Grigol Kalandadze

Associate Professor

PhD in Political Science

Georgian International University GIU LLC

 Tbilisi, Georgia

Abstract

The electoral system is an important mechanism for the political enhancement of any state. It can be said that elections are the intermediary link between the people and political parties. In this regard, it is possible for a particular electoral system to weaken or eliminate specific tendencies of relations between politicians and voters, or conversely, strengthen them. From this perspective, it is interesting to explore the specific trends created by changes in the electoral system in the countries of North-East Asia in the 1990s-2000s.

The purpose of this paper is to study the influence of electoral reforms on the political process of the North-East Asian states during the last decade of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century. Thereafter, the major attention is drawn to the aforementioned factors in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

Keywords: North-East Asia; patron-client relations; clientelism; electoral reform

Introduction

The relevance of studying electoral reforms in North-East Asian countries is determined by the fact that the political situation created by various electoral systems is a very important topic precisely in comparative politics and in political science in general. At the same time, based on my observation, the political environment of the Asian continent, including the North-East Asian region, has not yet been fully explored. A scientific novelty lies in the fact that the political situation created by electoral reforms carried out in specific years in this yet underexplored region should be examined.

Specifically, it is interesting to study the shift from a Single Non-Transferable Vote system (SNTV) to a Mixed-Member system in three countries in the northern part of the region—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—and its impact on patron-clientelism (a trend where individuals in a disadvantaged socio-economic position are influenced by those who control resources and power, gaining their continuous trust and support through these effects (Scott, 1972)) and the overall picture of individual political figures’ significance in politics (Reilly, 2007).

The study of these countries is relevant in terms of their relatively democratic path, as confirmed by Benjamin Reilly’s observations. Specifically, in the 1990s-2000s, the region witnessed significant political events, such as the pro-democratic election of Kim Dae-jung as president in South Korea in 1997, the peaceful transfer of power from one party to another after the victory of opposition leader Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election, and the formation of Japan as one of the main democratic states in the region by the late 1980s and early 1990s.

It should be noted that before the electoral reforms, the Single Non-Transferable Vote system made competition between parties practically irrelevant. In this case, the emphasis was more on individual candidates, which gave room to tendencies such as patron-clientelism and a focus on individual politicians in these developing democracies (Reilly, 2007). It can be said that the initiators of the Mixed-Member system in these countries were motivated by the creation of strong party infrastructures and the establishment of a virtuous political process. For them, the main obstacles appeared to be these two tendencies. Therefore, it is interesting to examine whether the shift to a Mixed-Member system succeeded in eliminating or neutralizing the personal politics that fostered patronage and intra-party tensions in North-East Asian countries.

In this regard, the aim of the research is to analyze the electoral reforms carried out in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The subject of the study is the outcomes of these electoral reforms in relation to patron-clientelism and the personal factor in politics. Based on the aforementioned aspects, the research question will be: What impact did the introduction of a Mixed-Member Majoritarian electoral model in the 1990s-2000s have on political patron-clientelism and the prominence of individual figures in politics in North-East Asian countries?

Literature Review

In order to thoroughly investigate the political outcomes of electoral reforms carried out in the 1990s-2000s in the three North-East Asian countries—Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea—it is essential to review the scientific sources and perspectives related to the region as well as those regarding patron-clientelism and the political factors of individuals.

Firstly, the thoughts of Allen Hicken and Yuko Kasuya are important. The authors emphasize that the political processes and constitutional order in Asian countries have not been adequately studied by scholars (Hicken & Kasuya, 2003). This observation highlights the need for a more complete academic analysis of the electoral and political processes in various regions of Asia, including North-East Asia. In this context, the relevance of my research is further emphasized. The governance systems of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea presented by the authors are also interesting. Their analysis is particularly notable because it provides insight into the legal and political path taken by various Asian states, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Hicken & Kasuya, 2003). However, this does not focus on the situation created by electoral reforms or on patron-clientelism and the political factors of individuals. Therefore, this gap in the literature can be filled by a scientific examination of patron-clientelism and the political role of individuals resulting from electoral changes in the countries of North-East Asia.

The views of Benjamin Reilly are also remarkable. Among other topics, the author focuses on the aforementioned North-East Asian states, which, during the 1990s and 2000s, opted for a transition from a Single Non-Transferable Vote system to a mixed one, partly or fully, with the aim of eliminating patron-clientelism (Reilly, 2007). This perspective is significant for my research, as it focuses specifically on the electoral reforms of that period and the subsequent developments, which are the focus of my own work. Reilly concludes that in East Asian countries (including North-East Asia), electoral changes mainly contributed to strengthening the majoritarian component, which, in turn, increased the likelihood of a two-party political environment (Reilly, 2007). While the source provides an interesting overview of electoral reforms and their subsequent political outcomes, it does not delve deeply enough into two key factors: patron-clientelism and the political role of individuals. Additionally, Reilly addresses multiple East Asian countries rather than focusing solely on the North-East Asian region. Therefore, based on Reilly’s analysis, it is crucial to investigate these two factors specifically within the context of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.

Also relevant are the views of Olli Hellmann. According to the author, political leaders in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan actively engaged in patron-client activities by utilizing state administrative levers for electoral purposes and increasing party ratings (Hellmann, 2013). This aligns with the core theme of my research: the use of administrative resources for political purposes, which creates a solid foundation for the development of political patron-clientelism. In this context, it is of interest to examine the political scenario created by such an institutional environment. Hellmann notes the growing scale of competition among political forces in Japan, where, amidst democratic development, there was a struggle to control state levers. As a result, party leaders had to maintain a calm attitude towards patron-client relations with specific candidates and their voters to avoid internal conflicts within their political organizations. This situation led to the growth of the role of individuals and the institutional dysfunction of parties (Hellmann, 2013). Hellmann provides valuable insights into the institutional development and factors of the political systems in North-East Asia. However, there is no clear connection between the electoral reforms of the 1990s-2000s and changes or continuity in patron-clientelism and the role of individuals. Therefore, it is important to conduct research on the development of patron-clientelism and the growth or reduction of the role of individual politicians after the establishment of the mixed electoral system in these countries.

The views of Orell Croissant are also interesting. According to the author, the political system in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is less polarized, with moderate fragmentation. He emphasizes the importance of program-oriented parties with charismatic leaders and patron-client approaches. Croissant observes that both programmatic and patron-client characteristics are prominent in the political systems of Japan and Taiwan, with charisma and patron-clientelism especially evident in Taiwan (Croissant, 2002). In this regard, his analysis directly highlights the pathways that may help determine how patron-clientelism and the role of individuals evolved politically in these countries as a result of electoral reforms in the 1990s-2000s. Croissant’s study provides thoughtful considerations that are essential for examining the potential impact of the introduction of the mixed electoral system on patron-clientelism and the role of individuals in North-East Asian states.

With regard to political patron-clientelism, the views of James Scott are also insightful. The author focuses on the nature of patron-clientelism in the context of South Asian political processes. Scott emphasizes that this phenomenon is not unique to Asian countries and is not unfamiliar to other developing regions of the world (e.g., African countries) (Scott, 1972). This demonstrates that the formation of patron-client relationships between voters and politicians is a relevant phenomenon in numerous countries across different continents, which further underscores the academic significance of my research. It can confidently be stated that the study of political patron-clientelism in North-East Asia is valuable both scientifically and practically. Additionally, Scott defines the clientelism phenomenon as a situation where an individual from a higher social class uses their authority and resources to encourage someone from a lower social class to provide various services, such as voting in their favor in elections (Scott, 1972). Scott’s analysis is quite valuable for investigating patron-clientelism and the role of individuals in North-East Asian countries. However, there is no emphasis on electoral reforms, which necessitates further research.

From the sources discussed above, it is clear that the impact of electoral changes in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan during the 1990s-2000s on patron-clientelism and the role of individuals in politics is a topic worth investigating. It will be interesting to explore this issue in the context of all three countries in North-East Asia. It is also worth noting that there is limited literature available on the electoral and political processes in these countries, which is a constraint for the research.

Research Design

For an in-depth study of the political outcomes of electoral reforms in North-East Asian countries, it is essential to establish a clear research design. Key aspects in this regard include conceptualization, operationalization, and research methodology (Babbie, 2016).

In the conceptualization phase, it is necessary to discuss key concepts and underlying theoretical foundations (Babbie, 2016). Therefore, it is important to focus on both dependent and independent variables (Van Evera, 1997). In this case, the dependent variables are political patron-clientelism and the personal factor, while the independent variable is electoral system reform. The literature review highlights that the patron-clientelism factor involves a person from a higher social class using their influence to create mutually beneficial connections with someone from a lower social class, improving their conditions or providing one-time assistance (Scott, 1972). This implies a stable relationship where the protégé always feels indebted to the influential person and performs tasks beneficial to them without official documentation. From a political perspective, patron-clientelism involves the use of various state and administrative levers to achieve political goals, such as winning elections (Croissant, 2002). In a political context, patron-clientelism arises when influential political figures use democratic facades to perform favors for supportive voters, ensuring unwavering political support in return. Politicians do not necessarily follow party discipline and form personal connections with citizens (Croissant, 2002). Political patron-clientelism may not always be conducive to healthy political processes and may even undermine stable political conditions. Therefore, it could be argued that for a healthy, competitive, and stable political process, it would be beneficial to reduce or even eliminate this phenomenon. This will be emphasized in the research. The personal political factor refers to a party system based on the personal talents and approaches of specific politicians. This refers to a situation where the charisma of a political figure is more important for political processes than party programs or infrastructure (Reilly, 2007). This focuses on how political figures in electoral and party competition emphasize their personal qualities as a primary weapon. The focus of my research is to examine the importance of political figures’ individual skills and influence compared to other elements of political strategy.

Regarding the independent variable, electoral system change refers to the shift from a Single Non-Transferable Vote system to a Mixed-Member system in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the 1990s to 2000s (Reilly, 2007). A Single Non-Transferable Vote system (SNTV) is a simple majority system in which an individual candidate receives voter support in multi-member constituencies, with no transfer of support between candidates (Lin, 2006). It is important to clarify a Mixed-Member Majoritarian model (MMM) and a Mixed-Member Proportional model (MMP). These electoral systems essentially involve two parallel elections: one in which voters elect a party list proportionally, and another in which they elect individual candidates in single-member constituencies. The difference is that in the Mixed-Member Majoritarian model, results from party lists and single-member constituencies are added together to calculate the party’s overall result, while in the Mixed-Member Proportional system, results from single-member constituencies are considered within the party list, contributing to the proportional result (Thames & Edwards, 2006). My research focuses specifically on the in-depth study of the changes in political patron-clientelism and the political importance of personal factors in these countries after the transition from one electoral system to another.

In the operationalization phase, it is crucial to identify indicators that will allow us to investigate the above variables (Babbie, 2016). In this regard, to study patron-clientelism, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan cases have to be examined by using the following indicators: 1. Unequal, asymmetric relationships (Scott, 1972) – the article investigates how, after the shift to a Mixed-Member system, politicians continued using levers to ensure the well-being of voters in exchange for their political support; 2. Unwavering faith (Scott, 1972) – this involves analyzing whether the tendency for personal trust between politicians and voters in the political process, especially during election campaigns, persisted, decreased, or disappeared after the electoral reforms of the 1990s-2000s; 3. Stable relationships based on needs (Scott, 1972) – the article explores how often patron-client relationships were used without formal structures and frameworks after these changes. Furthermore, to study both political patron-clientelism and the political importance of individuals, investigate voter and candidate behaviors need to be observed after the shift to a Mixed-Member system. Specifically, it is crucial to examine how candidates manage relationships with citizens during election campaigns and how citizens make their electoral decisions in light of the 1990s-2000s reforms (Croissant, 2002). This involves analyzing whether the personal factor of political leaders became weaker or stronger during the election campaign and the relative importance of personal factors compared to party infrastructure during this process. To fully examine these indicators, attention must be paid to sub-indicators such as the individual abilities and behaviors of candidates/politicians and party programs in the political process (Croissant, 2002). In the research, attention must be given to what was prioritized during election campaigns and which sub-indicators were characteristic of the main political parties in each country.

Regarding the research methodology, it is necessary to present the methods through which the research will be conducted. First of all, it is essential to note that both qualitative and quantitative methods are required for studying the cases of North-East Asia, with attention to the validity and reliability of each method (Babbie, 2016). In this context, process tracing (Keohane, King & Verba, 1994) is significant, as it allows for the analysis of the relationship between independent (electoral reform in the 1990s-2000s) and dependent (political patron-clientelism and the personal factor) variables, guiding the proper direction of the study. At the same time, the case study method (Van Evera, 1997) provides an opportunity to determine the political outcomes of these reforms in each country, as it allows for the study of changes or trends in patron-clientelism and personal political significance in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Additionally, based on the indicators and sub-indicators from the operationalization phase, document analysis (Bowen, 2009) is necessary to fully explore the frequency of asymmetric relationships, unwavering faith, and stable relationships without formal structures. Document analysis also allows us to understand the political leader’s personal phenomenon in relations with voters, comparing it with the importance of party programs and administrative resources. This approach ensures validity and reliability by analyzing results from different periods in the 1990s-2010s/2020s regarding patron-clientelism. Descriptive statistics (Babbie, 2016) are also important for this purpose, using sources like Freedom House (Freedom House, n.d.), which will help to assess the importance of patron-clientelism and personal factors in elections and political activities post-reform.

This research design enables the study of political patron-clientelism and the personal factor of politicians in the three North-East Asian countries following the electoral reforms of the 1990s-2000s. Thereafter, the research methods as well as conceptualization and operationalization have an important essence for the perfection of a research about a link between the electoral system and political process of all three aforementioned states of the same region.

Analysis

Case Study of Japan

It is interesting that as a result of changes made in Japan in 1994, a mixed electoral system was established, with a single-member district element brought to the forefront (Lin, 2006). In this regard, it is important to analyze how events unfolded in Japan following this change.

Notably, Japan, which had been considered one of the prominent countries since the 1960s, was affected by the global economic crisis in the 1990s. It is interesting to note that elections played a very significant role in Japan’s political life. Considering that the system ideologists of the so-called developing countries viewed elections held under the principle of a Single Non-Transferable Vote as an effective tool for implementing their individual aspirations (Lin, 2006), it becomes clear that the electoral process in Japan was highly utilized by politicians to serve their personal interests. From this perspective, one might argue that this, in turn, created a problematic situation in terms of the health of competition in the political field. The Single Non-Transferable Vote system, which existed in the country prior to the electoral reforms of the 1990s, gave room to political patron-clientelism. Since party leaders and influential figures had their favorite candidates who would serve their narrow political interests (Lin, 2006), it can concluded that before the activation of the Mixed-Member system in Japan, patron-clientelism and the individual factor of politicians were relevant. Therefore, it can be said that this created serious tension in the political process.

This led to public protests, after which, following lengthy discussions between the parties, a consensus was reached in 1994 to elect members of the lower house of the country’s legislative body, the Diet, under a Mixed-Member Majoritarian model with 300 single-member district seats and 180 (originally 200, later reduced) proportional representation seats (Lin, 2006). Practically, the electoral procedure in the country was changed, but it is interesting to examine the results of this change in terms of the rise or decline of patron-clientelism and the role of individuals in politics. It is evident that, based on the analysis above, both phenomena were firmly rooted and had a significant influence on the political life of the country under the old electoral system. It is important to follow the events chronologically in order to fully study their development in the context of the new electoral system.

It is essential to emphasize that these changes, carried out with prior expectations, were aimed at improving the political process. After the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost control, Japan’s political system embarked on a path of bipartisan development. After 2000, the Democratic Party of Japan was established as the main opposition to the LDP (Lin, 2006). Thus, it could be said that the situation should have developed in the direction of diminishing party competition and the role of individuals, but in practice, this did not happen. In other words, despite the enthusiastic start of the reforms, the processes did not unfold as expected. Following these events, in the 1996 electoral race, politicians relied on their individual supporters to win, a factor that was facilitated by the possibility of running in both proportional and majoritarian elections simultaneously (Lin, 2006). This actually shows that during the first elections under the reform, the individual abilities of politicians were more important than party programs or party platforms, which emphasizes the strength of the role of individuals in politics. All of this raises the question of how the situation evolved after the first elections to the legislative body.

It can be said that the increased role of parties in the political process, and the move towards appealing to the interests of a broader electorate rather than a specific loyal segment, began to take shape. Replacing internal party conflicts with a unified infrastructure and common strategy became the key to success under the new electoral system. In this battle, the barrier between urban and rural voters seemed to fade, and the focus shifted to gaining as many supporters as possible, regardless of location, social status, or other factors (Rosenbluth & Yamada, 2015). This creates the impression that party programs were becoming more important and valuable in the electoral and political process than administrative resources and individual politician skills. Interestingly, in 1996, the LDP nominated a single candidate in almost 80% of constituencies, in 2000 it was 89%, in 2005 it was 100%, and in 2009 it was 99%, among others. This significantly reduced the practice of obtaining votes through material resources in political life (Rosenbluth & Yamada, 2015). In this regard, it seems that the tendency of patron-clientelism was on the decline. This, on one hand, reaffirms the previously expressed point about administrative resources, while on the other, it develops the logic that the importance of individual candidates remained relevant in the political life of the country, despite the seeming decline in their individual influence. Therefore, it can be concluded that at the early stages of the reform, some successes were visible, but it was difficult to predict what long-term results this would yield.

In this context, it is interesting to explore in more depth the significance of individual candidates’ charisma. For example, the LDP, before the change in the electoral system, focused more on its loyal rural voters. After the change, the priority in the government’s funding shifted to social security for urban populations, rather than public projects for rural areas, which had been prioritized before the reform (Rosenbluth & Yamada, 2015). The logic suggests that patron-clientelism was seriously shrinking in scope and was practically becoming irrelevant in the relationship between politicians and voters, largely due to the system change. At the same time, it can be said that the internal restructuring of parties and their updated priorities, made possible by the Mixed-Member Majoritarian model, led to the reduction of individual charisma and the personal element of candidates, preparing fertile ground for ideological platforms and programmatic battles. This indicates that the electoral reform of 1994 in Japan effectively reduced the tendency of winning elections through the manipulation of loyal voters by administrative, material, or other resources, while increasing the role of parties in political life compared to the personal factor. However, the practical experience of the following years showed a different picture.

It is remarkable that there was an active group in Japan known as Koenkai, a circle of loyal voters who supported a particular candidate in exchange for certain benefits (Greenwood et al., 2020). Thus, despite the reduction in the number of candidates in the same constituency, which seemingly strengthened the party platform, it can be said that this tendency actually helped preserve Koenkai. According to my research operationalization, an unshakable bond was formed between voters and politicians. This shows that the campaign to remove administrative resources from political life and strengthen the political significance of party programs was not entirely successful in Japan. In practice, patron-clientelism and the political factor of individuals remained intact and gradually increased.

It should be noted that under centralized financial and budgetary resources, the LDP maintained its ability to fund local-level politicians, which once again drew a line between rural and urban voters and reinforced the support of segmented voters through funding public projects (Greenwood et al., 2020). This situation exhibited an asymmetric relationship between politicians and voters, as, on one hand, the funding of certain projects helped politicians exert influence over their voters, while on the other, it fragmented and divided voters based on certain criteria. According to the 2012 Freedom House report, the tendency for mutually beneficial business relationships between the banking sector, the ruling party, and large private enterprises was also confirmed (Puddington et al., 2013). This again underscores the asymmetric relationship and the absence of formal structures in the relationships between politicians, voters, and other segments (including the private sector), where politicians freely demanded any type of resources from businesses and directed voters as per their interests.

This ultimately shows that the asymmetric relationship between politicians and voters, unwavering belief, and stable relationships without any formal framework continued to strengthen, and personal interests and individuals came to the forefront in electoral and political arenas over parties. In this regard, it can be said that the seemingly weakened personal factor of politicians actually strengthened, becoming more significant than party platforms and infrastructure. Consequently, political patron-clientelism and individual charisma remained relevant in Japan. While summarizing the case of Japan, it can be said that despite some initial successes, political patron-clientelism and the strength of individuals in politics ultimately remained relevant aspects in the country’s ongoing processes. In this regard, it is worth noting that the shift to the Mixed-Member Majoritarian model did not eliminate these two phenomena from Japan’s political life.

Case study of South Korea

It is important to note that authoritarian tendencies were prevalent in South Korea until the second half of the 1980s, which provided a solid foundation for patron-client relationships and personal factors in politics (You, 2015). In this context, it is interesting to examine the issue of patron-clientelism and the role of individuals in politics following the electoral reform that was implemented.

Notably, the ruling party in the country focused on rural constituencies to win votes in exchange for specific benefits (You, 2015), a situation that mirrors Japan’s political dynamics. Despite democratic shifts in the 1980s, the electoral process continued to be marked by the biased division of voters and the strengthening of patron-clientelism during the 1990s (You, 2015). Additionally, since 1973, South Korea had employed a Single Non-Transferable Vote system (Grofman et al., 1999), which likely accelerated the pace of patron-clientelism. These developments suggest that before the transition to a Mixed-Member system, the political process was largely shaped by support from loyal voters, highlighting the significant role of political leaders over party platforms. This raises an interesting question about the development of events after the electoral reform.

It is important to highlight that South Korea fully implemented the Mixed-Member system in 2004. As a result, the National Assembly, consisting of 299 legislators, included 243 majoritarian and 56 proportional representatives. A 3% threshold was introduced for parties to gain seats in the legislature (Reilly, 2007). These electoral changes seem to have been aimed at addressing the regionally concentrated nature of political parties and their election strategies, which were more aligned with regional rather than national interests, posing a challenge to the democratic process. This logic still implied a division of voters based on benefits, suggesting that patron-client relationships remained a key phenomenon. Therefore, it is essential to analyze how events unfolded following these electoral reforms.

It is noteworthy that, in parallel with the 2004 electoral changes, the Political Parties Act was revised to combat patron-clientelism. This revision focused on reorganizing the organizational structure of South Korean political parties and their local offices. As a result, leading parties abolished over 200 local organizations that had been staffed primarily through personal connections (Han, 2021). This indicates that initial steps were taken to address patron-clientelism and to emphasize party infrastructure over individual politicians. This suggests that the reform aimed to eliminate personal relationships and voter segmentation from the electoral and political process. Thus, it seems that South Korea’s reform mirrored similar efforts seen in Japan’s electoral changes. However, the regionally concentrated voter base still persisted, and between 2004 and 2018, state funding for the two main parties – the Democratic Party and the Conservative Party – grew by almost 10%. During the same period, membership contributions to the Conservative Party decreased by almost 15%, and to the Democratic Party – by about 30% (Han, 2021). This suggests that long-term changes did not contribute to the stabilization of the party system or the institutional environment, leading to the conclusion that patron-clientelism and the role of political personalities continued to shape the political process.

Compared to Japan, South Korea exhibited signs of concern much earlier regarding the Mixed-Member Majoritarian model’s inability to curb patron-clientelism and the role of political charisma. Research by Han indicates that in 2012, unlike in 2004, the electoral approaches and messages of the Conservatives and the Democrats were significantly out of sync with the demands of the general voter base. This prompted the parties to segment the electorate (Han, 2021). This indicates that patron-clientelism continued to play a prominent role eight years after the reform, despite efforts to prioritize party platforms over individual personalities. The situation in South Korea, as in Japan, shows that after the shift to the Mixed-Member Majoritarian system, initial steps were taken to prevent patron-client relationships between voters and politicians. However, political circles did not display enough will to effectively address this, allowing patron-client relationships and the regional loyalty of voters to persist. As a result, party platforms were not sufficiently emphasized, and individual politicians’ roles remained central.

To understand patron-clientelism and the role of political figures in South Korea, it is important to consider the operationalization aspect. It is clear that a strong loyalty remained between voters and politicians, as individual politicians maintained loyal voter groups, known as Sajojiks, which were actively used during elections, independent of party agendas (Hellmann, 2011). This supports the idea that, despite the shift towards party platforms, South Korean politicians continued to rely on loyal electorates in the electoral process. The presence of Sajojiks emphasizes that, despite the development of party platforms, individual politicians still played a dominant role. This is further evidenced by data from Transparency International, showing that in 2010-2011, nearly 70% of South Korean respondents accused political parties of corruption and unethical behavior. Despite the legislative changes starting in 2004, political organizations continued to use traditional, unofficial practices, such as school boy and house boy systems, to gather votes (Hellmann, 2014). This demonstrates that stable relationships between voters and politicians, without formal constraints, remained intact, confirming that patron-clientelism continued to thrive in South Korean politics after the introduction of the Mixed-Member Majoritarian model.

It is also worth mentioning that, according to Freedom House data for 2018 and 2019, South Korea experienced malapportionment in rural areas, similar to Japan (Freedom House, n.d.). The New Village Movement, which has existed in the country for many years (How the African Development Bank and Korea are transforming African villages and boosting rural economies, 2018), likely played a significant role in supporting the ruling party’s patron-client interests. In other words, politicians continued to use their leverage over loyal rural voters to secure their support in elections, representing an asymmetrical relationship.

A comprehensive analysis of the situation reveals that, despite some steps toward developing party infrastructure, individual politicians’ roles remained more significant in the political process. Lee and Shin confirm this aspect in their 2016 article, asserting that individual political leaders, rather than party politics, remained crucial in South Korea’s political process (Lee & Shin, 2016). This may explain why, in 2020, the political elite of South Korea reverted to a Mixed-Member Proportional model instead of the Mixed-Member Majoritarian system, also motivated by the desire to create a multiparty political field (Kim, 2020). This suggests that insufficient political will and the personal interests of politicians prevented the decline of patron-clientelism and individual political charisma.

To sum up, similar to Japan, South Korea’s shift to the Mixed-Member Majoritarian system failed to eliminate patron-clientelism and the importance of individual politicians. While South Korea faced regionalism more acutely than Japan, it became evident more quickly after the electoral reform that patron-clientelism and the role of political leaders remained influential in electoral and political processes, mirroring trends in Japan.

Case study of Taiwan

In Taiwan, just like in South Korea, the movement towards democratic governance began in the second half of the 1980s (Reilly, 2007). It is also important to note that the political life of Taiwan has been significantly influenced by the People’s Republic of China (Freedom House, n.d.). From this perspective, it is interesting to analyze the patron-client and personalist political tendencies in this country. Thereafter, all the important details that followed the democratization process in Taiwan need to be examined.

Interestingly, Taiwan’s system of a Single Non-Transferable Vote was replaced by a Mixed-Member Majoritarian model (Huang, Kuo & Stockton, 2016). This can be seen as evidence of a reform similar to those in Japan and South Korea. At first glance, the logic suggests that similar events might have unfolded here as well. The reform initiated in 2005 aimed to reduce and eventually eliminate both political patron-client networks and the dominant role of individuals in politics (Reilly, 2007). This creates the impression that, just like in the previously discussed countries, patron-client relationships and the focus on individuals had a wide scope in Taiwan, which many did not consider a healthy political condition. This created the necessity for such a reform. As a result, 73 out of 113 legislators were elected according to the majoritarian principle, while 34 were elected through proportional representation. At that time, the election of six additional representatives was also made possible through local elections (Reilly, 2007). Against this backdrop, it is essential to examine the developments that followed the reform.

At the outset of the discussion, it is important to note that Taiwan, like South Korea, had the problem of a regionally concentrated electorate (Reilly, 2007). This supports the earlier argument that conditions for patron-clientelism were created in the country, as the phenomenon of a regionally aligned electorate is a clear illustration of this. Especially considering the fact that Kuomintang (KMT) formed patron-client relations with influential groups (Lin, 2006) and that there were numerous cases of vote-buying in the early 21st century (You, 2015), it becomes clear that clientelism was a significant phenomenon in Taiwan’s electoral and political processes. During the 2004 parliamentary elections, foreign observers emphasized the material incentives provided by individual politicians to voters, especially in rural areas (You, 2015). Therefore, it should come as no surprise that patron-clientelism and personalism had deep roots in Taiwan’s political life. Additionally, given that intra-party tensions and divisions under the non-transferable vote system were driven by the significant role of individual candidates (Stockton, 2010), it becomes clearer how diminished party competition and the prominence of individual politicians shaped Taiwan’s political process.

While looking at the World Economic Forum’s corruption ratings for the years 2002-2004 and 2006, an average corruption score appears to be 4.5 (You, 2015). Considering also the reformists’ desire to strengthen party platforms (You, 2015), it is clear that initial progress was made, and there seemed to be groundwork for reducing patron-clientelism and increasing party competition. However, the revelation of over 5,000 cases of vote-buying in 2008, which led to legal proceedings against a legislator (Puddington et al., 2009), clearly shows that patron-clientelism persisted in Taiwan’s political process even after the electoral reform.

While considering these facts from the perspective of operationalization, several important elements can be figured out. In 2013, Lin Yi, who was elected to the legislative body under the KMT list, was exposed for being involved in secret dealings with a large business, mismanaging millions of dollars in assets, and engaging in vote-buying (Puddington et al., 2015). This case illustrates, on the one hand, that there were illegal relationships between politicians and businessmen, conducted without formal standards or boundaries. On the other hand, it highlights the asymmetry of these relationships, as business structures provided money to the ruling party representative for electoral and other political goals, while the politician used their influence to create favorable conditions for the business’s existence and development. These details can lead to a judgement that even after the implementation of the Mixed-Member Majoritarian model, patron-clientelism continued to thrive in Taiwan’s political process, fueled by the strengthening of individual politicians’ roles and the dysfunctional party competition.

This conclusion is further supported by the case of former president Lee Teng-hui in 2011, when illicit funds were obtained through obscure channels to finance analytical groups (Puddington et al., 2015). This not only reinforces the strong influence of individuals in politics but also contains elements of patron-clientelism. This case demonstrates the necessity of building unwavering trust between politicians and their loyal electorate or business circles because the head of state used illegal income to finance research groups that would support his electoral and other political objectives. Interestingly, during 2019, large business figures closely connected to the KMT had significant influence in the political process. Compared to the country’s second major party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the KMT received more financial and material resources from the country’s production, which eventually led to discussions about the responsibility of specific KMT members (Freedom House, n.d.). This further reinforces the argument that patron-clientelism played a major role in Taiwan’s political life, as well as the continued importance of individual politicians’ charisma in the political arena. This suggests that due to the pursuit of private interests by politicians and the dysfunctional political environment, neither of these phenomena was eliminated from Taiwan’s political life.

In sum, it is clear that, after the introduction of the Mixed-Member Majoritarian model, both patron-clientelism and the personalist political nature of Taiwan remained firmly in place. Moreover, Taiwan’s case is more similar to South Korea’s, as both countries saw only a brief influence of the electoral reform on the reduction of patron-clientelism and individualistic politics. As the analysis showed, the impact of this reform in Japan lasted longer, but in all three countries, patron-clientelism and the influence of individuals in politics did not diminish in the long term. In fact, they persisted and even continued with a new dynamic.

Conclusion

Thus, in response to the research question above, the following hypothesis can be formulated: The introduction of the Mixed-Member Majoritarian electoral model in North-East Asian countries in the 1990s and 2000s failed to eliminate the factors of political patron-clientelism and the prominence of individuals in politics, despite initial attempts. Consequently, in the long-term, these two factors remained relevant in the political life of all three countries.

It is worth noting that the weak aspects of this research were the lack of literature on the electoral and political systems of North-East Asian countries, as well as the limited time and financial resources. Nevertheless, the consistent analysis with the available resources revealed that, in Japan, following the electoral reform, there was some temporary reduction in both patron-clientelism and the desire for party platforms to be placed ahead of individual politicians. However, ultimately, both factors became so ingrained in the political and social consciousness of the Japanese that their elimination was impossible, and over time, they re-emerged. As the analysis shows, a similar situation developed in South Korea and Taiwan, but with the difference that in these countries, the strength of patron-clientelism and the personal charisma of politicians became evident much more quickly in their political processes.

Furthermore, the research clearly shows that groups such as Koenkai (Greenwood et al., 2020), Sajojik (Hellmann, 2011), and various business and analytical teams (Puddington et al., 2015) created the basis for political leaders and their parties to develop loyal electorates and groups of supporters. Consequently, the factor of unwavering belief remained in place. At the same time, as the analysis made clear, the relationships between politicians and their loyal electorates or business circles proceeded without formal structures, as evidenced by the existence of the schoolboy institution (Hellmann, 2014) and many other cases described above. Moreover, the employment of loyal voters in rural development and other projects using state leverage, which gave politicians significant influence over voters, created asymmetrical relationships between political leaders and specific representatives of society. This, in turn, further reinforced the grounds for patron-clientelism.

The research clearly demonstrates that, despite the development of some bipartite competition and the refinement of party infrastructure, significant influence by political figures remained in the political processes of North-East Asian countries, and party competition did not fully develop. In conclusion, it can be said that the transition from a Single Non-Transferable Vote system to a Mixed-Member Majoritarian model failed to reduce the prominence of patron-clientelism and individual politicians in the political life of North-East Asian countries. A recommendation would be to conduct more in-depth research into the social, cultural, and other aspects that may influence the increasing role of patron-clientelism and political charisma in the political processes of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

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