertion Revisited. International Studies Review
  12. Greene, S. A. (2014). Moscow in movement: Power and opposition in Putin’s Russia. Stanford University Press.
  13. Hoffman, D. (2000, March 6). Putin says, ‘Why not?’ to Russia joining NATO. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/03/06/putin-says-why-not-to-russia-joining-nato/c1973032-c10f-4bff-9174-8cae673790cd/  
  14. Hill, F., & Gaddy, C. G. (2013). Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Geopolitics in the 21st Century). Brookings Institution Press.
  15. Jentleson, B. (2014). American foreign policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century. Duke University Press.
  16. Kremlin.ru. (2000). Annual address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21480
  17. Karaganov, S. A. (2023, June 13). A difficult but necessary decision. Russia in Global Affairs. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-difficult-but-necessary-decision  
  18. Kozhanov, N. (2018). Russian policy in the Middle East: Motives and methods. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-02-21-russian-policy-middle-east-kozhanov.pdf
  19. LaFraniere, S. (2003, March 18). Russia’s Putin calls Iraq War a ‘mistake’. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/03/18/russias-putin-calls-iraq-war-a-mistake/7fff0ba1-bfda-4970-a1a9-f7c7afd6aaa2/    
  20. Levada Center. (2014). Approval ratings of Vladimir Putin https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings  
  21. Lukyanov, F. A. (2016, May 4). Putin’s foreign policy. Russia in Global Affairs https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/putins-foreign-policy/  
  22. Lavrov, A. (2018, November 5). Russian military reforms from Georgia to Syria (Report). Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-military-reforms-georgia-syria  
  23. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2021, December 17). Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on security guarantees. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1790818/   
  24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2021, December 17). Agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and NATO member states. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1790803/  
  25. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2016, November 30). Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016) [PDF]. In Russia Matters. Retrieved July 18, 2025, from https://www.russiamatters.org/sites/default/files/media/files/Foreign%20Policy%20Concept%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation%20(approved%20by%20President%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation%20Vladimir%20Putin%20on%20November%2030,%202016)%20-%20Asset%20Publisher%20-%20The%20Ministry%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation.pdf  
  26. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. W. W. Norton & Company.
  27. McFaul, M. (2005). Transitions from Postcommunism. Journal of Democracy
  28. Pomerantsev, P. (2014). Nothing is true and everything is possible: The surreal heart of the new Russia. PublicAffairs.
  29. Putin, V. (2007, February 10). Speech and the following discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. President of Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034
  30. Putin, V. (2013, September 19). Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. President of Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/727  
  31. Putin, V. (2021, July 12). On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181   
  32. Putin, V. (2022, February 24). Address by the President of the Russian Federation [Speech]. The Kremlin, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843   
  33. Putin, V. (2022, February 21). On the recognition of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics [Executive order/Statement]. The Kremlin, Moscow. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67829  
  34. Putin, V. (2014, March 18). Address by President of the Russian Federation. President of Russia. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603  
  35. President of Russia. (2008, January 12). The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Official website of the President of Russia. Retrieved July 18, 2025, from http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116   
  36. Radin, A., & Reach, C. (2017). Russian views of the international order. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1826.html   
  37. Rumer, E. (2019, June 5). The Primakov (not Gerasimov) doctrine in action. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/06/the-primakov-not-gerasimov-doctrine-in-action?lang=en  
  38. Service, R. (2019). Kremlin winter: Russia and the second coming of Vladimir Putin. Picador.
  39. Stent, A. (2019). Putin’s world: Russia against the West and with the rest. Twelve / Hachette Book Group.
  40. Sakwa, R. (2017). Russia against the rest: The post-cold war crisis of world order. Cambridge University Press.
  41. Talbott, S. (2003). The Russia hand: A memoir of presidential diplomacy. Random House Trade Paperbacks.
  42. Treisman, D. (2011). The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev. Free Press.
  43. Tsygankov, A. P. (2012). Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in international relations. Cambridge University Press.
  44. Tsygankov, A. P. (2016). Russia’s foreign policy: Change and continuity in national identity (4th ed.). Rowman & Littlefield.
  45. Trenin, D. (2019, April 25). It’s Time to Rethink Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy. Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78990  
  46. Trenin, D. (2014, December 22). Russia’s breakout from the post‑Cold War system: The drivers of Putin’s course. Russia Matters. Originally published by Carnegie Moscow Center. https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/russias-breakout-post-cold-war-system-drivers-putins-course?utm_source=chatgpt.com
  47. Trenin, D. (2007, June). Russia’s strategic choices. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/events/2007/06/russias-strategic-choices?lang=en  
  48. Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. Addison-Wesley.
  49. Zygar, M. (2016). All the Kremlin’s men: Inside the court of Vladimir Putin (T. Mikhailova, Trans.). PublicAffairs.
  50. Zinets, N., & Soldatkin, V. (2022, February 2). Putin accuses U.S. of trying to lure Russia into war. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-announces-plan-boost-army-foreign-leaders-rally-2022-02-01

Share this content: