Giorgi Koberidze

Georgian Institute of Public Affairs

Assistant Professor

Tbilisi, Georgia

Abstract

The operationalization of the Zangezur Corridor represents a fundamental restructuring of the South Caucasus security architecture, transcending its nominal function as a transport link. This article analyzes the strategic implications of the route, arguing that while it fulfills Azerbaijan’s dynastic imperative to reconnect with Nakhchivan and facilitates Armenia’s potential diversification away from Russian hegemony, it poses an existential “transit dilemma” for Georgia. The central thesis posits that the loss of Tbilisi’s monopoly on East-West connectivity creates a vacuum susceptible to Russian manipulation, thereby eroding Georgia’s strategic utility to the Euro-Atlantic community. Furthermore, the study examines the corridor as a theater of Great Power competition, where the conflicting interests of the United States, Russia, and China converge. The article concludes that without proactive Western engagement to ensure a transparent governance mechanism, the corridor risks becoming an instrument of authoritarian consolidation, leaving Georgia marginalized in a newly formed regional order.

Keywords: Zangezur Corridor, South Caucasus geopolitics, Georgia transit security, Russian hegemony, Armenian foreign policy, Nakhchivan, Middle Corridor.

Introduction

The concept of the Zangezur Corridor has emerged as the single most contentious and transformative element of the post-2020 South Caucasus security architecture. Following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the tripartite ceasefire statement of November 9, 2020, introduced a provision – specifically Article 9 – that mandated the unblocking of all economic and transport links in the region. However, the subsequent interpretation of this clause has evolved into a high-stakes geopolitical contest. While the text explicitly calls for the construction of new transport communications connecting the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, the project has transcended its logistical purpose to become a symbol of shifting power dynamics in Eurasia (Broers, 2021).

For the leadership in Baku, the restoration of a direct land link to Nakhchivan is not merely an economic convenience; it is a project of immense historical and symbolic weight. Nakhchivan occupies a unique space in the national narrative of modern Azerbaijan. It is the ancestral home and political power base of the ruling Aliyev dynasty. Heydar Aliyev, the former president and father of the current leader, governed this exclave during the turbulent early 1990s, using it as a springboard to consolidate power in Baku (Cornell, 2011). Consequently, President Ilham Aliyev views the physical reintegration of Nakhchivan with the mainland as a completion of his father’s legacy and a restoration of territorial integrity that was disrupted by Soviet border engineering in the 1920s. Currently, Azerbaijan is forced to rely on transit through Iran to supply the exclave, a dependency that Baku views as an unacceptable strategic vulnerability given the oscillating tensions with Tehran (Özkan, 2025).

From a broader regional perspective, the corridor represents a critical geopolitical imperative for Turkey. Ankara has long envisioned a seamless connection to the Turkic world in Central Asia, a strategy often referred to as the “Middle Corridor.” The Zangezur route offers Turkey a direct gateway to the Caspian Sea basin, bypassing both the rugged terrain of Georgia and the geopolitical complications of transiting through Iran (Dalay, 2021). This connection would effectively operationalize the “One Nation, Two States” doctrine, creating a contiguous logistical chain from Istanbul to Baku. Such a development would significantly enhance Turkey’s projection of hard power in the South Caucasus, solidifying its role as a primary security patron in the region alongside, or potentially in competition with, the Russian Federation.

However, the terminology itself remains a battlefield. Azerbaijan’s insistence on the term “corridor” implies a level of extraterritoriality or minimal customs oversight, drawing a parallel to the Lachin Corridor that connects Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. This rhetoric suggests a route that is effectively carved out of Armenian jurisdiction, a prospect that Yerevan vehemently opposes as a threat to its sovereignty. Thus, the Zangezur route is not simply a road or a railway; it is a litmus test for the new regional order, where historical grievances, dynastic ambitions, and great power competition converge on a narrow strip of land in southern Armenia.

Shifting Alliances: Armenia’s Opportunity for Diversification

The catastrophic defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War served as a brutal reality check for the political establishment in Yerevan, shattering the illusion of security provided by the Russian umbrella. For decades, Armenia’s strategic calculus was predicated on a singular assumption: that total reliance on the Russian Federation – formalized through membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the presence of the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri – guaranteed existential protection against Turkey and Azerbaijan. The events of 2020, and the subsequent inaction of Moscow during the incursions into Armenian sovereign territory in 2021 and 2022, demonstrated the bankruptcy of this policy. Within this context of betrayal and vulnerability, the opening of regional communications, often framed under the aggressive moniker of the “Zangezur Corridor,” paradoxically offers Armenia a lifeline for sovereignty.

While the domestic opposition in Armenia views the unblocking of transport routes as a capitulation to Turkish-Azerbaijani demands, a dispassionate geopolitical analysis suggests otherwise. Armenia is currently a prisoner of its own geography, exacerbated by a dual blockade imposed by Ankara and Baku since the early 1990s. This isolation has forced Yerevan into a suffocating economic and logistical dependence on Russia. Key infrastructure, including the railway network (operated by a subsidiary of Russian Railways) and the energy sector (dominated by Gazprom), is effectively under Moscow’s control (De Waal, 2021). Furthermore, Armenia’s only land route to its primary economic partner, Russia, runs through the fragile Upper Lars checkpoint in Georgia – a bottleneck frequently closed by weather or political whims.

In this landscape, the operationalization of the route through Syunik (Zangezur) presents a tangible opportunity for diversification. If implemented under the logic of unblocking rather than extraterritoriality – a concept Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has rebranded as the “Crossroads of Peace” initiative – it would reconnect Armenia to the regional railway grid. This would grant Armenian exporters access to Turkish ports on the Mediterranean and, crucially, a rail link to Iran that does not depend on the geographically challenging trucking routes. Armenia understands that still now, Poti port in Georgia is the main port for Armenian exports, and Black Sea is the main sea for Armenia connecting to the outside world. (MB Consulting 2023). By integrating into the East-West trade flows, Armenia could theoretically transform itself from a Russian outpost into a transit hub, thereby creating economic interdependence with the West and Turkey.

This pivot is not without immense risk. Russia views the diversification of Armenian foreign policy as a direct threat to its hegemony in the South Caucasus. Moscow’s interest lies in maintaining the status quo where Armenia remains isolated and dependent on Russian protection. Therefore, the opening of the border with Turkey and the restoration of rail links through Nakhchivan would erode the primary lever of influence the Kremlin holds over Yerevan: the fear of total encirclement. Consequently, while the Zangezur route is demanded by Baku for nationalist reasons, it is increasingly viewed by pragmatists in Yerevan as a necessary bitter pill to break free from the suffocating embrace of the Global North. The reduction of Russian leverage is a prerequisite for any genuine Armenian sovereignty, and ironically, the road to the West may run through the very territories Armenia fought to keep isolated for thirty years.

The Georgian Dilemma: Economic Marginalization and Geopolitical Vulnerabilities

For the past three decades, the geopolitical relevance of Georgia has been predicated on a single, indisputable axiom: its status as the indispensable transit monopolist connecting the Euro-Atlantic space with the Caspian basin. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the architecture of regional energy and logistics – embodied by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway – was designed specifically to bypass the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this strategic equation, Georgia was not merely a participant; it was the chokepoint. This “transit function” served as Georgia’s primary security guarantee, compelling Western powers to invest in its sovereignty and stability. The emergence of the Zangezur Corridor fundamentally threatens this monopoly, creating a strategic nightmare for Tbilisi that is often glossed over by diplomatic rhetoric regarding regional peace.

The argument that increased regional connectivity benefits all actors is a dangerous oversimplification in the ruthless environment of South Caucasian geopolitics. For Georgia, the operationalization of a route through southern Armenia is a zero-sum game regarding strategic significance. While proponents argue that trade volumes are projected to increase enough to sustain multiple routes, the mere existence of a viable alternative erodes Georgia’s leverage. Even if only a minimal amount of cargo – say, 10-15% – diverts through Nakhchivan, the psychological and political impact would be catastrophic. It signals to Ankara, Baku, and potentially Brussels that Georgia is no longer the sole gateway to the East. Once Georgia becomes “one of the options” rather than “the only option,” its value as a strategic partner to the West diminishes proportionately.

This marginalization creates a vacuum that the Russian Federation is eager to fill. The logic is stark: if Georgia loses its critical function for the West, American and European commitment to Tbilisi’s security will inevitably wane. A Georgia that is less vital to Western energy security is a Georgia that is easier for Moscow to digest.

It is important to emphasize that the Zangezur route itself, depending on the modalities of its implementation, could serve as a vehicle for Russian expansionism. If the corridor is guarded by Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) border troops – as stipulated in the original 2020 ceasefire agreement – it would effectively place the transport artery between Turkey and Azerbaijan under Kremlin oversight. This will not be easily acceptable to Armenia, Azerbaijan, or the United States, especially given that the latter is increasing its interests in this section. However, the problem lies with the Russian military forces based in Armenia, which are trying to actively control border sections and, in order not to lose their significance, are exerting pressure on the Armenian authorities and creating a narrative that Armenia cannot survive without them. However, in the event of active involvement and intervention by the United States – even if carried out through a private company – Russia would be pushed aside. On the one hand, it would oppose the operation of this corridor, and on the other hand, it would intensify its focus on Georgia.

Moreover, the shifting dynamic between Turkey and Azerbaijan further isolates Georgia. Currently, Tbilisi is the vital link that physically unites the “One Nation, Two States.” If Ankara and Baku can connect directly via Zangezur, their reliance on Georgian goodwill evaporates. This loss of leverage is particularly dangerous given the asymmetry of power in the region. Without the “transit card,” Tbilisi lacks the instruments to counterbalance the economic and political pressure from its larger neighbors. Consequently, the opening of the Zangezur Corridor poses a paradoxical threat: the peace and integration of the South Caucasus may be achieved at the expense of Georgia’s strategic irrelevance, leaving the country exposed to a resurgent Russia without the protective shield of Western necessity.

The Great Power Chessboard: Western Engagement vs. Sino-Russian Interests

In the chaotic landscape of Eurasian geopolitics, the prospect of a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is often touted as the ultimate stabilizer for the region. For Georgia, a pacified neighborhood theoretically reduces the risk of spillover conflict and fosters an environment conducive to investment. This scenario becomes particularly potent if the United States, potentially under a renewed Trump administration, decides to re-engage with the South Caucasus. A transactional, “peace through strength” approach from Washington could view the Zangezur Corridor not just as a road, but as a strategic wedge to minimize Iranian influence and bypass Russian-controlled logistics. At the same time, U.S. focus on Armenia and Azerbaijan and the opening of a route to Turkey – that is, a direct connection – may not necessarily mean a benefit for Georgia, and along with a reduction in its importance, the motivation for partnership with it may also decline.

However, it is dangerously naive to assume that the revisionist powers – Russia and China – will passively applaud the arrival of “Pax Americana” in their immediate neighborhood. The operationalization of the corridor creates a fundamental conflict of interest. For the Kremlin, any infrastructure project in the post-Soviet space that it does not physically control is a threat to its imperial projection. Russia aims to oversee the Zangezur route through its FSB border troops precisely to keep a thumb on the region’s carotid artery. If the corridor evolves into a sovereign, Western-backed commercial route monitored by European or American observers, Moscow loses its leverage. Therefore, Russia is likely to employ tactics of “managed instability” to sabotage any implementation that excludes its dominance, because this kind of fear existed during Russian peacekeeping mission in Azerbaijan (Mammadov, 2023).

However, with elections approaching in Armenia in 2026, the situation remains complex. If Pashinyan retains power and a peace treaty with Azerbaijan is finally signed, there is a possibility that the Russian military presence could be reduced and the border guards replaced. While this may be Pashinyan’s ultimate objective, fully normalizing relations with Baku necessitates a constitutional referendum in Armenia. Consequently, Russia still retains room to maneuver – it can attempt to impose its own agenda and favorably recalibrate the terms of its operations within the country, or alternatively, obstruct and prolong the peace process with Azerbaijan. In other words, Russia has not only contributed to the erosion of Georgia’s significance over the years, but it may ultimately obstruct the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well.

China’s position adds another layer of complexity. While Beijing ostensibly supports the “Middle Corridor” as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to diversify export routes to Europe, its strategic calculus is aligned with Moscow in opposing American hegemony. A South Caucasus fully integrated into the Western security architecture is a nightmare scenario for Beijing, as it places a critical node of the supply chain under the potential influence of Washington. Consequently, if the Zangezur project becomes a vehicle for expanding U.S. influence, China and Russia will likely coordinate to disrupt its efficacy. This creates a precarious paradox for the region: the more the West pushes for a democratic, transparent corridor, the more incentivized Moscow and Beijing become to spoil the peace, leaving countries like Georgia caught in the crossfire of a new Cold War (Yıldız, 2025).

To counteract the existential risk posed by the Zangezur Corridor, Georgia must transcend its role as a mere land bridge and assert its unconditional dominance as the maritime gateway of the South Caucasus. The response to the “transit dilemma” is not to compete solely on the tracks, but to secure the sea.

Tbilisi must aggressively expand its port infrastructure to establish direct, high-volume maritime bridges with European Union gateways – specifically Constanța in Romania and Varna in Bulgaria. This ambition must extend beyond the Black Sea littoral to the Danube River ports, effectively linking the South Caucasus to the industrial heart of Europe. Furthermore, in a prospective post-war security environment, reinstating a strategic connection with Odesa will position Georgia as a critical logistical node for the reconstruction of Ukraine, embedding the country into the new European security architecture.

Central to this strategy is the immediate construction of the Anaklia Deep Sea Port and enlargement of Poti Port. This is not merely an infrastructure project, it is a geopolitical necessity. A deep-water harbor creates the necessary scale to attract major Western logistic interests – and potentially engage Chinese cargo flows along the Middle Corridor – thereby neutralizing the risk of bypass. By offering capacity that the limited gauge of the Zangezur route cannot match, Anaklia ensures that Georgia remains the primary option, not the alternative.

Maritime capacity is futile without terrestrial efficiency. The domestic road network must undergo rapid modernization, ensuring that the East-West highway operates with flawless speed and European-standard safety. In the ruthless competition of logistics, any friction or safety hazard on Georgian soil serves as a direct argument for the competitors in the south.

Conclusion

The emergence of the Zangezur Corridor signals the definitive end of the post-Soviet status quo in the South Caucasus. As this analysis has demonstrated, the project is far more than a logistical adjustment, it is a rewriting of the regional security code. For Azerbaijan and Turkey, it represents the triumph of long-term strategic patience, cementing a pan-Turkic connection that bypasses historical rivals. For Armenia, it offers a perilous but necessary escape route from total Russian subjugation. However, for Georgia, the implications are stark and devoid of sentimentality. The comfortable illusion of being the region’s irreplaceable transit monopolist is evaporating, and with it, the automatic guarantee of Western attention.

Although the potential appearance of the United States in the region and the final resolution of Armenia-Azerbaijani conflict in the Caucasus would be a very important and desirable precedent, it would still not have an unequivocal outcome for Georgia. It remains to be seen what the nature of U.S. involvement will be and to what extent Russia will fully concede to it. The activity of private companies cannot completely replace the security framework.  If the corridor functions merely as a mechanism to tighten the Russo-Turkish grip on the region, Georgia’s role will be reduced to that of a peripheral buffer zone. The danger lies not in the road itself, but in the geopolitical vacuum it could create if Tbilisi loses its relevance to Euro-Atlantic partners. The logic is simple: a Georgia that is not needed is a Georgia that is not defended.

Ultimately, the impact of the Zangezur route depends on the broader contest between great powers. If the United States and the West engage proactively – treating the corridor as an opportunity to integrate the entire region into the global economy outside of Moscow’s shadow – then Georgia can adapt and thrive as part of a wider network. However, if the project is abandoned to the whims of Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran, it will serve as a tool to dismantle the Western presence in the Caucasus. Georgia cannot afford to be a passive observer in this process; it must aggressively redefine its utility to the West, proving that its value lies not just in its pipelines, but in its function as the only reliable democratic bulwark in an increasingly illiberal neighborhood.

Bibliography

Broers, L. (2021). Armenia and Azerbaijan: Anatomy of a Rivalry. Edinburgh University Press.

Cornell, S. E. (2011). Azerbaijan Since Independence. M.E. Sharpe.

Dalay, G. (2021). Turkish-Russian Relations in Light of Recent Conflicts: Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. SWP Comment, 5.

De Waal, T. (2021). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in its Fourth Decade. Carnegie Europe.

Yıldız, G. (2025, July 18). America’s high-stakes bet on Zangezur: How a U.S.-led corridor could slash Europe’s energy costs and counter Russia. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/guneyyildiz/2025/07/18/americas-high-stakes-bet-on-zangezur-how-a-us-led-corridor-could-slash-europes-energy-costs-and-counter-russia

Mammadov Mahammad (2023) Azerbaijan’s Soft Balancing vis-à-vis Russia. Caucasus Strategic Perspective Azerbaijan’s Soft Balancing vis-à-vis Russia

MB Consulting. (2023). Analysis of main cargo & logistics routes of Armenia: Evaluation of cargo routes for Armenia and proposal on support mechanisms to boost exports. EBRD; Investment Council of Armenia. ANALYSIS-ENG.pdf

Özkan, Mazlum (2025, September 4). Iran is the biggest loser in Trump’s Azerbaijan-Armenia peace deal. The Hill. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5485138-iran-is-the-loser-in-trumps-azerbaijan-armenia-peace-deal

Share this content: