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An Exposé on Corruption in Political Parties' Financing and Electoral Credibility in Nigeria

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Abstract

Political party financing and spending during elections in North-Central Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole has become worrisome in that scholars across the globe have been divided in their quest to provide answers to the obvious question of whether or not it has an impact on the credibility of the overall electoral process viz-à-vis the behaviours of the electorate. Hence, the study examined political party financing and voting behaviour in north-central Nigeria, with particular focus on the level of financing in the region, the underlining motivations for such financing, and an insight into the benefits or otherwise of political party financing on governance and development in the region. In achieving the research objectives, quantitative and qualitative methods were utilised. The data obtained were analysed descriptively. The investment theory of politics and social exchange theory were the theoretical frameworks

adopted. Findings reveal that political party financing does impact voting behaviour in the 2015-2023 general elections. It further revealed that excessive political party financing affects the performances of eventual winners after elections, and lastly, that political party financing does not benefit the region in terms of governance and development. The study therefore concludes, among other things, that electoral financing, especially if unregulated, is capable of destroying governance and development in the region. Thus, the study recommends that the federal government, without undermining the existence of INEC, the nation's electoral body, establish an independent and distinct body whose sole function is to oversee and regulate the financing of the electoral process.

Keywords: Election, Electoral Credibility, Political Party & Democratic Sustainability

Introduction

An election is a process where the citizens exercise some degree of control over their representative (Obi, Sekpe, & Stephenson, 2019). It is one thing to have elections, another to accomplish the transition to democracy, and still another to continue holding elections regularly for many years after the change is complete. To have credible elections, which are elections that are generally acknowledged as being free and fair by the people as well as the international community, is something entirely different. If the outcomes of elections are seen as legitimate by all of the relevant parties, then there is a better probability that democracy will be consolidated. An examination of the election anomalies that pose a threat to the process of democracy's consolidation in Nigeria's fourth republic is the focus of this body of work, as it concerns the impact of political party financing on election credibility. It analyses how electoral fraud and violence can "deconsolidate" democracy. Since 1999, electoral misconduct in Nigeria's fourth republic has raised concerns about democracy consolidation. This article proposes election malpractice prevention strategies. On May 29, 1999, Nigerians established a

democratic government after a protracted military rule that nearly crippled the economy. Citizens believed the new period would improve their lives and the nation. However, the political system seems to have internalised impunity rather than the suavity and politeness that will strengthen democracy. Even elections, which are the minimum condition for any political system to join the exclusive club of democracies, have been horribly manipulated by political elites to reflect the views of the people.

Nigeria has had seven general elections and other re-runs and local government elections since returning to civil rule on May 29, 1999. Only the 2011 and 2015 general election satisfied local and international standards out of seven. However, each general election was worse than the one before (2003 was worse than 1999, 2007 was worse than 2003, 2019 was worse than 2003, and 2023 was worse than 2019 since INEC refused to post presidential results in real time). This graph reveals that our country is faring pretty poorly at each election. Leaders seem to have forgotten that free and fair elections are essential to democratic growth. An average Nigerian voter wants instant material rewards and will easily trade off his votes when enticed. The people's severe poverty and justified suspicion of political leaders explain this. Indeed, free and fair elections must represent the will of the people. Elections, especially in advanced democracies with many vested interests, are expensive.

The role of money in Nigerian electioneering campaigns is crucial to the way a society works. Money in politics that isn't controlled creates a level playing field, which adds to the idea that money can buy political power and threatens political equality. This lack of a level playing field makes it hard for all citizens to take part and be represented in democratic government processes in the same way. Political groups need money to be able to do what the law says they have to do in their own areas. Without money, it might be hard for politicians and political groups to explain and show voters their ideas. For political groups to sell their plans and platforms to the public, they need money. However, party financing, particularly campaign financing globally, is fraught with corruption. The history of electoral contests in Nigeria is

replete with moneybags bankrolling candidates' elections. Incumbency factors, such as vote buying, bribery, and other financial inducements by politicians, security agents, electoral officers, and civil society groups, have been commonplace in most elections conducted in Nigeria since the return of the current democratic process in 1999.

The increasing role of money in Nigerian electoral processes over the years, especially since 1999, has led to the sidelining of the people in terms of providing the dividends of democracy to them. This contrasts with the democratic promises made to the Nigerian populace in 1999. Due to illegal actions during the election process, the Nigerian government has been in a state of uncertainty. Due to problems with how her elections were run, Nigeria's Fourth Republic has been marked by a high level of political instability. This is clear from the fact that election petition courts all over the country have thrown out many election results. The role of money in politics and buying votes in Nigerian politics today has made it possible for the political bourgeois to dominate and hold key elected and appointed political positions, controlling the power of the state and making decisions about who gets what, when, and how.

From what has been said, it is clear that people all over the world, including Nigerians who are eligible to vote in North-central Nigeria, want political parties and governments to reflect their views and meet their needs. But all too often, parties serve the interests of the donors who have given them most of their money. If big businesses and wealthy people can buy more power by giving a lot of money to campaigns, people may lose faith in the political process or be left out of it. This is made worse by the fact that people don't join political groups, which makes people even less interested in politics. In addition to this, politicians with a lot of money or deep pockets often buy their way into public office by taking advantage of the high level of poverty and the dominant subjective-parochial political culture in Nigeria and among the North-central Nigerian population. Some of the time, they use an army of unemployed young people as thugs and killers to achieve narrow and selfish goals. At the moment, Nigerian political groups have a lot of ways to get money. Parties can charge their members' dues either

once a month or when they join. They can ask for money from groups that agree with them, like trade unions and private businesses. Parties also make money by charging people who want to run for office for entry and interest forms before elections. Lastly, some parties' internal constitutions give them the right to charge members who were either voted in or picked by the party. Most of the time, they get about 5% of the pay of their chosen and appointed public officials (Nwankwo, 2017). So, the main goal of this study is to look at how political parties get money and how normal Nigerians vote to see how much the first affects the second.

Several studies have been conducted on elections in Nigeria and general voters' behaviour (see, for example, Anifowose, 1982; Tenuche, 2009, 2010; Segun and Oni, 2010; OECD Report, 2013; Egwemi, 2013; Segun, 2013; Nnamani, 2014; Aondowase, 2015; Ibrahim, Liman, Mato, 2015), among others. However, to a large extent, existing studies have not substantially addressed the chosen topic scientifically and holistically in the format this study intends to. To this extent, the issue of political party financing and the electoral behaviour of voters in the chosen area, the North-central Nigeria region of Nigeria, which constitute the thrust of this study, has not actually been examined. This leaves a major hiatus in Nigeria's political history that needs to be closed.

For instance, Tenuche (2009), Segun and Oni (2010), and Segun (2013) specifically revealed that among the people of Ebiraland (North-central Nigeria, Nigeria) in the chosen area of this study, the electoral behaviour of voters is essentially determined by the ability of the political gladiators to appeal to and mobilise ethnic, sub-ethnic, and religious sentiments and identities of the people concerned to ascend to political office. In particular, Tenuche (2009) noted that during the Second Republic, the dimension that was introduced into party politics in Ebiraland was the increased political mobilisation of sub-ethnic identities, as witnessed in the fierce contest for power between Adamu Attah (a son of Ibrahim Atta) and Obatemi Usman for a seat in the Constituent Assembly in 1977. Resorting to appeal to the sentiments of his Oziogu

clan, Obatemi Usman, who lost to Adamu Atta, accused the Aniku sub-clan of Adavi, to which Attah belonged, of occupying most of the public offices in Ebiraland.

On their own part, Adamu, Ocheni, and Ibrahim (2016) viewed the role and influential impact of money on politics generally and the voting behaviour of average Nigerian voters and stated how politicians often adopt this strategy of vote-buying to cover up their inability to convince the electorate through their manifesto as to what they stand for, their mission and vision, and most importantly, what the electorate stands to benefit if voted into power. Their study is broader in context, covering the entire Nigerian population without specifically focusing on a specific study population. This constitutes a major problem. Similarly, while Obi, etal (2019) identified that the results of the 2015 general elections clearly portrayed the dominance of ethno-regional sentiments as determinants of voting behaviour and political participation across the country, Adetula (2015) recognised money, godfathers, and election violence as the key determinants of voters' behaviour and their participation in elections in Nigeria, particularly in the 2015 and 2019 general elections. Therefore, despite the avalanche of some of these studies, none has been able to substantially and adequately document the chosen topic for this research work. As a result, the study identified several problems. One is that there is an apparent dearth of studies on political party financing and voting behaviour in North-central Nigeria. Two, while previous research efforts have drawn attention to religion, ethnisim, godfatherism, and electoral violence, it is believed that these probably could not have been exhaustive of the factors that influence the electoral behaviour of the people of North-central Nigeria. It is on this premise that the study seeks to examine the impact of political party financing on voting behaviour in North-central Nigeria in an attempt to establish the extent of political party financing in the region and how political party financing affects the behaviour of voters in North-central Nigeria. Although this study does not claim to provide an exhaustive examination of political party financing and electoral behaviour among the people of North-central Nigeria, it will unravel an interesting research area that has been neglected by scholars. Hence, the research provide answers to the following questions:

What is the level of political party financing in North-central Nigeria?

What are the factors responsible for political parties financing in North-central Nigeria?

What is the effect of a political party's political party financing on the electoral behaviour of voters?

Conceptual Literature Review

The Concept of Elections and Electoral Process

Elections signify a competitive politics that tends to bind citizens closer to the political process (Eme and Elekwa, 2008: 57). Therefore, the importance of elections as formal processes or procedures of balloting that allow members of an organisation or state to choose people who they believe will represent their interests or hold positions of authority on their behalf through voting cannot be overemphasised. It is in this respect that Akindele, Obiyan, and Owoeye (2000), for instance, argue that to a certain degree, elections are historically identified as the genesis or breeding father of the representative form of government, which to them in political parlance connotes the selection of people, that is, the representatives, by qualified adult voters into public offices. They further emphasise that the origin of elections is traceable to the ancient city-states of the Greeks, from whom it has been immortalised as a symbol of democracy. Hence, to them, even though it was then by lot and involved the showing of hands to indicate support or disapproval on any decision or topical issue under discussion, it has today retained that special emphasis, especially on the qualifications of aspirants for political offices. Therefore, they conclude that since its entry into the realm of political activities, elections have passed through many reformatory Rubicons and political metamorphoses ranging from denied, restricted, to unrestricted franchises or rights, the variations of which still exist today within different contemporary polities (Akindele *et al.*, 2000).

Thus, the election itself has been subjected to intense controversy and/or debate among political scientists and other writers regarding what it means. For instance, while defining elections, This is suggestive as it is instructive that citizens' participation and active involvement in the electoral process are pivotal to the democratic process. As a matter of fact, it is the irreducible criterion without which elections and democracy lose their savour.

It is this homogeneity of democracy and elections that makes Eme and Elekwa (2008) assert that in many parts of the globe, the impression is given that elections are equivalent to democracy. Even though the authors disagree with such a position on the sameness of elections and democracies, it is important to emphasise the point that elections do reinforce democracies. Corroborating this assertion, Apam notes that "elections have meaning for most people only in a democratic context because they lead to the choice of decision makers by the majority of citizens" (Apam, 2008: 90), and particularly so that elections and democracy, in the view of Ibrahim (2007) (cited in Apam, 2008), are inextricably linked such that the latter, elections, serve as the bedrock upon which democratic institutions are based.

Arising from the foregoing, Nwosu (2008: 104) observes that if nothing else, the significance of elections to liberal democracy is that they provide an avenue for the concrete expression of three major attributes of democratic governance: choice, participation, and accountability. In a nutshell, elections emphasise the ideas of popular choice making, representation of interests in public space, and demand for accountable and responsive leadership by the people from their leaders, the representatives in contemporary democracies.

Notwithstanding the important role of elections in every democratic polity, elections have continued to pose several challenges to Nigeria's democracy since the country's return to the path of supposed democratic (or civil?) rule. For many African leaders at the helm of affairs, rather than seeing and approaching elections as diligent, civilised, and democratically acceptable means of leadership recruitment by the consent of the majority of the people, they

rather see them as mere veneers to attain political power and relevance. Hence, many leaders of the continent, including successive administrations in Nigeria since 1999, pay lip service to the tenets that elections hold in a supposed democratic setting. Nothing betrays this pretension more than the statement credited to Nigeria's former President Olusegun Obasanjo, who, while campaigning for his People's Democratic Party (PDP) presidential candidate in the 2007 elections, the late Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, overtly told the bewildered public that for him (Chief Obasanjo, the then sitting president) and his party (the PDP), the elections were going to be a "do or die affair" (Adebayo and Omotola, 2010; Agbor, 2007). This explains why many elections in Africa and indeed Nigeria end up with violence of unimaginable proportions leading to untimely loss of lives and wanton destruction of property of the citizenry, including creating palpable tensions and fears that eventually culminate in violent conflicts, as experiences of post-election violence in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and others have shown. It is for this reason that Tenuche (2011) argues, for instance, that political succession in Nigeria, and by implication, indeed the rest of Africa, has been plagued by problems for the most part due to the fact that the choices for citizens to select who rules them are cut off even before elections, which undermines elections as the manifestation of the will of the people and a way to protect and safeguard democratic norms and ideals.

To tie all of this together, Sani (2015) makes the astute observation that elections are democratic when they allow for equal voter participation, are carried out with an authentic voter list and adequate electoral materials, and are free from fraud, repression, or intimidation in such a way that all contestants are able to engage in their activities without hindrance. That is, they allow for participation, encourage competition, and are generally regarded as a respectable means of ascending the political ladder. On the other hand, despite the fact that democratic elections are open to public participation, feature open and fair competition, and are generally seen as the correct way to ascend to power, our experience shows that not all elections are democratic.

Political Parties

Political parties, no doubt, constitute the bedrock upon which the entire structure of democracy and democratic governance, especially in an electorally competitive democracy, rest. Thus, the importance of parties in elections and democracy cannot be overemphasised. Although consensus does not exist on how scholars and stakeholders have come to view parties, nonetheless, as Usman, and Obiyan, (2016) rightly states, "in spite of the many definitions of political parties by scholars, there is relative certainty as to what constitutes a political party". Political parties, if not anything, serve as platforms for candidates to contest elections and/or vie for public offices on the strengths of their respective manifestos and ideologies, with the intention of winning in order to form a government in power.

In particular, it is this singular character that distinguishes the political parties from other organised groups in the state. As such, political parties have been conceptualised from various dimensions and backgrounds by scholars. Scholars have different views of political parties; be that as it may, most scholars views (Ukase, 2015) say that political groups are more about who controls the government. Elections are the way that political parties drive the democratic process. Institutionalising democracy isn't possible without political parties. This is why Agbaje, in Adejumo and Kehinde (2007), says that it's almost impossible to think of democracy, either in theory or in practise, without participation. The only way to run for office at regular intervals is through the party system. It is the political parties that give voters different choices at the polls by offering competing platforms and points of view. This makes electoral competition possible by reinforcing the fact that losing an election is a given and that the result cannot be changed (Adejumo and Kehinde, 2007).

But Ukase (2015:7) says that there are some things that all definitions of political parties have in common. Those things are getting power and keeping legal control of their own places. Political parties are the most important way for candidates to compete for political power, join

government activities, and have their voices heard. Each party has its own structure, rules, leadership, members, finances, and beliefs.

Impact of Political Party Financing on Nigeria Democratic Sustainability

During the last general election, the way political groups and their candidates raised money led to a number of troubling issues. Corruption in the election process was shown by the fact that political parties used a lot of money that was, to put it politely, not theirs to run their campaigns. Even though campaigns have acceptable costs, the way political parties and candidates raise money shows how commercialised the election process has become. This makes it hard to trust the legal and moral standing of those who want to lead the country (The Guardian, 2015). The Guardian newspaper was much more honest about what was going on. In one of its editorials, it said, among other things, "It is a tragic drama that business, interest groups, and different people raised, for example, billions of naira in a few hours to support an individual's campaign for elective office in a country where millions of people are jobless." Clearly, donors to all parties have sent a strong message that they have only played their cards face-up for their own benefit, with the implication that such donors would be key players in the control of the nation's economic levers if their beneficiaries won the election (The Guardian, 2015).

First, there was proof that people who had access to high-paying government jobs gave money to individual party members. However, most of the rest of the money came from government-favoured merchants and contractors (Kura, 286). Unfortunately, this pattern of giving has big effects on the government and the democratic future of the country. This gift, for example, shows how important patron-client networks and neo-patrimonialism are in African politics, which takes them to new heights. Okpeh (2013) was more honest about this topic. Neo-patrimonialism also refers to the tendency of the ruling class to do favours for each other (both in cash and in kind) in order to stay in the power game. According to this line of thinking, a

new politician must first find a powerful backer, or "Godfather," who can spread the word about him to the people who count. This negotiation is often based on a few questionable deals between the person who wants to be a politician and his or her patron. It has nothing to do with helping the public. In the end, the authority of the voters is used to help the patron and his friends, which puts the political process in danger (Okpeh, 2013).

Money seems to be able to play a role in a lot of different things. Money, for example, can change the outcome of an election, affect how people vote, and make or break a person's authority. Money does play a big role in how and where politics are played in Nigeria, as Okpeh (2013) said. Because of money, the ruling elites have been able to control national politics at the expense of the interests of the masses as a whole. Also, one of the bad things about money is that it makes it harder for leaders to get people to follow them in politics. Worse, money has not only helped to establish and strengthen class dominance, but it has also made our political culture shorter and our political process less idealistic. These things lead to more crude ambition, corruption, and mediocrity (Okpeh, 2013, Oyovbaire, 1999, and Lawrence, 2002). During the 2015 elections, this financing system was seen as making corruption worse. It also makes the government less open, accountable, and responsive to the hopes and dreams of the general public. Second, people who give money have power over the people who get it, and leaders become more accountable to their sponsors than to the people they represent. This has big effects on how the government works after an election. It is a given that most of the gifts came from people who have or want to get respect from the government. For example, because these donors aren't "Father Christmas," they take over government institutions as soon as elections are over and put their friends and "godsons" in high-paying political positions so they can get their money back and also make a lot of money. Corporate donors would always ask the government they supported for policies that would help their different industries, even if those policies were very bad for society as a whole. This goes against the ideas of democracy and good government, and it also has the unintentional effect of making corruption in the government even worse. Third, the fact that money is so

important in Nigeria's political system makes it hard for good-hearted Nigerians to use politics as a tool for change. In a country with a big gap between the rich and the poor, a campaign's cash needs automatically leave out a lot of people who might have good ideas. This is because they don't have the help of godfathers like many older Nigerians and people who are already in power. Because of this, most poor people and young people can't use politics as a way to make big changes in society.

Political party financing and Voting Behaviour in Nigeria

In fact, since the emergence of what Samuel Huntington (1991) describes as the "third wave of democratisation" in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet totalitarian regime primarily due to democratic reforms by Mikhail Gorbachev, competitive electoral democracy appears to be on the prowl in Africa, and indeed, the rest of the global community, including Nigeria, appears to be bowing to its wave. And by implication, regular elections between rival political parties and movements have evolved into the preeminent mechanism of leadership recruitment and government selection. During this process, the electoral bodies, on the one hand, as well as political parties and candidates, on the other hand, need access to money in order to perform their statutory obligations without fear or favour. Additionally, political parties and candidates need to reach out to the electorate in order to explain their objectives and policies and receive feedback from them regarding their perspectives.

Therefore, financial support for political parties has a constructive role to play in democracies since it has the potential to assist in the strengthening of political parties and candidates and provide opportunities to compete on terms that are more equitable. In fact, as IDEA (2014) has pointed out in an eloquent manner, having sufficient access to money that is provided without any strings attached is essential to the general vitality of an electoral and democratic system since it helps voters believe in (and trust) politics and politicians. Sadly, behind the surface, political institutions frequently function quite differently from the ideals of inclusion and fair

play on which the concept of the democratic process is based. In the direst of circumstances, elections are reduced to nothing more than a farce, providing the electorate with no actual options. These extremes may have been brought about by a number of circumstances, including the domination of an elite, electoral fraud, and the use of violence (or the threat of its use). The power of money is one of the primary elements that prevents the political process in many nations from reaching democratic ideals. This is true across the globe. Even though money is essential for democratic politics, it may also be used as a weapon by some people to improperly influence the political process by purchasing votes or influencing policy decisions. While money is essential for democratic politics, it can also be used as a tool for this purpose.

In Nigeria, the influence that such financing has had in the past on our elections makes many believe that Nigeria's democracy is not one where the electorate freely decides who governs them but where the amount of 'war chest, that is, money, available to the political elites and actors determines the direction and outcomes of elections. Even INEC, which is expected to be an unbiased umpire, has had its supposed integrity stained and muddled up in previous elections due to its connivance with the ruling parties at various levels to rig elections, thereby truncating the free will of the people through the ballot (Agbor, 2007).

Adetula (2011) asserts that "money and violence exercise significant influence over electoral politics in Nigeria" in this regard. Elections in the nation have historically been tainted by violence and financial scheming by wealthy elites hell-bent on maintaining their power over the masses of voters. According to media accounts from the general public and reports from local and foreign observers, each of the five national elections that have been held in the nation since 1999 has seen its share of violent clashes. Concerning is also the shady use of funds by "money bag" politicians and godfathers," who use the advantages of state-sponsored patronage politics to manipulate the electorate using "carrots and sticks" tactics, leading to vote-buying, intimidation, and violent elections. The comment made by Paul Collier about money and politics in Nigeria is quite telling. It demonstrates how the wealthy elites control electoral

politics in the nation. He asserts that "money is one factor in the struggle between fair governance and the other possibilities. How can you defeat a well-established rival while running as an unknown candidate in Nigeria in just a few months? You most likely require a lot of money, is the answer (Collier, 2009: 45).

Electoral Democracy, Party Financing and Voters' Behaviour in Nigeria; Brief Highlight

In order to give voters a variety of real options when they go to the polls, electoral democracy, as described ab initio, is built on the premise of free and open competition among alternative political parties that represent various policy programmes, candidate groups, and societal sectors (Omilusi, 2019). Elections are important in this case; political parties are the tools or institutions used, and political parties have evolved into institutions that play crucial roles in the electoral advancement of nations. Their functions and the best methods of financing political parties in a way that will maintain equality and equity during elections raise questions. The operation of political parties is crucial and relies on sufficient financing, which may be obtained legally or illegally. Politicians are scarcely accountable to the electorate if they are connected to financiers, which has prompted stakeholders to exercise prudence (Ayeni, 2019). The boundary between legal and illegal party finance, political party financing, and political corruption is always blurry. When Nigeria had a two-party system with the National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP), the aborted Third Republic presided over by the 1989 constitution included provisions for public financing of political parties, while the 2010 Electoral Act included provisions for private or individual financing of political parties (Ayeni, 2019).

There is a lot of pressure on politicians in countries like Nigeria, where there is a high rate of poverty and the electorate consistently has high expectations. When politicians are unable to meet these demands, they turn to financiers, with the citizens suffering as a result of this unhealthy relationship. Despite the position of the laws and their knowledge of who may

contribute and how much may be contributed, politicians flagrantly flout the existing laws, and political party financing is always shrouded in secrecy (Ayeni, 2019). For example, the 2010 electoral law, in its sections 88 to 93, clearly stipulates party finance regulations and the consequences of erring. This has a significant impact on the political system because it prevents equity and equality in the financial accessibility of political parties and candidates running for office. It also has an adverse effect on elections because it causes certain voter behaviour. The impact of financing on the electoral process cannot be overstated, as President Olusegun Obasanjo, the former president of Nigeria, correctly noted in a forum when he lamented the risk posed by the unchecked use of money during elections. It is not difficult to detect the correlation between politics and the potential for high-level corruption, the speaker said in his address to the INEC-Civil Society Forum on November 27, 2003. The voters who have their faith and investment in the system hijacked and undermined because money, rather than their will, is allowed to determine elections are the biggest losers. Can we not go from a politics based on money and consumerism to one based on concepts, problems, and advancement?

In the same forum, the former president discussed the cost of holding elections and added, "Even more troubling, however, is the complete lack of any control on expenditure by candidates and parties towards elections. With reference to my past life, I can say without reservation that the sum total of money spent by all parties and candidates during the most recent elections was greater than what would have been required to wage a victorious war. I have remarked that we prepare for elections as if we are going to war. In the face of so much effort focused entirely on winning, the people's will cannot emerge and thrive. Elective positions devolve into commodities that can be bought and sold by whoever is willing to pay the most, while those who genuinely invest only see them as a way to recover their investment and profit. Politics turns into a business, and that enterprise just serves to divert public finances away from the desperate need of our people for genuine personal growth (PPF Handbook, 2005).

The above statements by former President Olusegun Obasanjo depict the unhealthy relationship between money and politics, party financing, and election integrity, and their implication for democracy. When there are no strict regulations and even when existing regulations are not able to peg or adequately monitor the inflow of funds during elections, there can hardly be an election free of electoral manipulation. This is because, despite provisions of numerous electoral laws against unregulated money in the electoral system, the conduct and outcomes of elections in Nigeria appear to have contradicted the visions and intentions of the framers of these Electoral Acts (Cited in Ayeni, 2019). Financing is indeed important, which is why Ayeni (2019) asserts that the success or failure of a political party in an election as well as the credibility of the entire electoral process are, in most cases, tied to how monies are raised and expended. Though essential in all electoral processes, political party financing, when unregulated, poses a threat to the democratic process of any nation. The destructive role of money in Nigeria's politics was further echoed by scholars as one of the factors that weakened or undermined the nation's democratic governance in the past and also became part of the excuses for military intervention in the First and Second Republics (Omenka and Apam, 2006).

The impact of financing on the electoral process in the North-central region of Nigeria is the same as that of the whole nation. Money in the electoral process has bastardised the system, thus emitting a particular political behaviour amongst voters in the region. The electoral behaviour of voters in the region before now was determined essentially by sentiments, ethnicity, and identities. However, the electoral behaviour of voters now in the region is tilting towards money politics. Several elections held in the region in recent times have shown that the electorate almost no longer votes along ethnic or religious lines but based on an understanding of how cash flows and money changes hands. This trend is linked to factors like illiteracy, ignorance, and particularly poverty. People who are poor are easily manipulated and bought over, and poverty is prevalent in the North-central Nigeria region (Shaba, Yelwa, Obansa, and Magaji, 2018). Most poor people are ready to submit their mandate and political

alliance for monetary benefit. This can also be attributed to the economic situation of the country and the assumption by some electorates that political office holders are incurably corrupt, equating politics to fraud. They collect or receive money from politicians with the erroneous impression of partaking in the national cake because politicians hardly fulfil their campaign promises and do almost nothing when they hold elective positions; this, however, negates development and derails democracy.

It is on record that there is a considerably high prevalence of poverty in North-central Nigeria, and poverty is prevalent more in rural areas. The records state that a high rate of poverty together with income inequality has greatly affected the development of human capital in the North-central Nigeria region and in Nigeria generally (Shaba, Yelwa, Obansa, and Magaji, 2018). This situation has led to heavy monetization of politics in the region; monies that are expended during elections in the region are targeted at the poor, who constitute a greater population of the region (Shaba, Yelwa, Obansa, and Magaji, 2018).

Theoretical Analysis

There are numerous theoretical stances that provide in-depth justifications for political party financing and electoral behaviour. However, the Social Exchange theory and Investment theory of party rivalry, sometimes known as the Investment theory of politics, were used as our theoretical framework for this study.

Ferguson Thomas first proposed the investment theory of politics in 1995. The thesis emphasises how political institutions are dominated by business elites rather than voters. According to the argument, policy is made by competing investor coalitions rather than by voters since money-driven political systems are expensive and difficult for regular citizens to participate in. The theory contends that political parties (and the topics they support in elections) are entirely the product of economic interests, which are divided into labour- and capital-intensive, free-market and protectionist, and other groups. This contrasts with a

corporatist system, where elite interests band together and negotiate to shape policy. According to the investment theory, political parties serve as the political fronts for these business associations and so rarely attempt to reach an agreement on policy. According to Anthony Downs' 1957 book *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (Ferguson: 1995), the traditional Median Voters Theory of Democracy is challenged by the theory.

The fundamental tenet of investment theory is that, since most people cannot afford to obtain the information necessary to invest in political parties and electoral processes, those who can will dominate politics. Accordingly, the theory contends that, rather than simply focusing on vote maximisation, political parties are best understood as groups of investors who band together to support candidates who will advance their interests (Ferguson, 1995). Furthermore, according to the hypothesis, political parties are more likely to try and sway the public's opinions to align with those of their investors than the other way around (Ferguson, 1995). The theory's proponent contends that while elections do not always go to the highest bidder, only having access to investor financing enables a genuine campaign. He claims that because candidates for office must raise money, they are unable to take positions that are unpopular with investors, and voters are unable to overcome the transaction costs associated with pooling their resources, so they must accept the options presented.

Critics of this idea, on the other hand, contend that all options on important matters are the same and that the subject of what influences voters to vote one way or another is insignificant and unimportant. And that understanding the sources of ballot choices, particularly in American politics, is crucial; in order to achieve this, one must "follow the money". Ferguson contends that the true issue is that people are impoverished and neither ignorant nor lazy to achieve what they want; therefore, proposed improvements like changing the election system or altering the electorate, i.e., greater voter education, are not the real issue.

The second theory asserts that social behaviour is the outcome of an exchange process and is known as the social exchange theory. The exchange is meant to maximise gains and cut down on expenses. George Homans, a leading proponent of social exchange, claims that people balance the risks and rewards of social interactions and that they will end or abandon a relationship when the danger is greater than the gain. Social exchange theory is a theory that looks at social transformation as an interaction process between many people. The basic tenets of the social exchange theory are cost and reward evaluation driving human decisions and behaviour, where costs are the unfavourable effects of a decision, such as lost money, time, or energy, and rewards are the favourable outcomes of social exchanges. According to this theory, human interactions and exchanges are viewed as a type of results-driven social behaviour. The theory contends that people will make decisions based on certain outcomes; they will expect the most profit, rewards, and long-term benefits. They will also prefer social exchange that results in the most security and ultimately independence. As a result, the general idea is that people will subtract the cost from the rewards in order to calculate the value (The Social Work Degree Guide). According to social exchange theory, most people are rational thinkers who prefer incentives to punishments.

According to the theory, parties have economic interactions when they each possess items or commodities that the other party or parties value. Since trading can have both economic and social consequences, the social exchange theory sees it as a social behaviour. The fundamental tenet of social exchange theory is that human activity is fundamentally an exchange, especially of incentives or resources that are primarily of a material nature (wealth) and secondarily of symbolic qualities. All social phenomena, including group dynamics and intergroup connections, are ostensibly permeated by these exchange transactions, which are conceptualised as assets or joint results of voluntarily undertaken individual activities motivated by rewards. As a result, exchange transactions are the basis and open secret of social life, notably group dynamics and relationships. Exchange theorists have therefore developed and condensed the aforementioned argument into the following: Given that people have

historically justified their acts, behaviours, and conducts by reference to the costs and benefits- or potential advantages to them- of those actions, behaviours, and conducts, it is arguable that social activity involves an exchange of (physical or intangible) activities and rewards or cost effects between persons. Furthermore, exchange serves as the foundation for human activity and permeates all aspects of social interaction. According to the social exchange theory, social actors (individuals or collectives) exchange a variety of valuable resources, such as tangible products, financial resources, and intangible social goods (humour, respect, and information). Social exchange can take place on many different levels. For example, people can exchange with organisations (such as exchanging their labour for a paycheck) and with governments (such as exchanging foreign aid for allegiance).

Scholars of this school of thought contend that these transactions, in which participants hope to maximise their returns by receiving an equal or greater amount than they gave, are the basis of social existence. One side in the transaction will exit and look for alternative exchanges if they do not receive a fair return. However, it's crucial to take into account whether individuals exchanging resources and power are on an equal footing because these factors have an impact on how the transaction will go. Stronger exchange partners- whether they be people, businesses, civic associations, or nations- have more valuable resources to contribute. Due to their wealth, they have a large pool of possible partners who are looking forward to an exchange opportunity. They have complete control over the exchange's terms and can select the partners they want to work with.

This provide clear justifications for why disengagement from the electoral process caused by political elite influence has a negative impact on the voting behaviour of ordinary voters and the general populace. Elites who vie for power do so not to serve the people, as elected democracy should, but rather to advance their own exclusive and narrow corporate interests. Contrary to the median voter theory, an offshoot of the investment theory of politics, which holds that voters typically cast their votes regardless of how far the alternatives are from their

point of view, the investment theory of politics assumes that the electoral process is dependent on party investment blocs, who are the investors. According to the median theory, the decision made by a majority-rule voting system will reflect the preferences of the median voter. The investment theory, however, focuses on how business elites, or investors, rather than voters, play a substantial role in shaping the political system. The claim is that affluent elites control politics as a whole and use it to their own advantage, and that party rivalry is motivated by money. The investor group sets the melodies that are played during the electoral process.

The major political parties, the APC, PDP, and LP, are dominated by investment blocs whose funds are invested in the operation of the party; as a result, their interests take precedence over those of the party's philosophy. This is how the theory is applied to the situation in Nigeria and the North-central part of Nigeria in particular. This idea aids in comprehending how and why certain elites control political party activities and, in turn, the electoral process.

Consequently, the Social Exchange theory could be looked at in terms of the relative power of exchange participants, which may be influenced by economic status or other social factors, as well as the various exchanges that are ongoing between the electorate and politicians running for public office and those undertaken under special circumstances such as during campaign or election periods. Due to their social status, which is starkly characterised by poverty, hunger, and low economic power, the electorate was frequently forced to trade their only and most valuable asset—their votes—for actual money or other tangible benefits like food, clothing, or even employment. This transaction is founded on the idea of reciprocity, or giving and receiving, which manifests itself throughout election season in the form of monetary and material incentives provided to the electorate. It is further stated that voting in elections by supporters of a certain political party or candidate is an exchange that is actually delayed reciprocity, or paying back a debt for gifts, a phenomenon known as "give and take," which are typically received during campaigns and occasionally during elections. The exchange is typically futuristic in nature; for instance, a voter without a job or in a community that

urgently needs some basic amenities like streetlights or a borehole will vote for any candidate or politician who promises to provide those amenities and a job to the community if elected. The electorate trades its vote in anticipation for a valuable promise, resulting in delayed reciprocity. Ironically, the individuals rarely consider their choices before selling. This effectively undermines the social exchange concept put forth by Cherry (2018), who suggested that parties involved in exchanges must consider the benefits and drawbacks of a deal before agreeing to it.

METHODOLOGY

The research work was carried out across three dominant political parties in north-central Nigeria, namely the All Progressive Congress (APC), People's Democratic Party (PDP), and Labour Party (LP), in the north-central geopolitical zone of Nigeria, and the rationale was due to the geographical spread of the 2023 general election, which shocked the Nigerian political space since 1999. In carrying out this research, the multi-stage sampling technique was more appropriate for the purpose of obtaining information for generalisation about the larger population. A multi-stage sampling procedure was carried out in phases. The research follows three stages of random sampling. **Stage one** involves the random sampling or selection of two local governments across Benue, the Plateau, and Nassarawa, totaling six units of study. **Stage two** involves the random selection of two council wards from each of the six (6) identified focus areas, for a total of twelve (12) council wards. **Stage three** involves the selection of 18 respondents from each unit sampled, making a total of 216 respondents for the study. In order to validate the research instrument(s), a pilot survey and pretest were carried out prior to the actual administration of the questionnaire by five experts in the departments of Public Administration, Political Science, management, and sociology, and items accepted by two or more of these experts were included in the final draught of the instrument before administration. The split-half method was used to assert the reliability of the instrument; items of the instrument were numbered odd and administered to respondents outside the study area.

The data obtained were analysed using Chi-squared statistical analysis. The obtained value of 71 was adjudged by these experts to be high enough for the instrument to be used for the study. The study made use of descriptive statistics to analyse the data obtained from a field survey. However, 200 questionnaires were valid for analysis.

RESULT

Objective One: Ascertain the extent of political party financing in north central Nigeria;

Table 1 shows that the majority of the respondents who are electorate members that have participated during the last three general elections in the region, the 2015-2023 general elections, strongly agreed and agreed with 32 (16%) and 164 (82%), respectively, that electoral processes are outrageously funded in the North-central Nigeria of Nigeria, while 3 (3%) and (4%) disagreed respectively. Analysis of the figure shows that electoral processes are indeed outrageously financed. The implication of this finding is that there can be no credible and even playing field when the electoral process is money-intensive.

Objective Two: Examine the underlying motivations behind political party financing in north central Nigeria

Findings from table 2 show that the respondents strongly agree 188 (94%) and agree 8 (4%) to the fact that politicians are motivated to fund political parties because of the winner takes it all nature of Nigerian politics, while 0 (.0%) and 0 (.0%) disagree and strongly disagree, respectively, with this position. However, 4 (2%) of the entire respondents are undecided on the issue that politicians are motivated because of the winner takes it all syndrome in Nigerian politics. The analysis illustrates clearly and undeniably that politicians in North-central Nigeria are motivated to fund political parties with the intention of taking it all when they eventually win. This also implies that politicians in this region are motivated to contribute and fund political parties because of the end result of having it all to themselves.

This finding agrees with the interview that: *"Politicians are motivated to contribute to political parties because of the nature of Nigerian politics of "winner takes all, where card-carrying members of political parties contribute so as to be active participants in the electoral process. Also, political parties' card-carrying members actually contribute to the running of the political party so as to participate actively in the electoral process.*

Furthermore, the interview reveals that "Political party members contribute to the financing of the party in order to secure appointments as a reward for their loyalty, and associations, people, and even organisations contribute to political parties for political patronages". The implication of the above is that, indeed, people, associations, and organisations contribute funds to political parties so as to benefit from political patronage.

Objective Three: Assess the extent to which political party financing in north central Nigeria affects the behaviour of voters.

Table 3 analysis revealed that 124 (62%) and 40 (20%) strongly agree that the amount of money at the disposal of political parties determines the extent of support and subsequent voting during elections. Also, 18 (9%) and 12 (.6%) strongly disagree with this position. However, 6 (3.0%) of the entire respondent population is undecided about their position on this issue. Be that as it may, the analysis shows that the amount of resources available at a political party's disposal certainly determines the extent of support and subsequent voting during elections.

The respondents have this to say:

The party with the highest available fund has more chances of emerging victorious in elections. Large sums of money are used by Political Parties and Politicians for vote-buying. They also said that large sums of money are used by political parties and politicians for vote-buying. That is to say, politicians and political parties indeed use large sums of money for vote-buying. This is further depicted below.

According to the respondents,

“Most contributions from within and outside a political party to a political party or to a particular candidate are tied to patronage. In one of the interview sessions, a particular interviewee pointed out that most sitting incumbent elected officials who are running for re-election have a list of contributors to their political campaign, and some even go as far as letting those who are not coming in that term know that they are against them. It was also gathered that most supporters of particular candidates go all out by branding their cars and even producing branded souvenirs with the face or faces of their candidates, with the sole aim of reaping from their office or position when or if they eventually win. Finally, all the interviewees tied motivation to fund electoral processes to a political thing, stating that in politics, people and or politicians are naturally motivated to fund the electoral process because of the scratch my back and I will scratch yours in return philosophy in politics. What is deduced here is that politicians, individuals, and even political parties are motivated to fund the electoral process because of gains; contributions are dependent upon what can be gotten in return”.

The respondents further posit that:

People see elections as reaping or harvesting seasons because politicians have recognised poverty as a tactic. The electoral acts have clear stipulations on election financing in Nigeria and expressly stipulate a benchmark on the maximum level of money that can be spent on elections, ranging from the local government to the presidency; however, from observations through opportunities as observers, it has been categorically stated that no political party or candidate, ranging from the President, has been able to meet the criteria as they have broken all laws as stipulated by electoral finance law. They abuse all laws, and these abuses are mostly by incumbents; this is clear; where incumbents use state resources and opposition is denied, it is against the law. Stating that it happened in one of the states in North-central Nigeria, for

example, where the opposition candidate was denied access to a state stadium. In another session, from another interviewee, it was gathered that, originally, when there is an election campaign, everything is charged and equated as spending, including television and radio ads, billboards, and even stationary. So when candidates spend this much on campaigns and other electoral processes, they do almost anything to win elections; therefore, if the finances are not regulated or monitored, it is difficult to have malpractice-free elections. It was further stated that the effect of political party financing on people includes the fact that they are forced or coerced against their will, their votes no longer count, and then they no longer believe in free and fair elections; they believe getting their share at the polls is the way. On the other level, when the candidates, political parties, and sponsors spend so much on the electoral process, it becomes an investment they must recoup and make a profit on; therefore, election finance has a negative impact on our politics and the subsequent behaviour of voters.

When asked if financing, or money, as the case may be, affects voters' choices at the polls, the interviewees responded in different ways. While some believe that it may not necessarily be political party financing or money, it could be personality, ideology, or the religion of the candidate, because from observation, some voters collect money during elections from candidate A but vote for candidate B. They even collect from both candidates but eventually vote for who they want. Sometimes, an influencing factor may also be peer group influence or major decision-makers in the household. Some voters just want a particular person without even knowing the manifesto or what idea he is pushing; it is about his personality, and this is the politics of the personality.

Findings

Findings reveal that the motivation for financing elections to reap the benefits that come with victory after winning elections is on the part of individuals and associations. On the part of the

politicians, there are so many things that motivate them; sometimes it goes beyond benefits; it is about relevance amongst and within the political party and its members. Particularly, one of the interviewees told the researcher that “politicians are motivated to fund elections for benefits they will reap when they get to office, and even if we put it in the progressive line, we can say what motivates politicians to fund elections is because they want to help or contribute to the development of their people when they get to office”. What this means is that, whether for themselves or for the people, they fund elections to benefit a particular gain. Particularly, the interviewee made reference to the 2015 general elections, where many supporters were motivated to fund in order to make a statement. Another thing, according to an interviewee, is ‘security. Some politicians fund the electoral process to get security-security for themselves and for their property or wealth. Some with questionable backgrounds who are already rich through dubious means will want to get the ‘immunity’ that comes with elective positions or offices. Some executives describe political party financing as investments. They say that some politicians are motivated to fund elections because they see it as an investment, especially when they have been nominated as party flag bearers. They contribute heavily because they intend to get gains from their investment eventually.

On the effect and relationship of political party financing on voters’ behaviour, findings show that, to a large extent, there is a relationship between political party financing and voters’ behaviour in North-central Nigeria. They agreed that with adequate financing, given the peculiarities of voters in the region, the result would most likely go to the highest bidder. In one of the interview sessions, an interviewee told the researcher that money makes politics a dirty game. Before now, political parties had what we call internal democracy, whereby we, the executives of the party, based on credibility, experience, and statesmanship, came together, deliberated, and agreed to put forward a worthy candidate for a position. But today, what we see is that political parties are waiting for the highest bidder, so without money now, one cannot get a mandate”, he explained. This is so because even the executive has realised that they need candidates who have money and are ready to part with it for his success at the polls

and the success of the political party. In another session with another interviewee, the interviewee said particularly that ‘financing actually changes minds and affects the result of voting during elections’.

Also, according to this interviewee, during elections, if a political party is sharing 2000 and another is sharing 5000-20000, voting will be to the advantage of the highest bidder. Even for INEC officials, money also changes their perception, up until the coalition centre, so yes, political party financing impacts greatly and negatively on the behaviour of voters’. However, amongst these executives, especially those of the ruling party, are of the opinion that money does not impact the behaviours of voters, but the obvious dividends of a particular administration, insisting that any part that makes obvious developmental strides earns people's support and consequent voting behaviour.

Voters do not vote their choices because of money, and where candidates on the other hand put in money to get to an office, when they get to this office, they will not do the right thing, and that is why anything development, humanitarian development, is farfetched in society’. He went further to explain that, when candidates buy their way into offices, when they win, because they brought their ways, using big money to buy mandates, they will no longer listen to anyone; it is about them and their decision; their money bought them the power. To him, Money has a great effect on politics, and its effect on society is underdevelopment. Another interviewee is of the opinion that the electorate, on the other hand, has likened electoral processes to the Christmas period because of the jumbo financing associated with the process; thus, they have substituted the supposed dividends associated with electoral democracy for Christmas gifts. For some executives, the advantage of political party financing in governance is that it helps connect government and the people. According to a particular executive, “governance is about connection, especially to the poor masses, and political party financing paves the way for this. It is with financing that government afterwards works, and political party financing from the outside saves government resources”.

Sakariyau, Aliu, and Adamu (2015) also agree that political party financing is outrageous when they point out that ‘the outrageous spending on elections during campaigns and mobilisation of supporters by the majority of contestants needs to be regulated. According to them, this outrageous spending is the bane of every electoral process and a threat to sustainable democracy. Elsewhere, Olorunmola (2016) corroborated when he pointed out that, though money is crucial in the electoral process, a high amount of it, especially when unregulated, “is capable of reversing the ethics, practises, and spirit of democracy”.

The study established that there are many factors that motivate financing in the electoral system. Factors that include anticipation for political appointments, the need to be active and relevant in the electoral process and system, and the winner-take-all nature of politics in Nigeria. This is corroborated by the responses gotten from the interview schedule; the interviewees unanimously agreed that parties, individuals, contestants, and associations are motivated to fund the electoral process for one reason or another. While some of them agreed that motivation comes from the notion that Nigerian politics is that of the winner takes all syndrome, some are of the opinion that motivation comes from the expectation of eventually securing appointments when their candidates eventually win elections. Others agreed that motivation comes from the need to make a statement through a change in the government in power. The study revealed that motivation for financing the electoral system through whatever means is geared towards gain. The notion that motivation in the electoral system is geared towards gain is further corroborated by Hersh and Schaffer (2017). According to them, their study to know what motivates donors revealed, amongst other things, that donors contribute to being involved in the electoral system or politics and to influencing public policy. Winner takes all is a major motivation for financing, and it is one that cannot generate any developmental stride (Orji, Eme, and Nwoba, 2014).

The study basically set out to examine the impact of electoral financing, which is finance or money used at all levels for the success of the electoral process. The study found out from the

analysis that political party financing does in fact impact voters' behaviour in north-central Nigeria. This is drawing from the responses of the electorates, political party executives, election observers, and INEC officials. The study found out from the interviews that money or political party financing impacts and affects voters' behaviour during elections to a large extent. A few of the interviewees are of the opinion that political party financing does not affect the behaviour of voters during electoral processes; however, most of them agree entirely that financing impacts the behaviour of voters. Scholars on this issue agree that financing those affects voters' behaviour, and at a different level, scholars like Bratton (2008) agree that financing through vote buying affects voters behaviour in that it affects voters' turnout, explaining further that some electorate who experience vote buying are less likely to vote than those who do not because they are torn between voting for the vote buyer and voting their conscience, thus they end up not voting at all. The prevalence of poverty in the region, according to Shaba, Yelwa, Obansa, and Magaji (2018), further deepens the effect of political party financing on voters' behaviour. The catchphrase stomach infrastructure, which is a term used to describe the preference for immediate gains like food and money as opposed to long-term development, is widespread and accepted, making it almost impossible for credibility and transparency.

The research study findings on the probable benefits or otherwise of political party financing on governance and development revealed that the benefits or otherwise of political party financing abound. While it is true that political party financing is necessary for the success of all electoral processes, including registration, campaigning, election proper, and all other electoral processes, it is also true that political party financing is capable of ruining governance and stalling development.

Political party financing, when unregulated, promotes political patronage and clientele networks; thus, political or electoral funders control and select politicians, thereby sacrificing good governance and development. Unregulated political party financing, according to Orji,

Eme, and Nwobi (2014) “will produce governance that has been captured by a tiny minority, to the detriment of the majority”. It puts the poor and governance at disadvantage; this is corroborated by Ayeni (2019), when he stated categorically that ‘when there is no equality in financing between two political parties, it would be amounted to putting one on a horse and the other walking with its legs and running the same race; certainly, the result would be known abinitio”. Clearly stating that unregulated political party financing cannot guarantee fairness, transparency, and equality in political competition amongst candidates seeking elective positions. The ills of political party financing on governance and democracy were further stressed by Mato, cited in Ayeni (2019) as being connected to the nature of politics in Nigeria. To him, ‘the nature of politics in the country has turned party politics and election into exclusive property of the rich, where citizens cannot aspire to any office without the backing of financiers”. This is against the desire for a consolidated democracy and good governance, where government, its dividends, and its services are targeted to its citizenry and not to political elites, who most times view politics as an investment.

Limitation

Limitations were also recorded during the field work as some interviewees viewed the researcher with suspicion, thereby making it difficult and almost impossible to grant an audience. Another limitation related to the interview is that some interviewees are sceptical and sometimes find it hard to divulge some information they consider classified; sometimes they may not be objective in their response because of their allegiance, and other times because of exaggeration or memory lapse. Questionnaires that went out did not come back early; some, if not a few, did not even return. However, the unreturned questionnaire is a limitation but not a barrier to drawing a valid conclusion about the entire questionnaire. The security situation in the region was among the study’s limitations. Because of the relative absence of security almost everywhere in the country and in the study areas, the researcher could not

travel as far and wide as desired; nevertheless, data were gathered through a Google survey, via text, WhatsApp, phone, and video calls.

Conclusion

The management and checks of political party financing are necessary for credible and genuine elections, and indeed, for all electoral processes. The financing of electoral processes, especially when it is excessive and comes from unidentified sources, has the potential to skew or tilt the competition between candidates vying for elective positions. Political party financing has been stressed all through the study as a very important aspect of the electoral process; its significance cannot be overemphasised. The entire electoral process, from registration through the elections proper, requires financing, without which there probably cannot be a successful process. However, it is the opinion of this study that high or outrageous political party financing in any electoral process is not good for society, for it breeds corruption and cynicism in and amongst politicians and the electorate, and these can easily damage good governance and deter development.

In all electoral processes in any democratic society, there is a need for constant interaction with the electorate and/or voters', and this is a process that requires financing. The snag, however, is that financing can make politicians and candidates more responsive to their funders than the electorate. Therefore, access to uncorrupt, legal financing reduces the temptation for politicians, political parties, and the electorate to engage in corrupt behaviour, but the very existence of money in politics creates this risk).

The research concludes from the preceding analyses that, even though financing is an integral aspect of the electoral process, it is also a creator of many electoral challenges. For one, it breaks the link between the electorate and politicians, it leads to unequal participation in the electoral process, the high financing needed makes it almost impossible for new and upcoming political forces to emerge or establish, the voices of politicians with enormous resources at

their disposal are heard louder than those without, and politicians who got backers to fund their getting to power most often give preferential treatment to individuals, associations, or corporations who are their backers and contributed to their elections and subsequent victory. Elected politicians abuse their access to state resources due to the nature and need of intensive use of money in politics to ensure they continue to stay in power; this is further stressed by Speck, Bruno, Fonantan, and Alessandra in their publication, *Milking the System*, in their words, “Besides damaging electoral competition, putting state resources at the disposal of the incumbent party negatively influences the quality of government.

Sometimes, through financing of the electoral process, politicians and individuals of questionable character get into government to gain immunity; others, through election campaigns, launder money; and some contribute to the process to exert influence on politicians to avoid being investigated into their illicit activities. Vote buying is another ill of electoral financing; politicians and candidates have, over time, directed their efforts towards winning elections through spending rather than through popular support, which has become a grave impediment to the nation's and region's electoral democracy. Therefore, it is important to take the issue of political party financing very seriously. The study has established the fact that political party financing impacts and influences voters' behaviour in North-central Nigeria; thus, there is a need to devise strategies for controlling the financing of the electoral processes, ensure strict adherence to regulations, and eradicate huge and illicit financing of the electoral system. This is necessary for an effective and credible electoral process, good governance, and ultimately, development.

Recommendations

The aspect of Political party financing in the electoral system is a potential disruptive one; it is capable of rescinding Nigeria's electoral democracy and, by extension, that of the North-central Nigeria region. On this ground, drawing from the foregoing analyses, the study deems it fit to give the following recommendations:

Strengthening regulatory laws on electoral finances and financing is crucial to preventing the erring of electoral laws and blocking loopholes in the electoral system. In Nigeria and the North-Central Nigeria region, there are several laws guiding the financing of electoral processes, but their application is questionable due to a lack of enforcement. Electoral laws on financing must be applied in practise, and politicians, candidates, and electorates must face consequences for breaching these laws. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) must have a clear mandate, the capacity to detect violations, and be independent with control over its budget. The INEC must have access to effective sanctions, ranging from administrative penalties for minor infractions to disciplinary actions for repeated financial misconduct. The power to dissolve political parties must be reflected, and the INEC must be seen as having political independence and the will to enforce existing laws for the effectiveness of the commission.

Strengthen disclosure requirements for electoral finances and financing to ensure an informed electorate. Bigwigs often spend large sums without disclosing their donors, denying them the right to know who influences their views and representatives. Transparency is crucial for an effective electoral system, and public disclosure can make donors less willing to support opposition parties and candidates. The Elections regulatory body, INEC, should establish a separate, unified law for disclosure concerning electoral financing. Adopting proactive disclosure methods using advanced technologies is essential. Establish independent agencies to oversee electoral financing, ensuring an equal playing field for all political actors and

ensuring candidates and parties are within approved spending limits. This will help define and regulate outside funders, ensuring efficient and independent oversight and enforcement. The government should not disparage the powers of INEC, which has regulatory powers over all election matters.

Civil society plays a crucial role in curbing electoral finance excesses by enhancing transparency, educating voters on the issues of political party financing, and educating them on their rights as citizens. They can also monitor the behaviour of politicians and the electorate during elections, particularly campaign finances. A consolidated group of independent civil society actors is essential, as they have tirelessly mobilised voters to educate them on various electoral issues, consolidating democracy. They can advocate for disclosure and reforms in electoral financing laws, gather information on political finances, and put finance regulation on the public agenda. They can also urge the INEC to track and account for parties' campaign expenses in accordance with existing laws. The region and electorate require a new orientation to expose the issues of unregulated financing and money in the electoral process. It is crucial to emphasise that selling votes promotes good governance and development in the region, and political party financing sacrifices merit. The informal traditions of politics in Nigeria, particularly in the North-central Nigeria region, contribute to low expectations and favour-seeking. Re-orientation, improved advocacy, and political organisation can change people's expectations and encourage demand for honest public services instead of vote-buying, welfare, or small investments. Restoring state subsidies is crucial to level the financial playing field between political parties and support party development. This includes fair access to state media and direct public financing for activities like policy research. State financing can also help prevent corruption and increase the number of small and weak parties. While it may not reduce abuses, it can help level the playing field and support political party development by building party capacity for membership, management, efficient campaigns, policy formulation, and resource raising.

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Analyzing the Aegean Sea Crisis between Greece and Turkey and Its Implications for Regional Stability

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Abstract

The Aegean Sea crisis between Greece and Turkey has been a longstanding issue characterized by historical animosities, territorial disputes, and conflicting interpretations of international agreements. Tensions have escalated in recent times, raising concerns about its implications for regional stability and international relations. This academic article examines the causes and implications of the Aegean Sea crisis, focusing on the strategic significance of the region, economic interests, and geopolitical complexities. The article analyzes recent incidents, including airspace violations and militarization, and explores the potential consequences of rising tensions for NATO and the European Union. Additionally, it delves into the diplomatic efforts and calls for de-escalation from international actors, emphasizing the need for peaceful dispute resolution through sustained dialogue. The paper concludes with a comprehensive examination of the multifaceted approach required to resolve the Aegean Sea crisis, encompassing diplomacy, adherence to international law, and the engagement of Track II initiatives to bridge societal divides.

Keywords: Aegean Sea crisis, Greece, Turkey, territorial disputes, geopolitical complexities, NATO, international law, peaceful dispute resolution, regional stability.

Introduction:

The Eastern Mediterranean region has long been a crossroads of civilizations, history, and geopolitics. Amidst the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis that dominates Europe's eastern borders, tensions have been steadily escalating between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, over territorial and airspace claims in the Aegean Sea. The Aegean Sea, is not only historically significant as the cradle of Greek and Western Turkish civilizations, but also strategically crucial as a commercial hub connecting three continents - Asia, Africa, and Europe.

The Aegean islands have been a longstanding point of contention between Greece and Turkey since the early twentieth century. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the modern borders of both nations were established through international treaties. However, the specific status of many Aegean islands remained undefined, leading to ongoing disputes over ownership and control. Since the 1970s, Athens and Ankara have found themselves at odds over maritime issues in the Aegean Sea, with both nations asserting rival claims over borders in the region. The root causes of this longstanding Aegean Sea crisis can be traced back to historical animosity, the demilitarized status of Eastern Aegean islands, disputes over delimitation of territorial waters and the Continental Shelf, and frequent airspace violations. These contentious issues have led to a series of incidents and military posturing, further fueling the tensions between the two nations.

Tensions between the two countries have intensified in recent years due to various factors, including the discovery of significant natural gas reserves in the region and the Europe-wide

refugee crisis. The presence of natural gas has raised the stakes, with Turkey asserting that islands like Kastellorizo should fall under its control due to their proximity to the gas fields.

One such island at the center of this dispute is Kastellorizo, located in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, just 2 kilometers from the Turkish coast and part of the Dodecanese islands. Italy ceded Kastellorizo to Greece in 1947 as part of the Treaty of Paris. However, Turkey has consistently claimed that the island rightfully belongs to its territory, supported by its proximity to the Turkish coast and its continental shelf area according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Another point of contention is the uninhabited island of Imia, known as Kardak in Turkish, situated between Kalymnos, Greece, and the Turkish coast. This island triggered a crisis in 1996, with both countries deploying military forces to the area (Pratt & Schofield, 1996). Though the crisis was resolved through diplomatic efforts, disputes over the island persist.

The ongoing refugee crisis has further complicated the situation. The Aegean Sea serves as a major route for refugees and migrants attempting to reach Europe, leading to accusations against both Greece and Turkey for exploiting the crisis for political gains.

Additionally, accusations of airspace violations and threatening rhetoric from Turkish military planes toward Athens have become increasingly common, fostering a perception of each other as rivals. This perception is shared by both governments and oppositions, reducing the prospects of successful negotiations.

Recent incidents in the Aegean Sea crisis have added fuel to the fire. In August 2022, Turkish Defence Ministry sources claimed that Greek S-300 air defense systems radar-locked NATO AWACS aircraft and Turkish F-16s during a military exercise. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's accusations against Greece of militarizing islands near the Turkish coast and Greece's swift response have rekindled long-standing hostilities between the two nations.

The implications of the rising tensions are far-reaching. NATO member countries are concerned that these escalating hostilities could undermine the Alliance's unity, making it more challenging to counter external threats, particularly in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis. Additionally, the crisis provides opportunities for external actors, such as Russia, to exert influence in the region, further complicating the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The economic partnership between Greece and Turkey, which has seen considerable growth in recent years, stands at risk due to the escalating friction over their dominance in the Aegean Sea. Sectors such as bilateral trade and tourism have already been impacted, raising concerns about the potential consequences for the region's economic stability.

As tensions continue to rise, experts express concern about the potential for a military conflict between the two NATO member countries. Although both sides claim to seek a peaceful resolution, the region's increasing militarization remains worrisome. With national elections approaching in both nations, there's a tendency to flex muscles, both verbally and militarily, to appeal to nationalistic sentiments and maintain positions of power. While war between Greece and Turkey is highly unlikely due to their NATO membership, the heightened tensions and hostile rhetoric still have detrimental effects on both Athens and Ankara's stability.

Causes of the Aegean Sea Crisis

The Aegean Sea crisis between Greece and Turkey has deep historical roots and is characterized by a complex interplay of territorial disputes and differing interpretations of international agreements.

The historical context plays a significant role in shaping the Aegean Sea dispute. Greece and Turkey have a long history of conflict, marked by their independence wars against each other and the development of their national identities in opposition to one another. The legacy of

past territorial losses and disputes has contributed to the persistent rivalry and mistrust between the two countries. Key historical agreements such as the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, the Montreux Convention of 1936, and the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 have shaped the territorial boundaries and demilitarized status of certain islands in the Aegean Sea. However, differing interpretations of these treaties continue to be a source of contention (Thomas Falk, 2022).

The issue of the breadth of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea has been a longstanding point of disagreement. Both Greece and Turkey have claimed a 6-nautical-mile territorial sea in the region since 1936. While the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows states to extend their territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles from the shore, the extension of territorial waters beyond 6 miles in the Aegean Sea is highly contentious. This extension could significantly impact maritime boundaries and the rights of access to the high seas, making it unacceptable to Turkey and a potential cause for conflict. (Stamouli, 2022)

The Aegean Continental Shelf has become a major point of contention between Greece and Turkey since the discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in the region. The lack of a delimitation agreement between the two nations has led to overlapping claims over potential drilling areas. This competition for hydrocarbon wealth has heightened tensions and resulted in both countries undertaking seismic surveys and exploration activities in contested waters. The absence of clear agreements on the continental shelf's boundaries adds further complexity to the dispute.

The demilitarized status of the Eastern Aegean islands has been a significant element in the political balance between Greece and Turkey. Ankara has expressed concerns over the militarization of these islands, arguing that it violates the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1947 Paris Treaty. Turkey claims that the islands were ceded to Greece on the condition of remaining demilitarized. On the other hand, Greece contends that its policy of militarizing

these islands is a right of self-defense, given their strategic location and proximity to potential threats.

Airspace violations over the Aegean Sea have been a recurring issue between Greece and Turkey. Both sides have accused each other of conducting flights near or over their coasts, leading to heightened tensions and military responses. Frequent airspace violations have added to the climate of mistrust and have the potential to escalate into more significant incidents.

Implications of the Aegean Sea Crisis:

The rising tensions between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea have far-reaching implications, both regionally and internationally.

The Aegean Sea crisis adds to the security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The increasing militarization and military exercises by both Greece and Turkey in the area raise the risk of accidental clashes or miscalculations that could escalate into a full-blown conflict. This situation not only puts the safety and stability of the two nations at risk but also has the potential to involve other regional actors and exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions.

As NATO allies, Greece and Turkey are expected to cooperate and maintain solidarity within the alliance. However, the escalating Aegean Sea crisis has raised concerns among other NATO member countries that this internal conflict could undermine the alliance's unity. At a time when NATO faces external threats, such as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis, internal divisions could weaken the collective response to common challenges.

The crisis provides opportunities for external actors, particularly Russia, to gain influence in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Both Greece and Turkey are vulnerable to Russian influence operations, and heightened tensions between the two countries can further erode NATO and EU cohesion. This could complicate efforts to coordinate policies and respond effectively to shared security concerns.

The Aegean Sea crisis poses risks to the economic partnership between Greece and Turkey. The bilateral trade between the two countries has seen significant growth in recent years, but escalating friction over maritime boundaries could adversely affect trade volumes. The tourism industry, a vital lifeline for both nations, is also impacted as the crisis intertwines with geopolitics, potentially deterring tourists and undermining economic stability in the region.

The Eastern Mediterranean region is rich in oil and natural gas reserves, and the crisis has implications for energy exploration and infrastructure development. Both states are actively conducting search operations. The competition between Greece and Turkey over maritime boundaries and the Continental Shelf creates uncertainty for international energy companies operating in the region. Potential conflicts or prolonged tensions could deter investment and delay energy projects, impacting the energy security and economic interests of countries relying on Eastern Mediterranean resources. In 2020 naval collision involving the Kemal Reis and the elderly Greek frigate, Limnos, underscores the simmering hostilities in the region. (The Economist, 2020) The situation did not improve after that.

The rising tensions between Greece and Turkey have economic implications, affecting trade, tourism, and investment. Both countries have significant economic ties, and any disruptions in trade or diplomatic relations could result in trade volume reductions and financial losses for businesses in both nations. The tourism industry, in particular, is vulnerable to the crisis, as travelers may be deterred by the perceived instability in the region.

The Aegean Sea crisis presents a challenging diplomatic situation for international actors seeking to mediate and de-escalate tensions. Engaging with both Greece and Turkey to find peaceful solutions requires careful diplomacy and the willingness of both parties to compromise. International bodies such as the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO may play a role in encouraging dialogue and promoting conflict resolution mechanisms.

The crisis also has implications for the management of refugees and migration flows in the region. Turkey hosts a significant number of refugees, and any escalation of tensions with

Greece could exacerbate existing migration challenges. The situation may lead to potential security and humanitarian concerns, affecting both nations and the broader European continent.

Diplomatic Efforts and Calls for De-escalation:

Amidst the rising tensions in the Aegean Sea crisis, there have been diplomatic efforts to address the longstanding issues between Greece and Turkey. International actors, including NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union, have urged both parties to exercise restraint, avoid provocative actions, and engage in dialogue to de-escalate the situation. These diplomatic efforts are crucial in preventing further escalation and finding peaceful solutions to the disputes. Some of the key diplomatic initiatives and calls for de-escalation are as follows:

NATO Involvement:

As both Greece and Turkey are NATO allies, the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been significant in managing the crisis. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has emphasized the importance of resolving differences through peaceful means and maintaining open lines of communication. NATO serves as a forum for dialogue and conflict resolution, and its mediation efforts have been aimed at reducing tensions between the two countries.

United Nations Involvement:

The United Nations has been closely monitoring the situation in the Aegean Sea and has emphasized the need for peaceful resolution of disputes. The UN's involvement in the crisis has been focused on promoting dialogue and facilitating negotiations between Greece and Turkey. The UN has called on both parties to adhere to international law and agreements to avoid any actions that could lead to further escalation.

European Union's Role:

As regional neighbors and potential EU members, Greece and Turkey's relations are of interest to the European Union. The EU has urged both countries to resolve their differences peacefully and in accordance with international law. The EU's involvement has also included support for confidence-building measures between the two countries and initiatives aimed at fostering dialogue.

Conclusion

The Aegean Sea crisis between Greece and Turkey is a complex and deeply rooted issue that has been simmering for decades, fueled by historical animosities, territorial disputes, and conflicting interpretations of international agreements. Tensions have escalated in recent times, raising concerns among the international community about the potential for further conflict and the implications for regional stability.

The Aegean Sea's strategic significance, with its historical and cultural importance, vast commercial potential, and abundant oil reserves, has elevated its status to a focal point in Greek-Turkish ties. Both countries have staked rival claims over the region, leading to disputes over territorial waters, airspace violations, and the militarization of the Eastern Aegean islands. These contentious issues have often resulted in military posturing, heightened rhetoric, and a deterioration of diplomatic relations between the two NATO allies.

The implications of the rising tensions in the Aegean Sea crisis are far-reaching and multifaceted. At the international level, the discord between Greece and Turkey threatens to undermine the cohesion of NATO and the European Union, presenting an opportunity for external actors to exploit the divisions and gain influence in the region. With Russia's assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, the crisis further complicates efforts to present a united front against potential threats.

The economic partnership between Greece and Turkey has also been affected by the escalating tensions, with potential repercussions for trade and tourism. The Aegean region, once a vital lifeline for both countries' tourism industries, now faces challenges as geopolitical considerations intersect with economic interests. This confluence has led to a decrease in bilateral trade and raised concerns about the future of tourism in the region.

Diplomatic efforts and calls for de-escalation from international actors, including NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union, have emphasized the importance of resolving differences through peaceful means and maintaining open lines of communication. The involvement of neutral mediators and adherence to international law are seen as critical components in finding lasting solutions to the disputes.

The path to resolving the Aegean Sea crisis requires a multifaceted approach that addresses historical grievances, territorial disputes, and energy resource claims. Diplomatic dialogue, confidence-building measures, and cooperation on economic ventures are essential to foster an environment of trust and mutual understanding. Compliance with international law, particularly the UNCLOS, can provide a framework for resolving maritime disputes and defining territorial boundaries.

Furthermore, the engagement of Track II diplomacy initiatives and people-to-people contacts can help bridge the divides between Greek and Turkish societies, contributing to a more conducive environment for conflict resolution. By prioritizing conflict prevention and crisis management, NATO can play a constructive role in facilitating communication and cooperation between the two nations.

In the pursuit of lasting peace, both Greece and Turkey must transcend the zero-sum approach and recognize the potential for mutually beneficial solutions. Despite the complexities and challenges, peaceful dispute resolution through sustained dialogue remains pivotal in avoiding an open conflict and forging a new era of cooperation in the Aegean Sea region.

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Scientific Foundations of Measuring Ideology and Political Orientation in Georgia: qualitative analysis of instruments

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Abstract

The paper aims to contribute to laying the foundation for the scientific, evidence-based and systematized Georgian measurement instruments of ideology and political orientation. As a very small number of such tools (e.g., questionnaires, scales etc.) that exist at the moment are either philosophical-artistic artifacts based on a priori, rational reasoning of the authors or are simply (inappropriately adapted) translations of a foreign analogues, it is especially important to create a scientifically supported foundation for the given field. It is also important to systematize existing information. The main goal of this article is to determine what issues are key to measuring ideology or political orientation in Georgia and what is the optimal structure and format of the assessment tool, which would employ these issues. The present paper contributes to the cause by qualitative analyses of existing literature and inventories. It outlines the optimal model of conceptualizing ideological issues, as well as the hierarchy of importance of the issues and constructs that would be used in such models. Other important recommendations are also presented.

Keywords: Georgia, Ideology, Political Orientation questionnaire/inventory/test/survey, qualitative analysis

Introduction and Literature Review

Ideology is both a prism, through which our perceptions and opinions are colored, and an engine that propels our actions. It is one of the most fundamental frameworks, which shapes descriptive, normative, and behavioral parts of our mind. It guides and reflects almost every aspect of life both at an intrapersonal (individual) and an interpersonal (societal) level. Thus, it's no wonder, that this concept is and has been for a long time a hot topic across various disciplines, thus attracting professionals from various backgrounds (including philosophers, experts of political science and international relations, sociologists, psychologists, journalists, historians, literary scholars and so on). Moreover, these themes engage not only professionals and experts, but laypeople too, who find their everyday life enormously saturated with ideological discourse.

Though ideology is most often thought of as an instrument of influence, it is also an analytical tool, which helps us understand the vastly complex world. By providing simplified (though, on the other hand, apparently distorted) representations, it produces intelligible concepts, patterns and systems, which are necessary in understanding relationships between the countless variables they represent.

This aspect and function of ideology is even more evident in the case of political orientation, as it is even more simplified version of just one aspect (namely, political) of it. Political orientation¹ aims to reduce the incomprehensibly infinite variability of political (mostly ideological) issues to the few factors/constructs².

¹ Often also called the political spectrum.

² Many synonyms and related concepts are used interchangeably in this field; while some (mostly psychologists and statisticians) prefer the abovementioned terms ("factors" and "constructs") others use terms like, „dimensions“,

Thus, the importance of having a good measurement instrument³ to assess political ideology and/or political orientation cannot be overstated, as effective assessment tools provide researchers, policymakers, and the general public with valuable insights into the complex landscape of political ideologies, enabling informed decision-making and facilitating a deeper understanding of societal dynamics. Reliable and valid instruments are crucial for comparability, accumulation of knowledge, prediction, and decision-making (including design and implementation of better policies).

Despite this, from a psychometric perspective, relevant research and practice falls significantly short of the benchmark. In a recent analysis conducted by Azevedo and Bolesta (2021), examining 400 scientific publications spanning from 1930 to 2020, they identified 358 unique ideological instruments, wherein they found:

“Substantial variance in scoring and scale type even within identical scales” with “high frequency of incomplete reporting of the items used”;

Validity evidence, statistical or psychometric technique, extraction or rotation methods being sparingly reported;

„most instruments being either on-the-fly measures (18.16%) or an ad-hoc combination of items (30.17%) present in existing, publicly available surveys“;

Weak overlap in topics of 10 most popular scales (with Jaccard index of .2 and .33);

And that these problems do influence variability in results.

Georgian instruments are even more problematic. As of now, only 5 such scales have been identified (by the contributors of this study).

„axes“, „values“, „themes“, „thematic groups“ etc. in this paper the most frequent terms to refer to these concepts will be “construct”, which will be used as the broadest category, “factor”, which will refer to psychometrically validated or founded constructs, and “axis”, which will be utilized in contexts where dimensionality is the core issue; other terms will be used only as a literary embellishment in the specific contexts, mostly referring to the lexical preference of the instrument being discussed.

³ In this article terms “measurement/assessment instrument/tool” are used as a broad category, which encompass different types of measurement tools (e.g., inventories, scales, questionnaires, surveys, tests, quizzes & indices), which are often (mostly mistakenly) used interchangeably in the field (especially in non-academic settings).

The oldest one in the list is the questionnaire used in a nationally representative survey (Kachkachishvili & Mezvrishvili, 2003). The instrument was comprised of only 7 items, which were intended to measure 3 proposed constructs. Though, the close investigation of these constructs and the variables reveals that its content may (almost exclusively) be explained by just one variable – left-right politics (mostly – 92% – related to economics). This is also indicated by the fact that the questionnaire also included only one unidimensional (left-right) self-placement scale. The model is questionable, not only from a logical perspective, but also from empirical as indicated by the authors themselves and also in another study (Avaliani, 2018).

Next one in the list is the Political Compass (Ramishvili, [ca 2007]), published on the web domain of Free University, which seems to have no scientific or any other kind of article or report describing its psychometric characteristics (or any kind of quality). The questionnaire is too long (96 items⁴), while (supposedly) measuring only 2 constructs. In addition, the face validity of this structural model seems fairly controversial.

One of the instruments is based on a master's thesis (Avaliani, 2018). Although it is partially based on questionnaires (Henningham, 1995; Everett, 2013; Wilson & Patterson, 1968), which are the most established in the field (Azevedo & Bolesta, 2021), it lacks reliability and validity (both internal and external), because its psychometric properties were studied with neither ideal methodological rigor nor on the ideal sample; Most of all, the process of translation and adaptation was inconsistent with the standards.

The fourth in the list is the Europe-Georgia Institutes "Political Compass" (2021). The associated article of this instrument was not found either⁵; Moreover, even an article dedicated to the American original (Individual Differences Research - IDRlabs, 2017) from which it is

⁴ In this paper, term “item” refers to all kinds of verbal stimuli used in such research (including e.g. questions or issues).

⁵ and probably couldn't have even existed because, as the authors of the study told me, the data were collected only on the aggregated/ level to ensure the protection of respondents' personal information.

translated and adapted could not be found. This questionnaire also has a very questionable theoretical structure, as its factors are quite different from other more established instruments. Additionally, in the Georgian version of the instrument, the *Diplomacy* “value/axis” (factor), which measures juxtaposition of nationalism and globalism, was replaced with Antiwesternism-Pro-westernism, a new dimension called "Social", which is a strange fusion of economic and public equality, was added, and the number of items was nearly halved. In addition to diverging from the original, it is noteworthy that the axis of this *Foreign Policy*, in my opinion, has almost nothing to do with ideologies. Furthermore, it is unclear what is the difference between *Social* issues and the axis of the *Economy*, as both are clearly about equality and equity. Discriminatory validity of the *Public* and *Civil* axes is also vague: usually progress and freedom, as well as tradition and control are closely linked, both philosophically as well as (if not more) empirically - with the psychometric investigation of surveys. This instrument is much shorter than the previous one (consists of 39 items), but still far from ideal in terms of conciseness.

The last one in this list is "Electoral Compass" (International School of Economics at TSU (ISET), CRRC Georgia, Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP), 2020; Papava & Tevdoradze, 2020; Kakhishvili, Keshelava, Papava, & Sichinava, 2021), which is a Georgian version of Kieskompas. The original of this questionnaire is of Dutch origin, although it has been translated into many languages and is used in at least 40 countries (ABOUT KIESKOMPAS, 2021). As for the Georgian version, it is clearly superior to the rest of the Georgian counterparts from a scientific point of view, although it still does not meet the desired standards. Let's start by saying that although its sample is huge (19,000 respondents), which is certainly admirable, it was conducted in a non-probability manner, which limits the generalizability of the data, strictly speaking, to the number of respondents themselves. Also, this paper is characterized by one oddity: it presents two factorial structures of issues; one of them (which seems to have been obtained by non-scientific/non-psychometric methods) is used in the largest part of the paper, and the other (which was obtained by factor analysis) is used in the remaining, very

small, cases. In addition, it should also be said that this factor analysis is not done properly, in my opinion.

Furthermore, such tools are very sensitive to time and culture. A clear example of this is that most of the issues from what was (and still is) apparently the most popular and well-established questionnaire for the study of ideology (Wilson & Patterson, 1968) were found to be completely obsolete after a couple of decades (Everett, 2013). Therefore, it is imperative to regularly update them and adapt them (to align with the peculiarities of the given culture).

As noted above, the purpose of political orientation is to devise a comprehensive model (with few intelligible constructs), that would explain a big part of the political variables. This can be done in two ways. One way is more qualitative and philosophical, based on a priori investigation of content; this approach mostly entails examination of face validity, which (preferably, mostly) is based on the experts' opinions (e.g., philosophers, historians, or political scientists), about what does any given ideology or political orientation encompass, and what kind of structure would best characterize it⁶. The second approach is empirical, relying on actual evidence of how the ideology is manifested in a (broader) population at a given time. The clearest manifestation of the latter is the creation of constructs and questionnaires with psychometric methods. One big, yet not so outwardly apparent, difference between these approaches should be noted: experts often recognize a consistency between issues where ordinary people do not see them, which leads to inconsistencies between concepts derived from these different methods.

The simplest, oldest, and the most widespread model of this is the one-dimensional left-right depiction of ideology. An example of this is the most popular and established Wilson and Patterson Conservatism Scale (1968) and its updates and variations, which also occupy leading positions in popularity (Everett, 2013; Henningham, 1995).

⁶ The most appropriate term to name and describe this approach would be the *deductive category formation* method.

Despite the establishment and persistence of this tradition, the limitations of this model are increasingly evident in contemporary times, as the issue of multidimensionality of political orientation becomes more and more acute. The most minimal step in terms of the abundance of dimensions, which is widely recognized by most modern scholars, is the division of the aforementioned dimension into economic and social issues⁷. Occasionally, even researchers who support and use a one-dimensional model present evidence and arguments in favor of the left-right spectrum consisting of two (relatively independent) variables/factors. For instance, Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) suggest that the core characteristics of conservatism⁸ are resistance to change and acceptance of inequality⁹, which they consider to be quite independent.

The separation of these two dimensions is particularly crucial in Georgia, because in this country, they are not merely sufficiently independent, but even exhibit a moderate negative correlation (Kakhishvili, Keshelava, Papava, & Sichinava, 2021). This pattern holds true not only in Georgia but also in Eastern European, and especially post-Soviet countries (Rovny & Edwards, 2012; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, & Edwards, 2006).

There are many other proposed factors and axes (e.g., pacifism-militance, multiculturalism-assimilationism, multilateralism-unilateralism, free trade vs protectionism, etc.), but they don't come close to significance of the 2 abovementioned factors for several reasons. Firstly, these 2 explain an immeasurably bigger variance than others. Secondly, they map onto political ideologies better¹⁰. Thirdly, they are relatively universal (across many variables; e.g. time and

⁷ Resulting in the axes of economic and social left and right, which are also called freedom, liberalism, libertarianism, authoritarianism, anarchism, collectivism and other related terms.

⁸ In this case, "conservatism" (contrasted with "liberalism", in the same American fashion) represents just the right wing of political spectrum.

⁹ The resistance to change describes the dimension of social conservatism axis, which is also called traditionalism, and inequality is linked to economic equality-equity factor.

¹⁰ One clear illustration of this is the fact, that very often "Conservatism" and "Liberalism" are even used as opposing labels of political spectrum (replacing right/left-wing or other such terms).

space)¹¹. Lastly, these 2 constructs are mostly *reflective* by nature (as opposed to *formative*), and, thus, can be represented by axes/continuums with polar opposites, which a big advantage (or, in many cases, a necessity) for accurate and convenient measurement. This provides a sound rationale for why these 2 factors have been, are, and should be prioritized. Nevertheless, adding more factors than 2 or breaking them down into more concrete ones does make an instrument more precise and extensive in scope, though at a price of conciseness and/or comprehensibility.

Meanwhile, despite all this, political orientation (frequently, mistakenly even called “ideology”) is very often measured by single item self-report/placement scales, requiring participants to rate how right-wing/conservative or left-wing/liberal they are. Besides structural inadequacy, this approach has other serious problems; namely, this method implies that: 1) the ideological labels that represent latent political constructs (e.g., “conservatism” or “liberalism”, to name the most prevalent ones) are consistently defined and operationalized (at least, throughout relevant literature experts), and 2) respondents are proficient enough to understand the meaning of these labels. These assumptions are apparently false. Even the most prominent theorists disagree about the nature of these concepts; moreover, such inconsistencies are prevalent within the works of a single author, or even individual texts themselves. As for the second assumption, its falsehood is even more evident especially in Georgia (Kachkachishvili & Mezvrishvili , 2003; Avaliani, 2018), where general population (including both parties and the political elite) is widely uninformed about ideological matters (Barkaia, Kvashilava, Gogoladze, Kobalia, & Chkhikvadze, 2020; Institute of Social Studies and Analysis (ISSA), 2016; Tavakarashvili, 2018; Jibladze, 2019; Melikidze, 2017; Andrea, et al., 2021; Kachkachishvili & Mezvrishvili , 2003; Tsitsishvili, 2011; The Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) Georgia, 2023; Kakhishvili, Keshelava, Papava, & Sichinava, 2021).

¹¹ Most other constructs (e.g. foreign and domestic policy) vary across time, culture or other factors much more.

Goals and Objectives

To address the problems stated above (concerning ideology research in Georgia), the main goal of the study is to create a scientifically rigorous foundation and research framework that will pave the way for elevating the scientific level of ideology research. This should include both a descriptive section supported by solid evidence, as well as specific guidelines and recommendations for conducting relevant research. To achieve this goal, ideological¹² instruments will be analyzed qualitatively; this will be done on both level of factors (critiquing, comparing, and integrating various factorial models) and items (integrating all items into the appropriate thematic groups). As a first step, optimal models and practices on an international level will be derived from the relevant literature. This framework will guide and shed light on the subsequent phase, which will focus on Georgian context. Lastly, information accumulated from all sources will be consolidated and summarized.

Methodology

As alluded to previously, one way to identify the key issues for measuring ideology or political orientation and fit them into convenient models and taxonomies is to examine existing alternatives. In this case, we rely more on the opinion of experts. This step is essential when creating or adapting instruments to establish face (and, partially, content) validity, but it is particularly important in this context because ideology is a complex issue and requires a high level of competence to understand it correctly. This has an even greater impact in Georgia, where the corresponding knowledge at a level of general public is very limited.

Establishing content validity is most commonly done through expert panels or surveys. However, analyzing questionnaires and similar tools presents a superior approach for several reasons. Firstly, questionnaires inherently incorporate the step of considering expert opinions, resulting in a broader range of expert input when multiple instruments are analyzed compared

¹² In some cases, in this paper, terms ideology, political spectrum and political orientation are used interchangeably (mostly in conjunction with words “instrument” and “tool”), though they differ significantly, as noted in the introduction, and must not be confused.

to a single study or paper. Additionally, pre-existing models often undergo additional validation stages such as peer review, or other type of feedback from colleagues and experts, further enhancing their refinement.

This method is widely regarded as a reliable and convenient source of information for such research. A notable illustration of its effectiveness is evident in case of the most well-established taxonomy of personality – the Big Five Factors – and the measurement instrument widely recognized for assessing these factors, the NEO-PI(-R), both of which are mostly derived using this method (Costa Jr. & McCrae, 2008).

Particular research methods will be presented at the outset of each section.

Factor-level analysis

This section will focus on investigating and integrating the factorial structure of existing instruments. Integration will ultimately result in a taxonomy, structured according to the following hierarchy: Taxons > Sub-Taxons > Topics/Categories/Issues (> sub-categories) > items¹³.

The analysis and summary of an **internationally** accumulated knowledge in the field will be based on the research briefly reviewed in the introduction (Azevedo & Bolesta, 2021), in which 400 scientific works (1930-2020) from 92¹⁴ countries were reviewed.

This paper presents two relevant lists developed by analyzing the 10 most important questionnaires: 1) 32 categories¹⁵ formed by open coding¹⁶, and 2) 16 topics extracted by deductive category formation. For intents and purposes of the current study these lists are too

¹³ To avoid confusion more prevalent terms like “themes”, “main categories” or “codes” were avoided, as there’s little agreement around the subordination of them.

¹⁴ In the search carried out as part of the research, questionnaires from 92 countries were found, although the search was of a global level.

¹⁵ Which are also called “(ideological) topics”, within the work, and may also be called *issues*.

¹⁶ Same as inductive category formation

concrete (with regards to the level of abstraction) and, thus, too lengthy¹⁷. Because of this, they were grouped into broader categories, following the same rules stated above. The merged taxonomy (at the broadest level of abstraction) of both methods¹⁸ looks like this:

Social issues¹⁹ (35/140)²⁰

Equality-equity (109)

Cultural and national (40)

Universal (19)

Sexual (18)

Gender & sex related (8)

Racial (7)

Freedom (31)

Purity of body (14)

Freedom of speech and expression (5)

Attitudes towards deviants (5)

Prohibited substances and objects (4)

Education (3)

Economic issues (29/62)

labor rights (36)

Employer rights (22)

Employee rights (14)

Welfare (28)

Foreign Policy (11/16)

Domestic Politics (20/4)

¹⁷ A comprehensive factorial model should have few, broad categories to fulfill its main purpose – simplification.

¹⁸ Both groupings resulted in a very similar taxonomy (the 5 main categories – *taxons* – were identical).

¹⁹ This taxon along with the subsequent one (economic issues) is essentially the same construct as the 2 main factors in the political orientation research, discussed earlier. Briefly, they may be called social & economic freedom axes.

²⁰ The issues are rank-ordered by the items the encompass (which are indicated in the brackets).

Other (7/3)

Besides the obvious, this analysis once again reinforced the notion stated previously, that constructs other than economic and social right and left²¹ are mostly formative²², as the issues included in those were clearly uncorrelated. Moreover, almost all of the topics included in these 3 taxons can be, and thus should be (for the reasons stated in the literature review), included in one of the first 2 taxons, making these 3 almost completely meaningless; This is less pronounced in the case of foreign rather than domestic policy.

As for the **Georgian** instruments, one extension was made (beyond the models given by authors); namely, the factorial structure of the Election Compass was investigated independently from the authors, with the open data provided by them. First 2 factor analyses were more confirmatory in nature²³. The results did not support the models proposed by authors. The 3rd analysis was completely explanatory and resulted in a significantly different structure. This model explained 51.879% of variance, with 5 factors²⁴. First 2 factors were one again economic and social freedom-etatism. The third one was conceptualized as *in-group bias*²⁵, as it spanned across various thematic groups, but offered a consistent semantic motif of opposition to other (e.g., ethnic or religious) groups and endorsement of the group one belongs to. 4th factor was a mix of 3 judiciary independence²⁶ and 2 economic freedom items; as the latter 2 did not offer any conceptual novelty, only the former part was retained. 5th factor did not offer any unique variance (besides one item with .55 loading).

²¹ In this case, 3rd, 4th and 5th taxons.

²² Moreover, this holds true even at a level of topics.

²³ They were conducted in a way (namely, limiting the numbers of factors manually) that would result in the closest replication of the model proposed by the authors.

²⁴ Same number as the one endorsed by the authors, but with different distribution of items.

²⁵ Popular term within social sciences (mostly psychology, sociology and evolutionary studies); also known as in-group(-out-group) favoritism, intergroup bias, or parochialism/parochial altruism.

²⁶ Items that were about democratization getting rid of top-down, authoritarian/totalitarian influence in this regard.

In sum, it has to be said once again, that individually all of the structural models were more or less flawed in regard to both logical consistency and empirical verification. Nevertheless, somewhat consistent patterns could be observed. Some models tend to overgeneralize, while others are inclined to the opposite bias; If were to sum them up though, these tendencies would cancel each other out and result in a balanced structure, that would look like the one presented below.

Combined constructs/taxons of all instruments:

Economic Freedom²⁷

Social Freedom

Foreign Policy: Pro-western vs Independence and/or Pro-Russian²⁸

In-group Bias

Judiciary

In sum, analysis revealed that, the most basic dimensions clearly appear to be social and economic freedom. These factors are present in all models in one form or another. In addition, as we have seen, these factor(s) can combine big part of the other dimensions' variance and content.

Additionally, for greater accuracy (although at the cost of sacrificing a large dose of brevity and intuitiveness), other categories can be added as well. We must remember that they are (mostly) formative constructs, meaning that we cannot form any common dimension/continuum with the issues within them, many separate scales have to be constructed for each sub-taxon. Furthermore, the vast majority of these appear to be highly variable over time, ideologically peripheral²⁹ and unconnected to each other. The most

²⁷ Though *left vs right wing* and (to a lesser degree) *conservatism vs liberalism* are more common terms, "Freedom" was preferred for 2 reasons: 1) stylistic advantage (brevity and elegance), and 2) coherence, especially in Georgia, where economic & social freedom are positively correlated, while other labels result in the opposite.

²⁸ While all instruments (that included this dimension) placed prowesternism on one pole of the continuum, the other pole varied significantly (from independence and/or pro-Russian course to, plainly, antiwesternity). If we were to summarize though (as intended by the authors), we would get the opposition of prowesternism to all other courses.

²⁹ As opposed to central: not part of the core issues and values.

common construct from these was *foreign policy*, followed by *ingroup bias* (which is fairly tightly connected to the former), and *judiciary* (which, semantically, is mostly covered by the *social freedom* taxon).

Item-level analysis: Inductive Category Formation

At the next (most important) stage, the Georgian instruments were analyzed inductively by forming categories (aka open coding) from the lowest level of abstraction – items. 189 items were analyzed, resulting in the following taxonomy³⁰:

Domestic Policy (80)

Authoritarianism/Centralisation-Democracy/Freedom (71)

Economics (28)³¹

Environmental Issues (10)

Freedom of speech, expression, opinion and belief/religion (8)

Family and Upbringing (8)

Abortion (3)

Other (14)

Other (9)

Orthodoxy and Dogmatism (58)

Religious O. (17)

Secularism (8)

Education (4)

Other (4)

Abortion (3)

³⁰ Multicollinear items were coded in all related categories.

³¹ This category is apparently related to the one in equality-equity taxon. The broad economic factor, which is one of the 2 most basic axis of political spectrum incorporates both; while sometimes the freedom aspect is more evident, the equity-equality aspect is more accented in other cases; this is evident even from its alternative names.

This category could be subdivided similarly to its counterpart, but was not, for brevity and comprehensibility.

Sexuality (2)
Other & Universal (4)
Traditions and Customs (8)
Lawfulness (8)
Freedom of speech, expression, opinion and belief/religion (8)
Ethnic-national (4)
Other (13)
Abortion (3)³²
Other and Universal (10)
Equality-Equity (38)
Economic E. (32)
Labor Rights/Policies (9)
Employer Rights/Support (7)
Employee Rights/Support (2)
Welfare (8)
Fiscal Politics (7)
Cultural and Educational Policy³³ (3)
Other and Universal (5)
Social E. (4)
Other and Universal (2)
Foreign Policy (32)
Prowesternism-Antiwesternism (9)
Neutrality/Independence (6)
Pro-Russian vs Anti-Russian (4)
Other (13)

³² This is the same category as above (in religious orthodoxy/dogmatism). It was included in both themes, because even though many oppose abortion for religious reasons, still a big part of opposers are non-religious.

³³ This category encompasses financing and subsidizing entities like culture, sports, and education.

Deviance (26)
Judiciary (21)
Severity (10)
Other (11)
Abortion (3)
Other (2)
In-group bias (23)
Nationalism and Ethnocentrism (18)
Traditions (4)
Language (4)
Economic Protectionism (3)
Other & Universal³⁴ (7)
Religious N. (4)
Other/self-sacrifice (1)

Once again, many categories were interrelated and most of this was connected to the economic and social freedom taxons. Only the most noteworthy connections will be discussed. In-group bias and Deviance (to a lesser degree) were tightly associated to Orthodoxy and Dogmatism. In turn, Orthodoxy/Dogmatism along with Domestic Policy could be mostly explained by other taxons (mainly Social Equality-Equity aka S. Freedom). These relationships are largely acknowledged in the field in general too.

In sum, it was once more confirmed that the Economic and Social Freedom/Equality are the most important possible factors. Other categories may be considered in particular situations.

³⁴ “universal” categories entail semantics of a whole given broader category; e.g., item “One should always defend and justify the motherland, even when it is wrong” relates to all kind of ethnocentrism or nationalism and is not limited to its only one particular sub-category (e.g, *language* or *traditions*).

Conclusion

If we were to summarize all kinds of analyses and information given in the article, the most important and robust finding would be, that economic and social freedom axes are by far the most fundamental constructs for measuring political orientation. After these the following categories may be included, considering peculiarities of given circumstances: foreign policy, deviance (including judiciary), orthodoxy/dogmatism, In-group biases, and domestic policy.

In the case of domestic and foreign policy, it should be clearly emphasized that the circumstances in this direction are changing very quickly, which is why it is impossible to ask questions (or even conceptualize constructs) that will be relevant for a long time.

It should be emphasized, that it is recommended to ask Georgians questions related to any ideology and political philosophy in the most understandable, simple form (avoiding jargon and relatively unknown words and phrases). The reason for this is that the Georgian population in general, as it was said, is quite inexperienced and uneducated in ideological issues.

It probably follows from this that self-reported information about ideology does not work among the Georgian population. Though it would be helpful to include such scales along with more reliable and valid measures to check its validity again, because the evidence of the opinion given above is not very reliable and also the situation in this regard does change in time.

There are several ways to solve this problem. One way is to simply continually update the questionnaire(s) and instruments. Another is to ask only (or mostly) questions that don't get old that quickly, and then philosophically and/or empirically deduce attitudes about more volatile, concrete issues from them.

It should be noted, that research once again shed light on the well-established rule of thumb among scholars of many disciplines (though not widespread among other fields), that many variables that even the very knowledgeable would assume are part of some broader category,

turn out to be uncorrelated with them³⁵. Such problems often arise, when the instruments are not properly adapted to the circumstances (e.g., culture or time) in which it is intended to be used. Therefore, proper adaptation and regular updates to instruments, as well as the underlying scientific or philosophical foundation(s), are generally necessary, particularly following significant events.

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³⁵ E.g., in the Election Compass the items “Participation in the accumulative pension system must be voluntary” and “Privatization of state hospitals will reduce healthcare costs for consumers” were categorized as part of economic freedom axis, but factor analysis showed that they were completely unrelated (with factor loadings of .136 &.134).

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Structural Realism and Georgian Foreign Policy

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Abstract

According to shared opinion, Georgia forged the western foreign policy after the rose revolution. The new elite who came to power after a bloodless uprising aspired to integrate the country into NATO and the E.U. Some scholars believe that Georgian western course is the outcome of the rose revolution. Therefore, they explore the process through the Liberal lens of international relations theory. On the other hand, Georgian foreign policy is regarded as a continuation of the course developed during the previous – Shevardnadze's – rulership, and the strategy can be explained via neoclassical realism theory. Another author goes further and uses offensive Realism for the Russian-Georgian War interpretation. The article aims to demonstrate that Georgian foreign policy from 1993 to 2012 can be examined through a Structural realism lens, and external factors play a significant role in designing foreign course.

Keywords: Georgia; Structural Realism; Small State; Foreign Policy.

Introduction

Several years ago, different articles were published regarding Georgian foreign policy. In 2013, an article about the foreign course of Georgia was introduced. The authors explained the formation of policy through the liberalism theory lens, arguing that the strategy of integrating

western institutions was formed by new elites who came to power after the Rose Revolution. The scholars went beyond and, for a particular reason, labelled the extension of the same foreign policy of Georgia after the Russian-Georgian war "puzzling" (Gvalia et al., 2013). Emphasizing only new elites and their ideas, the explanation created a specific way of investigating foreign course. This approach explicitly emphasizes the predominance of internal factors in designing external policy. Another attempt to investigate Georgian foreign policy not wholly rejected the importance of exogenous aspects but mainly focused on elite perceptions (Oskanian, 2016). The only article where foreign circumstances are considered investigates a pretty narrow part of the Georgian external course and primarily analyzes the 2008 war through the Offensive Realism perspective (Karagiannis, 2013). Recent scholars mostly ignore the systemic approach during an investigation of Georgian foreign policy. The primary reason for ignorance can be the lack of a broader prospect of Structural Realism to exhibit relevance in forming an external course. However, to a certain degree, the option is not as narrow as it may seem. The discounted point is that becoming part of NATO will help Georgia effectively balance the threat from Russia. Therefore, the state aspires to enter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to seek survival and security. Thus, there is space and option to review Georgian foreign policy through the lens of structural Realism too.

The article's primary purpose is not to reject previously introduced estimations via different theories but to demonstrate that the case of Georgian foreign policy can be contemplated through the Structural Realism prism. During the analysis, every author should consider the limits of theories. However, specific theories can explain a case more comprehensively than others. It has to be acknowledged that the initial investigation of Georgian foreign courses through a Liberal and neoclassical realism lens contributed much to the academic field. Nevertheless, there is room for the case to interpret via the Structural realism paradigm, and it may be regarded as not insignificant to other theoretical explanations.

Structural Realism

The disintegration of the Soviet Union had a significant impact on Realism theory. Authors commenced the new wave of critique, emphasizing the irrelevance and obsolescence of the theory (Schroeder, 1994) (Lebow, 1994) (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999). However, Realism theory can be marked as one of the most prominent among Liberalism and Constructivism. The latter theories are based on and consider the internal type of governance, institutionalism, democratic peace, ideas, identities, norms and culture. Meanwhile, the primary concern of Realism is the anarchy of the international system and states' interaction through the system.

The collapse of the USSR caused worldwide changes, but it is essential to mention that the system was reshaped at the unit level. Meanwhile, the feature of the structure remained the same. Changes in the system's structure are distinct from changes at the unit level (Waltz, 2000). The reduction of pole number to one caused the transformation of world politics to a certain degree. Yet, supranational governance has been absent in the world - one of the five assumptions on which Realist theory rests. The first assumption suggests that big states possess the military capability that can be directed against each other; further, states are never confident about other counterparts' motives and intentions. Additionally, survival becomes the primary goal, and states act rationally (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 30-31). An indispensable part of Structural Realist theory is the recognition of states – the units - as only actors in the international system. Units have similar functions but different capabilities (Waltz, 1979, pp. 96-97). Therefore, the internal features of states are not essential but the relative distribution of capability among international actors. Leaders, government types, ideology and culture, have no effect from the theoretical perspective. Unlike neoclassical Realism, the importance of elites and perceptions are entirely ignored, and the system dictates units' actions.

One of the main points of Structural Realism is that it evaluates international politics from a global perspective. The dependent variable for Classical Realism and neoclassical Realism is a state's foreign policy. In neorealism, international political outcome is the dependent variable

(Lobell et al., 2009, p. 20). Thus, the primary purpose of structural Realism is to investigate worldwide political event(s). As Kenneth Waltz stated at the end of his book:

The problem seen in the light of the theory is not to say how to manage the world, including its great powers, but to say how the possibility that great powers will constructively manage international affairs varies as systems change (Waltz, 1979, p. 210).

From this perspective, Structural Realism is an odd theory for the investigation of the foreign policy of a small state. However, it may be helpful if the external course of a small-scale actor is analyzed through the international system and interaction with more prominent players. The methodology part will demonstrate how this type of theory can help scrutinize Georgia's foreign policy.

Research Question, Hypotheses, and Methodology

The primary research question of this paper is can Structural Realism explain the foreign policy of Georgia? The most straightforward answer is Yes. Although structural components might influence the course of external policies, there is a need for improvement on a theoretical and methodological level. Nevertheless, it is essential to conceptualize a small state for two reasons: Georgia is a small country, and it is significant to describe a small state. The second reason is the difference in foreign policies between big and small actors. According to specific cases, small states act differently than structural realist logic. One of the arguments is that if great powers can balance each other via mobilizing internal capabilities, small states hardly follow such a strategy because of a lack of resources. Conversely, this logic there is a case when a small state continues the same foreign policy even though there are structural changes in the international arena and the threat toward the small state increases. The best example is Switzerland.

To cut a long story short, small states and their choices differ from the policies of big ones. Structural realism theory stands on the interaction of great powers and doesn't explain foreign

policy. The mission of this part is to conceptualize the meaning of small states, adjust structural realism theory to small actors, and find out if structural realism explains Georgian foreign strategy.

The ideal small state is a country with a small population, small territory, a small GDP, and a small military. In reality, everything is too complicated. No shared standard defines exactly how much is small. Previous works of different authors focused on the population as defining variable of state size and suggested various sets for labelling a state adjective "small". Simon Kuznets regarded a small state a country with less than 10 million population (Kuznets, 1960). Roderick Pace had the same assumption that a small state's population must be a maximum of 10 million (Pace, 2000). Fazal had quite a low threshold and regarded a state as small, with more than 500 000 people (Fazal, 2007). Some previous scholars added economic variables and suggested 10-15 million as the maximum population for developed countries and 20-30 million as backward ones (Vital, 1967).

Conversely, the abovementioned suggestions cause confusion. Some states have a relatively high population and less territory or vice versa. Bangladesh is 148,460 square kilometers, with over 165 million inhabitants (CIA World Factbook, 2022). However, the area of Norway is more than twice larger - 323,802 square kilometers with just over 5 million people (CIA World Factbook, 2022). Meanwhile, the GDP of Norway in 2021 was over 482 billion (World Bank, 2022) USD, while Bangladesh had more than 416 billion USD (World Bank, 2022). The verdict derived from the complex reality is that the absolute measurement of states seems worthless. Therefore, to determine whether a state is small, we can use relative size and common sense. Generally, actors in the international system can be split into four categories: 1) System Determining; 2) System Influencing; 3) System Affecting; 4) System Ineffectual (Keohane, 1969). As Waltz argues, finding great powers can be as easy or hard as discovering big firms in an oligopolistic market. The question is empirical and common sense can answer it (Waltz, 1979, p. 131). The same method can be used to categorize small state that does not affect the

international system; moreover, their foreign policies are forced by variations of balance of power (Browning, 2006).

After conceptualizing the notion of a small state, the first obstacle research faces is how to adjust the Structural Realism theory to explain the foreign policy of a small state. On the one hand, the prospect of theory consists of global scale outcome; on the other hand, as Waltz states:

True, the theory does not tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday. To expect it to do so would be like expecting the theory of universal gravitation to explain the wayward path of a falling leaf (Waltz, 1979, p. 121).

According to this logic, utilizing general theory only is not enough to evaluate a state's specific foreign policy. However, it has to be assumed that if there are other influential aspects that the theory may be combined with, the investigation of the external course might be successful. The article's purpose is to explain the particular action of the state via general theory accompanied by conditional variables. In this case, it can be argued that using the theory of universal gravitation and additional factors can explain the wayward path of a falling leaf.

During the analyses of the Georgian foreign policy, Structural circumstances will be under focus. However, it should to be assumed that external factors may not be the only conditional variables. Therefore, it is presumed that before the evaluation, all prominent theories – Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism – are equally important. It may be demonstrated that Realism is less successful in explaining Georgian foreign policy than the others. The additional element of the research will be that the state under the investigation lens is a small country. Scholars have already explored the pattern of a small state's behavior under different circumstances via different theoretical lenses. Since the scope of the paper focuses on the foreign policy of a small state, we can borrow from the authors' part of the methodological frame that suggests what the expectation of small state action on the international level is

through the Realism/Liberal/Constructivist prism. According to the specific framework, each theory suggests certain options for foreign policy. For example, based on the realism paradigm:

R1: Small states should react to structural constraints, most likely by bandwagoning or balancing. **R2:** As threat levels increase, small states should act more and more realist along the lines of **R1**. **R3:** Foreign policy choice is constrained for small states and smaller they are, the greater the constraint. the more constrained the choice, the more the state should follow the lines of **R1**

Domestic Actor Theory suggests that:

D1: Small states will support and appeal to international laws and organizations more than large states. **D2:** Small state foreign policy choice will be dictated by the interests of domestic actors and thus will change as the domestic actors in control of the state change. **D3:** Small state foreign policy choice will be constrained by domestic coalitions, and respond slowly to changes in the international structure.

According to Social Constructivist Theory:

S1: Small states will create and develop norms that support their identity. **S2:** Small state foreign policy choice will be consistent with these norms. **S3:** Small states foreign policy will be constrained by these norms and will only slowly respond to changes in the international structure.

(Jesse & Dreyer, 2016, p. 52)

The hypothesis of the paper suggests that the way of conducting Georgian foreign policy corresponds with realist logic because Georgia, in both – common sense and relative – terms, is a small state compared with Russia. Furthermore, Kremlin regards the former Soviet Union space as an exclusive interest zone, so Tbilisi has limited foreign policy options. Therefore, the hypothesis suggests that the Georgian foreign course corresponds with **R1**, **R2** and **R3** logic. Thus, the realist view indicates that a small state in the international system has two options: balance and bandwagon. Balance can be explained as the creation or aggregation of military power through internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter territorial occupation or the political and military domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition (Schweller, 2006). On the other hand, bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger (Walt, 1987) or it is caused by the opportunity for gain (Schweller, 1994).

A specific approach will be necessary to investigate the roots of the formation of the external course of a small actor during a particular timeframe. Regarding weak states³⁶, two methodological approaches are distinguished: "Horizontal" and "Vertical". The first approach is oriented toward generating general theories about operating and positioning weak units in the international system. The second approach seeks to profoundly investigate the foreign policy of a small state or a few weak states in a specific period of history. The "Horizontal" approach provides a common explanation. The "vertical" one uncovers precise details which can hardly be generalized (Handel, 2016, p. 4). The approach used in this paper will be the "vertical" one. The period for investigation has been chosen from 1993 to 2012.

Georgia gained independence in 1991; nonetheless, the early years of independence were characterized by nationalistic sentiments, civil war and separatist wars. There will be a discussion of these events in the research. Still, the main focus will be on conducting the country's foreign policy, from freezing the separatist conflicts to democratic change of government in Georgia. The reason why the observation ends in 2012 is the assumption that the Georgian government formed by the political party Georgian Dream had initiated the policy of appeasement of the Russian Federation, which was undoubtedly revealed during the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian war when prime minister Irakli Gharibashvili stated that Georgia would not join sanctions against Russia (Narimanishvili, 2022). The Russian Federation did not name Georgia in the "unfriendly" countries' list (Russian News Agency, 2022) (The Moscow Times, 2022). Even though Georgia has been maintaining a close relationship with the U.S. since 2012, and both countries have conducted joint military drills (The US Embassy in Georgia, 2020). However, during a specific moment in the international arena, Georgia revealed a policy that resembles bandwagoning with Russia. The subject is quite complex and confusing. According to the concrete methodological structure, when foreign policy choice is dictated by domestic actors and thus will change as the domestic actors in the state change

³⁶ Author Michael Handel used term "weak states". In this article weak and small is considered as synonyms.

(Jesse & Dreyer, 2016, p. 52) it has to be interpreted via the Liberalism theory of international relations. However, the complicated part in the case of Georgian foreign policy is that the domestic actor that changed in 2012 reversed the course of foreign policy from balancing to bandwagoning, which still is part of the structural realism frame. This type of knotty case needs independent research; therefore, it will not be included in this paper's investigation scope. Hence, the period for the analysis will be from 1993 to 2012.

The research is a specific case study that will test whether the theory helps explain Georgia's foreign policy from a structural perspective. The preeminent part of the methodology will be the process tracing that will guide to a chain of events by which initial case conditions are translated into the case outcome (Evera, 1997, p. 64). The procedure attempts to uncover the motivation the actors attend to; the decision process; the catalyst of the decisions, and development actions (George & McKeown, 1985). From a practical perspective, the fundamental research will be based on profound observation of the chain of events to determine the role of structural factors in Georgia's foreign policy conduction. However, the focus should not be oriented on the small state only. Under surveillance will be the interaction of Georgia with two other international actors: the Russian Federation and the United States. The latter is the leader of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and one of the prominent supporters of Georgian integration into NATO. Representing a whole military-political organization with 30 states as a sole actor would be inaccurate. The interests of each member country sometimes broadly differ. The most appropriate example is the reluctant policy of France and Germany in 2008 Bucharest summit, not expressing endorsement toward Georgian and Ukrainian integration into NATO. Thus, it is a mistake if the military-political organization is regarded as a monolithic structure of states with identical interests.

The most outstanding actor in the alliance which backs Georgia is the US. Therefore, the central balancer of the Russian menace is the United States. On the other hand, Russia is the leading regional player with the ambition of being a regional hegemon (Suny, 2007). From an

offensive realism perspective, it is natural that Russian Federation has a contentious relationship with NATO enlargement. Conversely, this type of attitude was manufactured by the top Russian elite more than a decade later after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In his famous Munich speech, President Vladimir Putin criticized the United States' action and emphasized that the unipolar world was over, as well as the time for making unilateral decisions (Putin, 2007). The 2007 Putin's speech may be regarded as when U.S. and Russian relations deteriorated. Nevertheless, Georgian-Russian interaction was exacerbated earlier.

Finally, Georgian foreign policy will be under surveillance from 1993 to 2012 following interaction with the Russian Federation and the United States. The chain of developed events will demonstrate the effect of exogenous factors on Georgian foreign policy. In case external variables are not abundant and/or the course of a small state does not validate hypotheses, the conclusion will be that Structural Realism is an inappropriate theory for explaining the foreign strategy of Georgia. Otherwise, the theory will help explain the Georgian external course if the hypotheses are approved.

The Beginning – The Rough Startup

In his book, the leader of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, states that there are handbooks about house building, mechanical maintenance, and how to write a book, but there are no written guidelines on how to set up a nation with different ethnic groups and without a prominent economic role in a region (Yew, 2000, p. 4). Although Singapore also had severe issues after gaining independence, the country became one of the most prominent players in the region and the world's financial center. In the case of Georgia, everything was the opposite. The demise of the Soviet Union caused the birth of Georgia, one of the ways new states appear on the world political map - by an ethnically-based dissociation from weakened empires or great powers (Knudsen, 2002). In Georgia, building a solid democratic state failed and was

overshadowed by nationalistic rhetoric and actions, leading to civil war. The turbulence in the Georgian domestic political arena occurred before the disintegration of the USSR.

When Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian presidents and prime ministers met at the hunting lodge near Minsk, where they agreed to dissolve the Soviet Union, Georgia was experiencing disarray and turmoil. The final dissolution of the USSR coincided with the civil war in Georgia. A couple of weeks later, on January 6 1992, Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his supporters left the country (Smeets, 1999).

Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected as president on May 26, 1991, with 86 percent of the votes (Fuller, 1993). The first president of Georgia, despite his political miscalculations and mistakes, is admired by a particular segment of the Georgian population as a national hero. His nationalistic rhetoric, less democratic, and more authoritarian actions can be regarded as the root of the turbulences that emerged in 1991 and continued for a few years. Despite serious issues, Zviad Gamsakhurdia had major endorsement and popularity in the country. His understanding of democracy was way vaguer and authoritarian. Political opponents were arrested, critics usually were labelled as "Russian agents", on the media was imposed censorship. Plans for economic reforms and land privatization were postponed indefinitely. His reputation soon deteriorated in the external and internal political arena. Gamsakhurdia's equivocal reaction to the August coup attempt in Russia alienated relations with northern neighbor. On a domestic level, his motto, "Georgia for Georgians" became a signal of menace for the country with many ethnoreligious minorities. The impractical and idealistic policy of the first president exacerbated relations among elites and specific regions.

The decisive moment was the crackdown of the demonstration in Tbilisi on September 2. The situation became quite tense when protesters were endorsed by the former leader of the national guard – Tengiz Kitovani. The civil war became the product of weird messianic and crusader policy degenerating into chauvinism. Furthermore, republics of minorities were so

alienated from the perspective of Georgian ultra-nationalistic independence that they preferred to side with USSR and later Russia rather than with Georgia (Nodia, 1996).

The ouster of the first president had no positive effect on relationships with alienated regions. On August 14, 1992, eight months after Gamsakhurdia had left the country, the conflict in Abkhazia commenced.

It may seem irrelevant to analyze the foreign policy of Georgia from 1991 to 1992. This part of Georgian history is nothing but chaos. Instead of forging an independent state, the country probably experienced the worst state-building scenario. The course exacerbated the state's overall condition. The nationalistic policy antagonized ethnical minorities, the Soviet Union and Russia. Instead of maintaining proper relations with the former metropole, the latter was constantly demonized. Georgia did not participate in the Soviet referendum of March 1991 nor join the Commonwealth of Independent States – CIS. It should not be surprising that Kremlin endorsed breakaway regions in Georgia after this policy.

What could be the best option for Georgia? The situation from a regional perspective was grave. Neutrality was unacceptable for the Russian Federation. A balance strategy was impossible because of no endorsing power on the horizon to support Georgia. Bandwagon would seem the best choice in the foreign arena, as well as moderate/pragmatic policy in domestic affairs. However, the chosen course during the first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia turned out to be the opposite.

One of the differences between "offensive" and "defensive" realism theories is that the former regards international actors as rational ones (Mearsheimer, 2001). Meanwhile, the latter units have plenty of options, and nothing prevents them from making wrong decisions (Waltz, 1997, p. 915). Any realism branch can hardly explain the Georgian historical phase of 1991-1992, but by the assumption that states are free in action and sometimes consequences might be dreadful. However, later, at the beginning of Shevardnadze's leadership, it may have been

presumed that the cease-fire agreement signed with Russian mediation was bandwagoning and abandoning the previous irrational policy. Apparently, structural Realism may be helpful.

Bandwagon – worse option rather than the worst one

Between 1991 and 1992, Georgia could be called anything but a rational actor. There were two reasons: 1) The whole conducted policy, domestic as well as foreign, was irrational and emotional; 2) The internal institutional disarray and civil war in the country turned the actor into a failed state.

Georgia had no better option than to agree to a Russian-mediated cease-fire agreement. Shevardnadze – the successor of Gamsakhurdia – commenced the policy of stabilization. On June 22 1992, in Dagomys, Russia, Shevardnadze and Yeltsin met each other and acknowledged a cease-fire to defuse the situation in the Tskhinvali region. A couple of weeks later, Russian peacekeepers entered the region. However, after less than a couple of months, a new conflict erupted in Abkhazia, which was more aggressive and atrocious than the previous one. Despite the cease-fire agreement in Sochi in July 1993, Abkhazians on September 16 resumed military actions. After eleven days, the capital of Abkhazia, Sukhumi, fell.

Along with the conflict, Russia revealed its fundamental interests. On the one hand, Moscow endorsed separatists. On the other hand, Kremlin demanded the legalization of Russian military bases in Georgia and required Georgia's enrollment into the CIS (Cheterian, 2008, pp. 199-200). In his memoirs, Eduard Shevardnadze mentioned that Georgia was coerced to join CIS (Shevardnadze, 2006). This action meant that the state de jure was returning to its previous orbit, and the attempt of independent policy failed and provoked dreadful consequences.

From 1992 Georgia seeks external power to solve the problems. Because of its lack of capabilities, including political competence, Tbilisi could not handle exacerbated situation alone. The only prominent and interested side was Russia. Despite downgrading from global

power, Russian Federation was the most significant regional actor, capable of mediation and assistance. Thus, the agreement to cease fire and introduce Georgia to the CIS resulted from recognizing continued Russian regional predominance (Fawn, 2002). It may be assumed that from the moment Georgia officially became a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States – on December 3 1993 - the policy of bandwagon began.

In Georgian case, it was the North from where the threat originated (and still is). It may hardly be assumed that the Georgian move to bandwagon with Russian Federation was motivated by seeking profit. The only gain Tbilisi obtained by Moscow mediated cease-fire agreement and enrolling into the CIS was peace at the expense of "freezing" conflicts that deteriorated Georgian territorial integrity.

It may be argued that the leader change caused the bandwagon and was Shevardnadze's policy. However, to look at the systemic constraints, hard to believe that these factors played no role.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kremlin gave up east Europe, but the "near abroad" remained the area of the Russian exclusive interest zone. The juxtaposing fact is that the first foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Andrei Kozyrev, mentioned that Russia still was great power with national interests and that defending these interests would be appropriately rough interaction with actors and not via confrontation (Kozyrev, 1992). Probably the statement was aimed at other great players in international politics. Meanwhile, Russia's aim appeared to try to restore its influence throughout the region, on all sides, in every conflict, to prevent developments from slipping out of control and opening the floodgates to outside interference (Trenin D. , 1996). The interaction with Georgia was quite unusual, with some elements of confrontation and coercive actions. On the one hand, Moscow endorsed Georgian territorial integrity. On the other hand, Russian weapons were found in Abkhazian separatists' hands. Furthermore, Russian planes bombed civilian targets in Georgian-controlled territory, and Russian-trained and Russian-paid fighters defended Abkhaz territory in Tkvarcheli (Human Rights Watch, 1995). In this case, Georgia had the worst and worse alternatives. The

former would be a continuation of war, and the latter agreeing on Russian-mediated negotiations and granting Kremlin military-political concessions. It was evident that Tbilisi had limited options and chose the worse one. However, what was Russia's aim? Apparently, the goal of the Kremlin was to dominate the area of former soviet republics. It was demonstrated in action and later declared as a doctrine by the first foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Andrey Kozyrev. According to the doctrine, the CIS and Baltic republics were the area of Russia's vital interest zone. The Foreign Minister emphasized the importance for Kremlin to maintain a military presence "near abroad"; otherwise, the Russian army withdrawal would cause a power and security vacuum in the area and would be filled by the forces that would not always have a friendly attitude toward Russia. Despite different era and geography, the doctrine is an analogy of the Monroe Doctrine (Litera, 1994/1995). The idea of Monroe Doctrine, implemented in 1823, declared that the government of the U.S. refused to condone further colonization in the western hemisphere by any European power, and any European intervention would be regarded as a manifestation of unfriendly action toward the United States (Rich, 1992, p. 42). Another similarity is that the Great powers not only attempt to deter other counterparts from interfering in their vital interest zones but also act in a particular manner to prevent the "leave" of geopolitical orbit by a state located in a crucial interest area. In the U.S. case, it was the western hemisphere. In Russian – "near abroad".

The structural constraint was obvious. The separatist wars in Georgia, endorsed by Kremlin, coerced Tbilisi to change the political agenda. There was hardly any better option than agreeing on Moscow-mediated peace negotiations, stationing Russian peacekeepers, joining the Commonwealth of Independent States and entering a Russian-dominated military alliance via signing Collective Security Treaty. That was a pure representation of bandwagoning. Thus, Georgia adopted the policy predicted by systemic-structural theories (Jervis, 1978), (Wolfers, 1962).

Seeking Better Policy – Initiating Balancing

After signing cease-fire agreements, Georgia gained relief to sort out a domestic mess. The conditions in the internal political arena were exceptionally grave. The country's general characteristics were a fragmented society, weak state institutions, paramilitary gangs, high crime, and unemployment. The situation started to improve but in slow motion. The first significant positive change was the adoption of the constitution in 1995 that set institutional frames and limits. Although the state had severe corruption and economic issues, the circumstances changed positively. The economy started to grow gradually. In 1994 GDP of Georgia was 2.51 billion USD; in 1995 – 2.69 billion \$ and in 1996 - 3.1 billion \$ (World Bank, 2022). The progress was evident in terms of GDP per capita as well. Even though the amount was too low still, slight development was evident. In 1994 GDP per capita was 519.9 USD, and in 1995 -1996 it became 578.3 \$ and 689.1 \$ (World Bank, 2022). Although there was an improvement, it was not conducted in a peaceful atmosphere. Five days after adopting the new constitution, there was an assassination attempt. The target was Eduard Shevardnadze. The main suspect, the state security minister of Georgia – Igor Giorgadze, who had long sought to install someone less independent than Shevardnadze in Georgia (Jones, 1996) fled the country after the assassination attempt. The failed coup became the excuse to fight against organized crime and paramilitary gangs.

Progress became apparent on the level of foreign affairs too. However, the way was full of obstacles. The primary mission of the newly independent country was to establish itself in the international arena. Georgia actively started a partnership with neighbor states – Azerbaijan and Turkey and later became a member of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project. The plan was political and geostrategic and aimed to transport Azeri oil through Georgian territory to the Turkish Mediterranean harbor (Alam, 2002). From the beginning, it became known that Russia was opposing the pipeline route through Georgia. Eduard Shevardnadze mentions in his memoirs that the next day after his assassination attempt President of the Russian

Federation Boris Yeltsin contacted him via phone, congratulated survival, but emphasized that the pipeline would cover Russian, not Georgian territory.

Conversely, the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline had already been agreed upon among partner sides; therefore, Moscow had no lever of influence (Shevardnadze, 2006). On the other hand, the project's proponent was the United States, which preferred Caspian oil and gas transportation through the territories fully affiliated with the Euro-Atlantic alliance - Turkey and Georgia (Shaffer, 2005). Although there was another assassination attempt on Shevardnadze directed against the country, it still seems evident that structural factors dictated the decision. It was the beginning of the moment when the US-Georgian interests coincided. The United States became interested in the region, meaning the global power started involvement in the "near abroad". Moreover, Russia was increasingly viewed in Washington as a spoiler in international affairs and as something other than an honest broker in regional conflicts (Hill, 2004). For small Georgia, this was a chance to find a new ally and balance the Russian menace. From this moment, the Gregorian foreign policy vector starts leaning toward the West.

The Kremlin's foreign policy toward Tbilisi had a severe issue that exacerbated Russian-Georgian relations. The prominent player was not allowing the small one to conduct particular policy to aggrandize its status and evolve the devastated economy. According to one of the assumptions in I.R. theories, states care most about wealth after their survival, which also boosts the chance of long-term survival (Monteiro, 2014, pp. 33-34). The fact that Moscow opposed Tbilisi to advance its role was a direct hint that bandwagon with Russia was not a good policy.

The gradual changes started during the middle and late 1990s when Georgia signed the treaty of cooperation with the E.U. and later became a member of the Council of Europe. Meanwhile, Tbilisi refused to continue membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 1999 and became a member of GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) to

strengthen ties with the West as well as the member states of the union. Although the GU(U)AM (Uzbekistan left the organization in 2005) was not entirely successful, the initiative had a definite prominent message to Moscow that there were former Soviet Union states willing to conduct the policy and deepen cooperation with the West.

In the Georgian case, there was a breakthrough on a bilateral level with the United States as well. Tbilisi was one of the most prominent receivers of U.S. aid, ranking among the top states in terms of U.S. aid per capita (Nichol, 2013). After the 9/11 terrorist attack, the US-Georgian relationship strengthened. In May 2002, the United States proposed the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), to aid Georgia's security services in combating internal terrorism threats and in border security, anti-terrorism, crisis response, and military reform. The program aimed to train four Georgian Army light infantry battalions and a mechanized company team (The US Department of State, 2003). Such a close relationship caused Russian resentment. On May 7, after the consultation in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, Georgia's Defense Minister, Lt. General David Tevzadze, was asked about the Russian reaction to the GTEP, to which the Minister responded by saying that "unfortunately our Russian friends have overreacted." (Areshidze, 2002).

The Russian attitude toward the US-Georgian close relationship was not surprising. Because of internal political turbulences, like the wounds of the 1997 economic crisis and the Chechen war, Kremlin had severe constraints that played a particular role in strengthening Washington-Tbilisi political ties. However, Moscow sought a reason to interfere in Tbilisi's policy and blamed Georgia for endorsing Chechen separatists. Sometimes allegations went too far; for example, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation stated that the leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, was hiding in Georgia, precisely in Pankisi gorge (Old.Civil.ge, 2002). The response of Shevardnadze to the absurd allegation was that he promised the Russian Minister of foreign affairs to search for Bin Laden in his house in the Akhmeta region, which includes Pankisi gorge (Риа Новости, 2002). Moscow sought a purpose that would give an

excuse to intervene in Georgian political affairs. The deployment of US military staff for training Georgian forces was direct involvement in "near abroad" by another big player, which was unacceptable and a cause of resentment in the Russian Federation. However, this was an opportunity for Georgia to conduct a policy of balance and change the foreign vector from coercive to great benevolent power. On November 22, 2002, Eduard Shevardnadze, on the second and final day of the Prague NATO summit, officially requested that his country be invited to join the 53-year-old alliance (Peuch, 2002). Since then, it can be argued that Georgia's initiated policy of balance entered a new level; however, the catalyst of the process was the Rose Revolution.

Acceleration, War, Continuation

Despite the changes and gradual but irreversible development in particular foreign policy aspects, Georgia remained a small weak state with serious issues. In the early 2000s, Mikhail Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania detached from Shevardnadze's political party - the Citizens Union of Georgia and criticized Eduard Shevardnadze for increased corruption and authoritarianism. After the 2003 fraudulent parliamentary election, a massive protest led by the triad (Saakashvili-Burjanadze-Zhvania) succeeded, and Shevardnadze resigned. The process became known as Rose Revolution, as protesters marched into the parliament building with roses, guided by Saakashvili. The new leader(s) of Georgia became younger politicians who got an education in the West. Soon new authorities launched advanced packages of reforms that positively changed the internal features of the state. The economy grew faster until the 2008 world economic crisis and the Russian-Georgian war (World Bank, 2022). Fighting against corruption became one of the central policies; hence, it started to shrink (Trading Economics, 2022). Foreign direct investments started to flow turbulent; nonetheless, in 2006/2007, it was 15.1/18.6 % of GDP (World Bank, 2022). It can hardly be arguable that

after the Rose Revolution, Georgia experienced massive positive changes on a domestic level. However, the foreign policy question after the revolution is hard, to sum up in a nutshell.

There are two distinct perceptions regarding the conduction of Georgian foreign policy after the Rose Revolution. On the one hand, it was a continuation of Shevardnadze's shift from bandwagoning to balance (Oskanian, 2016), on the other hand, the third president Mikhail Saakashvili and his government have established a distinctly Western ideological reorientation that permeates both domestic reforms and foreign policy (Gvalia et al., 2013). It is hardly questionable that internal reforms had ideological roots. However, the statement that cooperation with the West was caused by the ideology of Saakashvili's new government and that Shevardnadze never detached Georgia far from the Kremlin geopolitical orbit may be false. To begin with, the roost of Georgian Western foreign policy lies in the middle of the 1990s, and Shevardnadze was the first to initiate NATO integration.

Furthermore, it is well known in the theory of international relations that the general outcome in the world political arena is made by big players (Waltz, 1979, pp. 72-73). Thus, shifting Georgia out of the Russian geopolitical orbit depended neither on Shevardnadze nor Saakashvili but on Russian weakness. Nonetheless, Saakashvili's government tried to escape Russia's interest/influence zone.

Looking at the timeline of US-Georgian and NATO-Georgian cooperation, it becomes evident that after the revolution partnership between Washington-Tbilisi and NATO-Georgia, is progressively deepened. In 2005, GTEP evolved into the Georgian Sustainment and Stability Programs (SSOP and SSOP II), designed to train and equip the Georgian forces and command staff for peace support operations in Iraq. Since then, Georgia has actively participated in US/NATO-led missions (Ministry of Defence of Georgia, 2022). The timeline list emphasizes that the US-Georgian partnership started and evolved through Georgian Train and Equip Program, initiated and conducted during Shevardnadze's government. Thus, the solid foundation of the western foreign policy lies before the Rose Revolution, not after it. The

difference is in the speed and quality of enforcing it. If Shevardnadze's government abstained from officially declaring concrete Georgian foreign course, authorities during Saakashvili's presidency unequivocally demonstrated and advocated pro-Western policy (German, 2015). After developing the capabilities of the state, Tbilisi was able to deepen relations with the West. However, external factors were not favoring Georgia.

In 2007, during the Munich security conference, President Vladimir Putin made a speech that became a message revealing the Kremlin's different policy and attitude toward the West and the course of the US. The speech's plot emphasized that the unipolar world was over, and the unilateral decisions of the greatest actor became unacceptable. Furthermore, Russia regarded the fact offensive that Kremlin military bases were closing in Georgia; according to The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the country sought integration into NATO (Putin, 2007). Thus, North Atlantic Treaty organization's frontline near the Russian border and in the political backyard was repugnant to Moscow. If Kremlin was weak enough and unable to resist NATO enlargement in 2004, the situation changed dramatically three years later. During the early years of the 21st century, the Russian economy started to heal wounds. "It was growing so fast that by 2007, its GDP, in dollar terms, had surpassed its 1999 level no less than seven times" (Trenin D. , 2011).

Additionally, Moscow had diplomatic success as well. Significant actors on the European continent, like Germany and France, were actively cooperating with Russia. It was demonstrated when the Berlin-Paris refused Ukrainian and Georgian integration into NATO, simply explaining that the candidate countries could not fit the standards for the alliance. Nonetheless, the ample reason was maintaining a good relationship with Moscow (Lazarević, 2009). The summit demonstrated the revival of the 19th-century balance-of-power ideas in Berlin and Paris, involving Moscow's participation in a "European concert" of equivalent powers (Socor, 2008).

Not gaining Membership Action Plan on Bucharest NATO summit and Russo-Georgian war revealed that Tbilisi was Moscow's backyard and Kremlin had the liberty of coercive action. After the Rose Revolution, it may seem that Kremlin was losing influence ties in Tbilisi; however, the freedom of Russian action and reluctance of the West demonstrated that Georgia still was part of Moscow's interest and influence zone.

Why did Georgia continue to balance after the 2008 war? The mission of the Kremlin was to change Tbilisi's balance policy into bandwagon. If Georgia redirected the foreign course in favor of Russia, it would mean complete capitulation of Tbilisi, and Moscow would accomplish its task. Although both options – bandwagon and balance – are part of structural realist theory, it became evident from the middle of the 1990s that the balance was way more profitable than the bandwagon policy for Tbilisi. Russian hypocrisy toward Georgia was revealed during the bandwagoning years when Kremlin as a mediator, played no positive role in resolving Tbilisi's separatist "frozen" conflicts. Russia was opposing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project, which was crucial for Georgia. Recognizing separatist regions as independent states became a legal justification for maintaining military bases in the area by Russia. The reality for Georgia became quite dramatic; in the central and Northern-west parts of the country were stationed Russian militaries, as well as in South in Armenia, in Gyumri. Georgia was (and still is) surrounded by Kremlin forces, and in case of another full-scale Russian attack, Tbilisi could hardly be survived. Thus, nothing is puzzling and surprising that the western foreign vector of Georgia was maintained even after Russian aggression. Cooperation between US and Georgia continued. In 2009 Georgian Development Program was established to support Georgia's participation in NATO-led missions. In 2015, three years later, after the change of government in Georgia, the Development Program was replaced by Resolute Support Mission. Georgia was one of the mission's most significant non-NATO soldier contributors. (Ministry of Defence of Georgia, 2022). Thus, the balance was continued, despite the pressure from Moscow.

Evaluation

Georgian and Russian success/failure can be compared with a half-empty/half-full glass of water. On the one hand, Georgia could not integrate into NATO and complete its survival task. Nevertheless, cooperation with the West continued; a western endorsement to Tbilisi halted Kremlin military action. Therefore, the course of balance was maintained after the war. On the other hand, Russia using diplomatic and hard power, postponed Georgian integration indefinitely. Although, Moscow was unable to change the Georgian foreign policy course. Hardly can be made an unambiguous verdict, yet the Georgian integration process was frozen, and the policy of balance continued in a limited way.

Via the analysis of contemporary Georgian history, it becomes evident that in terms of foreign policy options, Tbilisi had limited prospects ranging from bandwagon to balancing. The aftermath of Russian-mediated cease-fire agreements and enrolling Kremlin-dominated organizations was a pure representation of bandwagon. Although, changes in international structure – the revealed interests of the US in Caspian oil resources and the Caucasus regions – gave Georgia a chance to participate in intergovernmental projects despite the pressure from the Russian side. It may be argued that Georgian foreign policy transformation from bandwagoning to balancing was the product of domestic actors. However, it must be admitted that Shevardnadze's government created the western course at the end of the 1990s when there were hardly prominent interest groups or internal actors that would influence the country's foreign policy. The practice continued and accelerated after the Rose Revolution. The fact that the policy of balance was forged before the revolution hints that Domestic Actor Theory is odd, and there is no evidence that **D1**, **D2** or **D3** suggestions are relevant.

Furthermore, the continuation of the same policy after the authority change may refer to the setting of a norm to support the identity of a state. Saakashvili and his government were too active proponents of Georgia's European identity. The Euro-Atlantic political narrative continued after the 2008 war. It may be assumed that the state created a norm, and the foreign

course followed it even during external systemic developments. However, his idea has a couple of specific flaws.

To begin with, the establishment of norms need time. In the Georgian case, it is pretty hard to declare without hesitation that chosen course after the Rose revolution was nothing but setting up a norm. To look at Switzerland's example, it becomes easy to analyze and make the verdict that Swiss neutrality is and was set of the norm that survived significant structural change during World War First, later turned into a tradition and did not shift from 1939 to 1991, became the culture, thus was maintained after the demise of the USSR and continues even nowadays. Constructivist theory can explain that very well (Jesse & Dreyer, 2016, p. 69) However, in the Georgian case, the history is too short of making a long "vertical" investigation. On the other hand, structural factors are evident, and the foreign policy of Tbilisi coincides with Realism theory options. Bandwagoning with Moscow guaranteed neither institutional development nor economic prosperity, and to a certain degree, it even undermined survival. Therefore, the small state made a maneuver to balance the big actor.

Further, we investigate the Georgian foreign policy from the early 1990s to 2012, and more convincing it becomes that policy of Tbilisi goes along with suggestions of Realism theory **R1**, **R2** and **R3**. In relative and absolute terms, Georgia is quite small compared to Russia. The theoretical frame suggests that a bigger constraint, the narrower option ranges from bandwagon to balance. As mentioned at the beginning of the evaluation, the whole Georgian foreign poly option, implemented in practice initially, was bandwagon later turned into balance.

Conclusion

Analyzing foreign policy by emphasizing elite perceptions is a quite prominent method; however, advocating the point via interviews with politicians and experts, not even

mentioning structural factors, makes the methodology less objective. Furthermore, analysis of a small part of history from 2003-2012, without any prerequisite, may lead to the wrong verdict. On the other hand, betting on elite perception and structural factors together seems to step forward to an objective investigation. However, assuming the same importance of both factors may be odd. Let us assume that Shevardnadze was assassinated in 1995 or 1998; how would the external course be changed? If, in 2008, Saakashvili's government was toppled by Russian forces, what policy would be taken by occupational authorities? In any counterfactual analysis hardly, we can speculate any scenario where the external vector would be different from the bandwagon.

Despite the previous works emphasizing elites and elite perceptions, the vertical structural analysis demonstrated that external factors were important in forming Georgian foreign policy. Furthermore, the Georgian external course from 1993 to 2012 fits Realist theory suggestions and varies from bandwagoning to balance. Additionally, it is essential to mention that the Georgian foreign course from 1991 to 1993 was based on ideas and certain nationalistic/chauvinist interest groups advocating complete detachment from Russian orbit culminated with a mess, civil war and separatist wars endorsed by Kremlin. The situation was relatively defused after Moscow mediation, bringing its peacekeepers into the conflict zone and made Georgia join CIS.

To summarize the fundamental structural factors in a single sentence, the Russian Federation creates structural constraints for Georgia. Whether some scholars and authors want to admit it or not, it has to be acknowledged that the foreign policy of Georgia yields those constraints.

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The Impact of Regimes on the Structure of the CIA and the KGB During the Cold War and on the Errors Committed

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Abstract

Based on a comparative analysis, the paper investigates how regimes affected the structure of the CIA and the KGB, as well as the errors committed during the Cold War.

The study is divided into several main parts. Initially, we examine the regimes in operation in the United States of America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and their influence on the structure of the CIA and the KGB. In the next stage, we discuss the structural problems in the CIA and the KGB, the methods used in order to collect information about each other (HUMINT and TECHINT), and their strong and weak points in intelligence activities. At the conclusion stage, based on the Case Study, we review the errors committed by the CIA and the KGB from the perspective of HUMINT, and on the basis of a comparative analysis, we judge to what extent the structural problems and the committed errors were a result of the regime types.

Key Words: Cold War, CIA, HUMINT, KGB, Regimes, Structure.

Introduction

The activities of the intelligence services were crucial during the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a military, political, economic, and ideological struggle. The CIA and the KGB made every effort to obtain more classified information about each other because, in any type of war, having information about the enemy can be crucial.

Both the American and Soviet intelligence services made a number of errors throughout the aforementioned period. From a political standpoint, the Cold War era turned out to be rather tense, so this was expected. It is always expected that governments will make mistakes during challenging and tense historical periods. Personnel in the intelligence agency frequently switched sides due to ideological, financial, or other motives. Aldrich Ames, who brought a lot of harm to the Central Intelligence Agency, is a well-known illustration of this.

The Cold War era should serve as a lesson for both the United States and the Post-Soviet countries. Because it is crucial to analyze the mistakes made during this time in terms of security. The reason the Cold War period was chosen is that we have access to some cases from the Cold War era, but their number would be even lower if we included Post-Cold War activities because recent historical cases have not yet been declassified and won't be until they lose their political significance.

In addition to the errors made, the literature analysis exposed structural problems caused by the regimes that reduced the efficiency of the CIA and the KGB. Since human intelligence cannot be replaced, regardless of how technology advances in the future, we shall talk about the blunders committed in this area. Analysis of errors in this area will always be valuable because they are repetitive, although the same cannot be said of errors in technical intelligence due to the rapid advancement of technologies following the end of the Cold War.

In the paper, a hypothesis was formed that the democratic and totalitarian regimes affected the structure of the CIA and the KGB, which became the reason for the errors committed in terms of human intelligence (HUMINT) during the Cold War. Regime type (democracy and

totalitarianism) is an independent variable, and the dependent variables are the structure and the errors committed.

Through comparative analysis, It is crucial to ascertain if the democratic and totalitarian regimes had an effect on the CIA's and the KGB's organizational structures. Did the Democratic and Totalitarian regimes determine the priorities of the Intelligence Services? (HUMINT/TECHINT) What mistakes did the CIA and the KGB make in terms of human intelligence? To what extent did the type of regime cause the errors committed?

In order to answer the questions listed above, we use one of the methods of qualitative research: a Case Study. It should also be noted that this paper is an Inductive type, since at the initial stage the structural problems and the errors committed in the CIA and the KGB were analysed, and then we came from a specific to a general conclusion that the given results were caused by the types of democratic and totalitarian regimes.

Structural Problems In The CIA And the KGB Induced By Regimes

Regime types have a significant impact on the formation of a country's institutions. The democratic regime made the Central Intelligence Agency as decentralized as the American government. The primary benefit of decentralization is that authority is not abused and does not serve the interests of a single person or group; nevertheless, it also has the disadvantage of a weak control mechanism. To this was added the principle of compartmentalization, which increased security but hampered coordination as the timely exchange of information at the internal level was impossible. The Central Intelligence Agency was an independent intelligence service and was primarily responsible for strategic analysis and covert action abroad. (Moses, 1983) Under independence I do not mean independence from the government's leader but rather independence from the so-called "killing the messenger" attitude. The latter entails disregarding expert evaluations when the analysis offered

contradicts government policy. (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002) Nonetheless, after a few years of the intelligence service's inception, certain issues with supervision's efficacy arose. (Snider, 2008) Furthermore, in democratic regimes, there are difficulties with intelligence that do not arise in a state with a totalitarian regime. This is society's stance towards covert action. As Dahl (1998) points out: „Democracy confers many advantages on its citizens...they possess fundamental political rights; in addition, they also enjoy a wider sphere of freedom;”(pp.75-76). Although the democratic regime in the United States has increased citizens' political rights and liberties, it has also decreased security. In particular, as people's rights in terms of government control have grown, so has their demand for the openness of government actions (mostly linked to covert actions), which has complicated the issue of preserving secret information. (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002) The National Security Act (1947) defines covert action as: „An activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.“ (p.100).

The CIA was further distinct from the KGB in that it made no effort to control and intimidate its own citizens, which was also caused by the type of regime. During the Cold War, the primary purpose of the Central Intelligence Agency was to contain the external dangers presented by the Soviet Union and its ideology. However, the concentration on covert actions hampered the CIA's analytical department's capacity to correctly Assess the situations. This is supported by Dulles' evaluation, which underlines the shortcomings of the Central Intelligence Agency's assessment of the Soviet Union. (Weiner, 2007) This flaw was causing unfavourable outcomes in the execution of deception.

The free press also complicates the activities of intelligence services in democracies. In the case of America, the right to free speech is defined by the constitution; hence, the existence of a free press presented extra security issues during the Cold War. (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002) The opinion that press control is important is supported by the example of Napoleon Bonaparte, who did not have to make extra efforts to collect information about England because the

English press could not be controlled by the state, so Bonaparte always trusted the information spread in the press more. (Andrew, 2018) The American press was obviously not as uncontrolled as the English press, although some classified information was still leaking. For the Soviet Union, information about the current processes in America was more easily available than information about the Soviet Union in America because there was neither freedom of speech nor a free press in the Soviet Union. Therefore, totalitarian states are in a more profitable position in terms of information control than democratic ones.

The problems related to intelligence activities in totalitarian regimes are different from those in democratic regimes. Unlike the CIA, the KGB's organizational structure was centralized and heavily politicised. The fact that the KGB was a centralized political body is indicated in the Regulation issued by the Council of Ministers. („Положение о Комитете государственной безопасности при Совете Министров СССР и его местных органах", 1959)

As Arendt (1958) points out: „Totalitarian bureaucracy, with a more complete understanding of the meaning of absolute power, intruded upon the private individual and his inner life with equal brutality.”(p.245). The scenario was similar in the Soviet Union. Public life was under the control of one party. It should also be noted that comparable sorts of intelligence services are not established to serve national interests or assure the safety of civilians but rather to protect the governing class and battle their rivals. (Prouty, 1985)

In contrast to democratic regimes, in totalitarian regimes, the personnel of intelligence agencies are subjected to extensive political vetting, Not only before entering the service but throughout their career, which creates tension at the organizational level. The efficacy of the intelligence agency suffers as a result of such circumstances. Unlike the CIA, high-ranking KGB officials were also required to be active members of the party. (Barron, 1974)

Firstly, the KGB prioritized political beliefs during the selection of personnel and, after that, the quantity of informants. (Barron, 1974) This resulted in two types of problems: the first was that candidates took advantage of the organization's politicization and demonstrated false

allegiance to communist ideology in order to advance their careers; the second was that similar selection criteria in the KGB simply gathered a large number of non-professionals, which damaged the organization's security.

The compartmentalization principle was applied at the structural level in the KGB. Access to information was frequently restricted (especially in foreign residencies) to the point where only one person might have detailed information on a specific activity abroad; thus, excessive secrecy eventually led to the fact that the KGB no longer had access to the details of the case and often had to halt the operation. (Barron, 1974)

One of the key problems was an existing "quota system" in the KGB, which had a detrimental impact on the reliability of the work done. The KGB was establishing a particular quantity for recruitment. This was the incorrect strategy because, to safeguard their careers, the KGB officers frequently exaggerated the value of contacts, which resulted in a waste of resources.(Barron, 1974)

The Soviet Union did not have a group of politically impartial analysts. On many occasions, politicians do not like to hear assessments that are not favourable to them, so they prefer analysts who make assessments that are acceptable to them. The behaviour when officials fail to pay heed to evaluations that are unacceptable to them is known as "killing the messenger," and it was a major problem in the Soviet regime. (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002) Furthermore, the Politburo did not trust analysts. The information was passing from the KGB's head to the Politburo, which subsequently made subjective decisions. The practise of mistrusting analysts comes from the Stalin era, because even he did not trust their evaluations. Such an approach resulted in the blunder that Stalin did not take into account the information offered by the analysts during the year, and when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, they were unprepared to resist.(Knightley, 1986) There was also the issue of "mirror imaging," which involves predicting the likely behaviours of another state based on one's own policies, which is one of the most common mistakes in intelligence.

As we saw, the structural problems outlined above differ between the two intelligence services. The compartmentalization, which existed in both intelligence services, is an exception; however, in the case of the CIA, the problem was coordination, and in the case of the KGB, suspension of operations. It also should be highlighted that the centralized intelligence service had more problems than the decentralized one.

But the main distinction between the CIA and the KGB remains in the priorities of human intelligence and technical intelligence, which we shall address in the next chapter. Using examples, we will define why HUMINT is more effective than TECHINT.

The Advantage of HUMINT Over TECHINT

Along with having an impact on the CIA's and the KGB's organizational structures, the regime types should be recognised as having an impact on the intelligence agencies' priorities.

In the case of the United States of America, technical intelligence was defined as the main priority. One of the main reasons for this was that the totalitarian regime and closed system in the Soviet Union made it difficult to obtain information, as it was difficult for foreigners to enter the Soviet Union (especially during the Stalin period), so it was necessary to develop TECHINT in order to gather information about the main adversary. In turn, the democratic regime in the United States made HUMINT a priority for the Soviet Union, as there were no restrictions on travel to the USA. In addition, the free press in the USA further expanded access to information for the Soviet Union.

Despite some of the advantages of technical intelligence, I consider that human intelligence is always one step ahead of technical intelligence, and there are many examples of this. One example of why human intelligence is more important is that in covert eavesdropping, it is possible for the target party to receive information from a double agent. As a result, the target object will intentionally spread misinformation or simply not say anything of value. A similar fact was observed during the Cold War, when the Americans secretly dug a tunnel from the

West Berlin to the East and installed listening devices on the telephone cables, through which the Americans in Berlin listened to Russian generals and all people who were interesting to them, although the Russians learned about this fact through a double agent and they weren't discussing any valuable information over the phone. In the end, America lost because a lot of money was spent on this operation and they they did not understand anything important. (Murphy et al., 1997)

The CIA considerably trailed the KGB in the development of HUMINT by prioritising TECHINT. This argument is further supported by the fact that, after the Cold War ended, the Americans who had exposed the Russian double agents (Robert Hansen, Lee Howard, and Aldrich Ames) discovered that Russia had information that none of the people they had revealed had access to. Therefore, it may be concluded that the Americans were unaware of another double agent working in the Central Intelligence Agency.

The famous coding machine "Enigma" also emphasizes the role of human intelligence, since it was of great importance to obtain notes and instructions on "Enigma" by a double agent, which eventually ended up in the hands of the British and led to their success. (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002)

Another example of why human intelligence is more important than technical intelligence is the case of Hansen. In particular, the Americans had installed listening and surveillance devices on the territory of the Russian embassy, which Hansen disclosed to the Russians, and as a result, the American intelligence service received a large financial loss.

Along with the advantages of HUMINT that were highlighted by examples, the drawbacks of it should also be acknowledged. The biggest difficulty facing HUMINT is that it is riskier and requires more time. In some ways, it costs the government more than TECHINT because it requires time, which is not a renewable resource like money. Additionally, it is an issue if an agent from one country ends up in the hands of another, since there is a strong likelihood that they will gain access to sensitive material or convince him to begin working covertly for them.

However, HUMINT is far more significant than TECHINT, since TECHINT alone will never be sufficient to acquire information such as a country's political objectives or military strategies. (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002)

Comparative Analysis of Errors Committed

(Aldrich Ames and Dmitry Polyakov Case Study)

The Aldrich Ames case is the most visible manifestation of the CIA's personnel management flaws. On the other hand, with the mentioned case, we can consider the shortcomings of the KGB in the context of rational decision-making. In addition, Poliakov's case is also interesting because it proves the notion that political interests in the Soviet Union were more important than intelligence interests, and it also confirms the influence of the KGB on other intelligence services inside the state.

One country's intelligence officers become double agents for four reasons: ideology, financial gain, ego, and compulsion. (Dulles, 2006) In the instance of Ames, I believe the major motivation was an ego and the desire for financial gain, but, as he stated himself, his decision was mostly founded on ideology. In my opinion, the ideological factor should be excluded, because if Ames had a similar motive, he would have sided with the Soviet Union much earlier, for example, during the Vietnam War, because American foreign policy in the 1960s had a really negative impact on the country's intelligence services in terms of personnel outflow.

The case of Ames illustrates that the CIA had structural and organizational weaknesses. As I previously stated when discussing structural difficulties, the problem of compartmentalization inhibited the quick transfer of information between divisions of the Central Intelligence Agency, and too much departmentalization also damaged control mechanisms. At the same time, the evidence released by the Central Intelligence Agency following Ames' arrest, which allowed them to identify the traitor, raises doubts about its reliability. Ames was traced down based on a review of his finances, according to statements from the Central Intelligence

Agency and other sources, since his expenditures exceeded his income. (Dylan et al., 2020) In fact, there is a more logical explanation: Ames was betrayed by another Russian double agent. The Central Intelligence Agency did not wish to publicise this possibility because: 1. The Central Intelligence Service has already lost numerous sources in the Soviet Union in recent years, and if this version was made public, they would have lost another source. 2. The fact that they could not find the traitor for so many years and then went on his trail based on information from a Russian double agent would have hurt the reputation of the organization.

The KGB, on the other hand, made the following mistake with Ames: once he provided the KGB with a list of Russian double agents, the head of the intelligence service (Kryuchkov) caught all of the traitors, which was an obvious signal for the Central Intelligence Agency that they had a mole in their organization. The KGB made a mistake, and they could have acted more rationally. For example, one option was to use the mentioned persons for their own benefit and carry out so-called deception operations or gradually withdraw them from the work, but the organization's head usually did not take analysts' opinions into account and acted based on political interests. The notion that the abovementioned action was truly motivated by political interests is supported by a regulation adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1959, which specifies that the KGB is a political body, And also by the fact that Kryuchkov, in addition to being the head of the KGB, was also a member of the Politburo.

Poliakov's case also demonstrates how decisions in the KGB were made based on political interests and how this intelligence service wielded significant influence over other intelligence services. The intelligence service did nothing when Poliakov was betrayed at the GRU by Hansen. The reason for this was that the KGB controlled everything, and there was a lot of competition between the two services, and they thought that if this information became public, the KGB's influence on the GRU would be even stronger, and it was these kinds of departmental interests that outweighed the intelligence service's interests, and Poliakov was gradually withdrew from the work. (Kalugin, 2009)

Polyakov's case also demonstrates weaknesses in the CIA's estimation of the Soviet Union, which was harming many sorts of activities. One of the deceptions involving Polyakov was carried out by the United States of America with the purpose of diverting the Soviet Union's attention and wasting their resources. The Americans intended to lead the Soviet Union into believing that America had created a new powerful chemical weapon. It should also be noted that this operation overlaps with the Vietnam War; thus, I believe America's major purpose was to gain an advantage in Vietnam at the price of diverting the Soviet Union's focus to another matter. This effort was a failure because America still lost the Vietnam War. Furthermore, experts failed to adequately appraise the Soviet Union's capabilities. In reality, by making this move, America caused the Soviet Union's strengthening rather than its weakening, which was one of the operation's key aims. (Garthoff, 2000)

Another huge mistake occurred when the American press reported about Polyakov that he was a triple agent who was supporting Soviet goals. This information did not reach the USSR, yet the fact that this sort of secret material was released in the press is itself a huge mistake and underlines the intelligence service's weakness in secret information protection. Similar occasions in relation to the press are common in democratic countries because, in totalitarian regimes, there is no free press at all. (Garthoff, 2000)

Finally, both cases demonstrate the errors committed by the United States and the Soviet Union, which differ from one another, but the common aspect is that the fundamental causes in both cases emanated from regime types.

Conclusion

The results of the paper confirm the hypothesis that the types of regimes during the Cold War influenced the structure of the CIA and the KGB and, therefore, the errors committed. The characteristics of democratic and totalitarian regimes were reflected in the organizational

structure of the intelligence services. However, compared to a democratic one, the structure created under a totalitarian regime had more problems.

In the case of the CIA, the organizational structure was as decentralized as the United States government because decentralization is an important element of democracy. The decentralized structure itself led to compartmentalization, which created coordination problems. In addition, democratic institutions are distinguished by more credibility than totalitarian institutions, so there was a greater trust factor between personnel of the CIA in contrast to the KGB. The Central Intelligence Agency was accountable to the U.S Congress and the president, which increased oversight mechanisms but also increased the risks of leaking classified information. A free press in a democracy has also complicated the issue of protecting classified information.

In the case of the KGB, the totalitarian regime led to the formation of a centralized structure for the intelligence service since power in the Soviet Union was also concentrated in the hands of one party. The politicization of the mentioned intelligence service also resulted from the type of regime because the interests of the ruling party in the Soviet Union were above all other interests. The excessive secrecy of information within the structure also created additional obstacles and caused the suspension of operations. In addition, the "quota system" was a problem, which led to the exaggeration of the importance of contacts and eventually to the waste of resources. Also, the KGB did not have a group of impartial analysts; The Politburo was doing its own assessments, which often caused problems of "mirror imaging".

The regime types also determined intelligence priorities. In the case of the United States, TECHINT and, in the case of the Soviet Union, HUMINT were the main methods of information gathering. Due to the closed system in the Soviet Union, there was a problem of penetration, so the Americans made TECHINT a priority, and the priority of Soviet intelligence was HUMINT because the democratic regime allowed free movement in the

United States. At the same time, the free press made it easier for the Soviet intelligence service to evaluate the processes taking place in America.

As for the errors committed, in the case of the KGB, it was decisions based on political interests, which is confirmed by the Cases of Ames and Polyakov. In the case of the CIA, the problem was the weakness of the analytical department's assessments in relation to the Soviet Union and trust at the organizational level, which is also supported by the mentioned cases.

Thus, on the basis of inductive research, the analysis of the structure of the mentioned intelligence services and the errors committed during the Cold War in terms of HUMINT allowed us to give an answer to the formulated questions and confirmed the hypothesis expressed at the beginning that the democratic regime in America and the totalitarian regime in the Soviet Union really determined the structure of the intelligence services and the errors committed, so this was not caused by a number of coincidences.

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