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Social Communication during Modern Conflict

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Abstract

Today's armed conflicts have different backgrounds. Some countries are fighting to gain independence, others for influence, and still others are experiencing civil wars. Among the most frequently cited causes of conflict, there are primarily cultural, ethnic and religious differences. Increasingly, they also include environmental threats. These can occur when, for example, one country uses a chemical agent that threatens the environment or the people of a neighboring country. The purpose of this article is both to present the relationship between social communication and modern conflict and to point out the dangers that can be caused by social communication conducted inadequately. The authors also wished to provide insight into the impact of the democratization of social communication on the conduct of modern conflict and the value of properly conducted social communication.

Keywords: social communication, conflict, media, democratization

Introduction

Social communication is the domain of all human activities in which there is contact with at least two social units. It refers to the exchange of information between them at both the verbal (words) and non-verbal (gestures, symbols, body language, space, etc.) levels. The cultural content of a message is of particular importance in the process of social communication.

Communication, understood as a system of multiple relationships between political actors, organizations, media or people, today has a special ability to shape relationships with each other, promote established behavior and political, social and cultural patterns. An important role in these processes is played by the media, which, as a tool, has become not only the main source of images and descriptions of social reality, but also an effective tool for activating and promoting innovation. As a result, modern conflicts are among the phenomena characterized by a high degree of mediatization.

Media and Conflicts - A Case Study

The media has become a vehicle for the transmission of information, aimed at dynamically shaping, modifying or changing knowledge, attitudes and behavior in a direction that is consistent with the values and interests of the interacting actors. The main purpose of any message, verbal or non-verbal, is to try to convey information to the recipient, who ascribes specific meanings to the words and gestures coming from the sender.

In the communication process, conflict can be defined as a clash of differing views and interests. An example of using information to start a conflict is the 2003 attack on Iraq. At the time, the testimony of a witness, an Iraqi chemist, was used to describe mobile biological weapons factories placed on trucks.

Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi worked at the Jerf al-Nadaf Military Factory near Baghdad in the mid-1990s. He left Iraq for Germany, where he was granted political asylum because he allegedly agitated against Saddam's regime. In March 2000, he was contacted by the German secret service Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). An officer of that institution began to question Janabi about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the man came up with a

story about truckloads of biobombs that were supposedly kept at the Jerf al-Nadaf facility, among others. The interrogations continued for several months, with Janabi developing his story and providing more details. In November 2000, German and British agents met with Janabi's former boss. The latter vehemently denied reports of trucks with biological weapons in Jerf al-Nadaf. At the time, Janabi admitted that he had made the whole thing up.

For almost two years the case went quiet, until in May 2002 BND operatives returned to get more information about the weapons, despite denials. In return, they promised to help Janabi bring his Moroccan wife and child to Germany. The talks touched on various issues, but it wasn't until February 2003 that the agents returned to the most important topic. A month later, Powell[1] gave a famous speech in which he referred to descriptions of Janabi. According to the Iraqi's story, the Germans were so eager to find confirmation of the presence of weapons of mass destruction that they believed everything Janabi had previously said. He himself claims that the descriptions he gave them could have been invented by any chemical engineer. Janabi also alleges that the BND's intelligence service broke the terms of the agreement as it agreed not to pass on his confessions to other intelligence agencies. The Iraqi's confessions are further evidence of how fragile the decision to invade Iraq was made on.

Democratization of Social Communication

Strategic communication is also used in the conduct of conflicts. It involves planned and thoughtful communication activities aimed at achieving the long-term interests of a specific entity. It allows you to reach specific target groups to promote your own conviction. Strategic communication within the defence framework is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, having at its disposal the Operations Center of the Minister of Defence. The center manages the public communication process - external and internal to the ministry - except for reporting on the mood of the military community. It also manages

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[1] 65-th Secretary of State of the United States from 2001 to 2005

matters in the field of defence-related social research. The center shapes the ministry's image and studies public sentiment in the context of the activities of the ministry.

Media and social communication sciences in the context of strategic communication emphasize the importance of the media in the communication process. With the progressive evolution of civilization and the spread of free access to information, the media have gained a monopoly on manipulating information and policy makers as well as entire societies. In the context of information warfare, the media has become an effective tool of the enemy in psychological operations. Through the media message, concrete, personified information reaches the enemy, appealing to emotions related to one's own safety and the health and life of one's family.

To understand the democratization of social communication, first it is necessary to know the definition of democratization. It is the process of transforming the political system to expand the political participation of citizens in the activities of a state, that is, the process of transition from a non-democratic to a democratic system. It takes place at 3 levels: institutional or formal, legal and social, and mentality. Juxtaposed with social communication, the democratization of social communication should be understood by involving a growing community of citizens in social media and online engagement.

The Value of Information

Having already understood the definition of democratization and social communication and realizing the impact that information can have, one can focus on the value that information has.

We have come to live in a time when we lie to ourselves, claiming that the world is ruled by money. A simple example can be given to confirm these words. Looking at a large corporation such as Coca - Cola, one can easily come to the conclusion that they trade in sums that the average person will not have a chance to experience in his entire life, but what would Coca - Cola be without its unique taste? The greatest value of this company is not the sphere of influence, revenue in general or recognition, because it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which this giant withdraws from a country reducing all the features

mentioned earlier. The greatest value of this company is the formula, namely the information about the composition. At this point, only three people in the entire world possess it and there is a provision in the terms of their contract that obligatorily prohibits them from traveling on the same means of transportation, because if all three die at the same time, the company will lose its raison d'etre. At this point, we begin to see the true value of information in itself, because receiving a large amount of cash at one time is less profitable than having the knowledge of how to make millions. Moving on to the substance, information is a powerful means used to achieve one's own goals, whether they are the interests of individuals or entire societies. Referring to the previously mentioned arguments and realizing the real values of social communication, democratization, information and interests, we can move on to the use of these in modern conflicts.

The Power of the Internet

More than half of the world's population is an Internet user, which provides the opportunity to reach an unimaginably large audience. It is not difficult to guess that this provides a huge number of opportunities, but also poses a large number of risks. Such a powerful tool in the wrong hands can spread evil of the best quality and best quantity.

Taking into account that only less than a quarter of people verify the information they read on the Internet gives us an idea of how big a problem we may be dealing with here. The Internet community, as an interest group of military circles, is a powerful tool that will exert a certain influence on the de facto target group through the mass media through properly given information and opinions.

Analyzing the example of hybrid warfare that has been going on for several years in Ukraine and Russia, we can see the use of all the previously mentioned instruments to achieve not only political, but also military goals. The growing number of informed Internet users translates not only public sentiment into shaping, but also has an impact on a very important military parameter, namely morale. The use of public opinion as a tool to influence large corporations that, for example, are withdrawing from the Russian Federation territory has become one of the most widely used means to make the average

representative of that country aware that something is happening behind the propaganda curtain. At this point, even if the ordinary citizen is not given true information, he is able to see the hidden problem. To confirm these words, one can cite the case of the McDonald's chain, which, after an uninterrupted 30 years, withdrew from the market of Russia due to its military aggression against Ukraine. Ordinary residents, observing the changes that took place in the market, the emptiness of the stores and the little information that came from across the border, began to express their concerns through mass protests that ended in arrests and the suppression of riots. This is one of many examples of one side of the conflict exerting influence on the other through the mass media.

Any propaganda is able to be coped with when accusations come from the mouth of an individual, but when real information comes directly to citizens via instant messaging that cannot be controlled, people will begin to be aware of the realities they face. The Internet community as a collection of people from all over the world who have their own ideas have invented a new way to fight the idealized information published by the propaganda of the Russian Federation. Despite the fact that they can't fight on the front lines they began to participate in the information war by creating numerous memes, ridiculing images while belittling the power of the aggressor. In this way they have found a very simple, yet effective and accessible tool to almost everyone to raise awareness of the conflict and current events even to people who do not follow news portals. On the other hand, however, we can see a different use of social media as a means of relief.

When considering the situation of Ukraine and the generally understood sympathy towards their citizens by the international community, one can observe solidarity with the people of this country. People from all over the world united in their actions through various portals show support and send material aid to those in need, affected by the conflict. Following this example with the help of mass media, certain groups have been forced or voluntarily taken action to start or end the actions taken. One of these groups is Anonymous which is a group of activists who are taking an active part in the ongoing hybrid warfare. Acting in line with prevailing public opinion about Russia's aggression

against Ukraine, they have undertaken a series of attacks on civilian and military information infrastructures revealing the truth and obstructing the Federation's troops.

Conclusion

Summarizing all the information previously given, we can easily come to the conclusion of how important social communication is as a tool for increasing awareness of people using the Internet. Knowing the true value of information and how to use it, we come to the conclusion that it is an important instrument especially during modern conflicts. Given that it is only a means to achieve the goals of individuals or groups, we must realize that despite growing awareness it can still pose a threat even to the modern-day giants of the international arena. The Internet community seems to be confirming this rule and taking the first steps towards globalization in the broadest sense in order to create transnational structures and create a world village. Having in mind that the technological boom has really only just begun, more than 60% of the population is going beyond its reach and is able to contact without any problems across all borders with other people even on the other side of the world. Let's hope, as it dies last, that such a powerful weapon will spread goodness, because it is solely up to us how we use it.

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Defense in Depth: The Key to Ukraine's Military Defense Strategy during the battle of Kyiv

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This article discusses the concept of strategic depth in military defense strategy and how it applies to Ukraine. Strategic depth refers to the distance between the front lines of a conflict and the rear, where a country's vital assets such as population centers, industrial areas, and political centers are located. The idea behind strategic depth is to create a buffer zone that allows a country to absorb the initial shock of an invasion and conduct a prolonged defense. Ukraine has enough strategic depth to continue military activity without notice and receive Western aid practically unhindered. The country's large population and well-developed infrastructure and industrial base provide sources of manpower and resources for defense. Additionally, Ukraine's history of industrialization and modernization also means that it has a relatively well-developed infrastructure and industrial base, which could be mobilized for the defense of the country. Ukraine's terrain also presents some challenges when it comes to strategic depth, but it also has some strategic depth in the form of its large population, which provides a source of manpower for the military.

General overview

Any war's Achilles heel is logistics. The logistical challenges for military forces entering adversary territory with strategic depth are exacerbated. Ukraine is one of Europe's largest countries. Under the current challenges, it has enough strategic depth to continue military

activity without notice and receive Western aid practically unhindered. States with strategic depth can move or hide their industry into the safe area, train their military, and engage in other military-economic activities without incurring huge losse. When using a military defence strategy like Defense in Depth, strategic depth becomes even more important. This was one of the main reasons why Kyiv effectively defend itself from Russia's invasion.

Strategic depth

Strategic depth is a military concept that refers to the distance between the front lines of a conflict and the rear, where the country's vital assets, such as population centers, industrial areas, and political centers, are located. The idea behind strategic depth is to create a buffer zone that allows a country to absorb the initial shock of an invasion and to conduct a prolonged defense, with the goal of ultimately defeating the enemy.

One of the key advantages of strategic depth is that it provides time for the country to mobilize its military and civilian resources, including its population, for the defense of the country. This is particularly important for countries with a large population, as it allows them to use their numerical advantage to their advantage. Additionally, strategic depth allows a country to make use of its natural terrain and geographical features, such as mountains and rivers, to create defensive barriers that can slow down or stop the enemy's advance.

Another important aspect of strategic depth is that it allows a country to conduct a defensive war on its own terms. This means that the country can choose where and when to fight, and it can also choose the type of warfare that it wants to employ. For example, a country with strategic depth can choose to fight a guerrilla war, which is characterized by hit-and-run tactics and the use of small, mobile units. This type of warfare can be very effective in tying down a larger and better-equipped enemy force.

Furthermore, strategic depth also plays a key role in the psychological aspect of warfare. The enemy would have to fight in a foreign territory, far from their home, and they would have to fight against a population that is motivated to defend their country. This can create a sense of isolation and despair among the enemy soldiers, which can lead to low morale and poor performance on the battlefield.

Ukraine's terrain also presents some challenges when it comes to strategic depth. The country is mostly flat, which makes it difficult to use natural features, such as mountains and rivers, to create defensive barriers. Additionally, much of Ukraine's population and economic activity is concentrated in the western part of the country, close to the border with Poland, which leaves the eastern regions relatively thinly populated.

That being said, Ukraine does have some strategic depth in the form of its large population, which provides a source of manpower for the military. Additionally, Ukraine's history of industrialization and modernization also means that it has a relatively well-developed infrastructure and industrial base, which could be mobilized for the defense of the country.

Because the Ukrainians had located the majority of their military units and equipment far from military bases and airstrips at the start of the war, it was able to save the majority of them from the first day cruise missiles. The Russian armed forces could quickly penetrate Ukraine if it weren't for the strategic depth, forested terrain, swampy soil, and the Carpathian mountains.

Defense in Depth

Defense in Depth is a military strategy that entails building multiple layers of defence to protect a country's vital assets and to slow or stop an enemy's advance. The goal of this strategy is to make it as difficult for the enemy to breach the country's defences as possible, as well as to force the enemy to fight on multiple fronts, which can weaken their resolve and deplete their resources.

One of the main advantages of the Defense in Depth strategy is that it allows a country to take advantage of its terrain and geographical features. A country with mountains, swamps, and rivers, for example, can create defensive barriers that can slow or stop the enemy's advance. Furthermore, the Defense in Depth strategy allows a country to create multiple layers of defence by utilising its population and economic resources. A country with a large population, for example, can form a large number of militia units to fight guerrilla warfare.

Another feature of the Defense in Depth strategy is that it enables a country to fight a defensive war on its own terms. This means that the country can choose where and when to fight, as well as the type of warfare it employs. A country with the Defense in Depth strategy, for example, can choose to fight a guerrilla war, which is distinguished by hit-and-run tactics and the use of small, mobile units. This type of warfare can be extremely effective in containing a larger and better-equipped enemy force.

Furthermore, the Defense in Depth strategy is important in the psychological aspect of warfare. The enemy would have to fight in a foreign territory, far from home, and against a population that is motivated to defend their country. This can lead to a sense of isolation and despair among enemy soldiers, resulting in low morale and poor battlefield performance.

To generalise, the Defense in Depth strategy is a powerful military tactic that allows a country to take advantage of its terrain and population, perform a defensive war on its own terms, and build multiple layers of defence that can slow or stop the enemy's advance. Furthermore, it contributes to the psychological aspect of warfare by instilling a sense of isolation and despair in enemy soldiers. Countries that use the Defense in Depth strategy are better able to defend themselves and eventually defeat the enemy.

Defense in Depth in Kyiv

The Kyiv region has flat terrain. A forested plains lies to the north, and a swamp rises along the Belarussian border. Furthermore, through artificial manipulations, the existing dam

near Kyiv increases the volume of the swampy soil and allows it to grow in an even larger area. Chernobyl, with its existing Pripyat radioactive zone, adds another layer of protection. Against this backdrop, the Russian army was forced to launch an attack in the direction of Kyiv through marshy terrain, necessitating the use of road infrastructure. The aforementioned fact was especially true at the start of spring, when the snow began to melt in the environment and the so-called muddy season "Rasputitsa" began.

The first military engagement took place near Milove village on the border with Russia, in Luhansk Oblast. But as it soon appeared, the attack on Ukraine was not only from the east, but also from Belarus, directly directed at Kyiv. The main infantry and tank attacks were launched in four spearhead incursions, creating a northern front towards Kyiv, a southern front in Crimea, a south-eastern front at the cities of Luhansk and Donbas, and an eastern front. The Russian army tried to encircle the capital, Kyiv, but Ukrainian forces managed to hold ground and repel the attacks. The defense of Kyiv was led by General Oleksandr Syrskyi. Ukrainian forces utilized Western arms effectively, including the Javelin anti-tank missile and the Stinger anti-aircraft missile, thinning Russian supply lines and stalling the offensive.

Syrsky organized two rings of defense, one in the outer suburbs of the city and one within the capital, with the goal of protecting the downtown area and keeping the Russians fighting on the approaches to Kyiv. He also divided the city and surrounding region into sectors, assigned generals to lead each area, and created a clear chain of command for all Ukrainian military units and security services. A week before the invasion, the Ukrainian military moved all command posts closer to the probable axes of a Russian advance, and moved aviation assets off major bases. However, there was only one brigade of tanks available to defend the city, so training centers were ordered to create makeshift battalions and artillery systems were brought in. Ukrainian air defenses were moved the day before the invasion, allowing them to quickly counterattack. Over the next several days, Russian forces attempted to enter the city but were met with resistance, and their supply convoy from Belarus was halted.

During the first 24 hours of the invasion, most of the stationary air defense sites and military bases in Ukraine were targeted, as well as airfields and naval bases. Russian strikes were intensive but number of military defense platforms survived. The Russian attacks were focused on specific areas and the majority of the air defense coverage in the southern coast, like Kherson and Mykolaiv, was eliminated. A key aspect of the Russian strategy was to neutralize not just the leadership of the Ukrainian military but its main defense capabilities. But the Russian campaign revealed a lack of understanding of the mindset of the Ukrainian military by Russian special services. The motivation and preparation for the defense of the country turned out to be better than the Russians expected. Additionally, the Russian military had a weak approach to evaluating the success of their strikes, assuming that any action carried out was successful unless there was direct evidence to the contrary.

The Russians broke through the first line of Ukrainian defence near Ivankiv in 27th of February. Ukrainian forces destroyed the Teteriv River bridge at Ivankiv, halting the advance of Russian tanks towards Kyiv. The battle for Ivankiv did not prevent the Russian light units from moving directly in the direction of Kyiv. After the Russian landing forces were able to seize the Hostomel airport near Kyiv on February 24, Russian units tried to enter the settlement from the direction of Ivankiv, even though Ivankiv was not completely under their control yet. Russian tactics were aimed at reaching Kyiv as soon as possible. Ukrainians were able to stop the Russians in Bucha and Irpin. The explosions of the bridge on the Irpin River and the dam in the village of Dymer proved critical for the Russian army's blocking manoeuvres. Russian supplies couldn't move beyond the road because of the flooding, and Ukrainian artillery knew exactly where they were. At the very least, the Russians crossed the Irpin River near Moschun. The Russians began to deploy near Moschun on February 27. Despite the fact that Ukrainian artillery was heavily bombarding their military bridges, the Russians managed to enter the settlement on March 6. Kyiv's Obolon district is located beyond Moschun.

Ukrainians were able to declare mobilisation, distribute weapons to volunteers in Kyiv, and successfully combat saboteurs during this time period, but fighting directly in a large urban

centre was not desirable for Ukraine which can cause large scale of destruction and possible chaos in the capital.

The Russian attack near Moschun alongside Irpin river was halted due to the enemy's long delay adjacent towns of Bucha, Irpin and Hostomel. The successful implementation of the mobilisation, the formation of territorial defence units, and the gathering of international volunteers is crucial to gain the upper hand during the defense tactics. The dam explosion in Dymer also caused problems for Russian units crossing the Irpin River. On March 21, the defence of Moschun became especially difficult, despite the massive use of anti-tank systems and artillery to halt the Russian army's advance.

Another significant point was Makariv, which is located on the near of E-40 highway and is connected to Western Ukraine and Kyiv. The Russians intended to seize it, cut off its supply, and move towards Kyiv. The Ukrainians were successful, and after a fierce battle with Makariv, they pushed the Russians back towards the settlement's entrance.

Mechanized military units had to move alongside infantry. Because the Russians were unable to take Chernihiv, they tried to bypass it and swiftly move to Kyiv by highway. The Ukrainians ambushed a Russian tank convoy in Brovary, northeast of Kyiv, leaving the Russians disorganized and forced to retreat after losing their tanks. One reason for this was the use of the main road, as well as the lack of auxiliary infantry units to protect tank units. Convoys of Russian supplies and equipment from the Sumy region to Kyiv encountered a similar situation. The ambushes resulted in the destruction of most of Russian convoys on this section. Logistical starvation hit the Russian army from all sides around Kyiv.

The Ukrainians successfully attempted to force the mass of Russian units into narrow stretches of terrain — impassable dirt roads, thawing fields or swamps that would lure vehicles and force them to consume more fuel. Fast-moving Ukrainian troops targeted vehicles that stayed on the main roads. Bridges and crossings had been mined and closed.

After exhausting the opponent, the Defense in Depth tactic includes preparation of launching a counterattack. When the Ukrainians had sufficiently weakened the Russian units in the vicinity of Kyiv and delivered some very accurate artillery strikes on Hostomel

Airport, the Russian attack slowed and the Ukrainians shifted their focus to local counter-attacks and then to the liberation of settlements around Kyiv.

Mobilization of military forces and militia in large numbers slowed the Russian army's speed and reduced its prior numerical superiority. The intensive activity of the Ukrainian artillery, as well as the effective use of Ukrainian and Western technology against armoured vehicles, resulted in bogging down in Russia's both logistics and speed. Simultaneously, it became possible to supply Kyiv from Ukraine, which had not been affected by the Russian attack. This made the strategic depth effect a reality.

Against this backdrop, the Russian military forces preferred to leave the outskirts of the city.

On February 24, the Kremlin became engulfed in its own myth of invincibility. Expectations are set incorrectly when you only know what you want to hear. Because desired information does not always reflect reality, Sun Tzu's formula about knowing one's own and one's opponent's abilities is critical. Russian propaganda about its Kyiv's weakness appears to be aimed not only at the West, but also at self-belief.

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Organizational Communication

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Abstract: The article discusses the importance of organizational structural communication in terms of effective management. Author mentions General theoretical considerations as well as distinguishing marks between types of communication.

At the end, the considerations are summarised to present the concepts of internal and external structural communications.

The importance of organizational communication

Communication is a complex process in which the sender sends a message carrying a specific content through an appropriate source to the addressee, who is obliged to decrypt the message in the background of specific circumstances. [1] This process is much more complicated when we talk about organizational communication, where both the volume of messages and the groups of recipients increases. Organizational communication carries a number of meanings that can be divided into different categories, however, all of them are ultimately aimed at the successful execution of a common organizational mission, as the organization views communication as a kind of mechanism and means. Organizational communication assists us in the implementation of any complexity or specific activity and guarantees the effective performance of certain tasks, procedures, and regulations. At the same time, it is through communication that the organizational culture is formed, which defines the values, priorities, goals, awareness, values , and specificity of the relationship between employees.[2] It should also be noted that the quality of communication is directly related to the quality of success, and the more efficiently the communication process is conducted, the more effective the organizational goals will be. Organizational communication is divided into internal and external structural communications, which will be discussed in more detail in other chapters of the article.

Internal Structural Communication

Relevant exchange of information between employees is especially important for the effective functioning of the organization, and these processes will take place at the expense of internal structural communication. [1]The internal environment of the organization essentially determines how it interacts with external structures, thus increasing its potential, precisely that is achieved through an effectively developed internal organizational structure. Conversely, the internal environment can be a source of problems and even the cause of an organization's failure if it does not provide the required functioning of the organization. Factors that determine the internal environment of an

organization include variables such as the structure of the organization, its goals, objectives, technologies, and people. The internal environment can be considered as a set of structural components of an organization's interaction. Internal organizational structure refers to the communication within the organization, which creates an environment conducive to employees in the organization, thinks of common ways to solve problems, exchange important information, etc. Which in itself contributes to a high degree of strategy orientation, which is directly proportional to achieving the maximum desired result. That is why internal organizational communication should be based on openness, clarity and simplicity, reliability, and mutual respect, both among the employees themselves, as well as between the employees and the representatives of the management.

Employees need to feel connected to the company - these are solutions, initiatives, common problems, plans developed, and so on. These connections are essential for employees to understand why executives make decisions and make changes. When they realize what drives these decisions and changes, they are more likely to feel a sense of teamwork and are motivated to bring more benefits to the organization that values it. It is also noteworthy that with the effective internal structured communication the company seeks to avoid bureaucracy. [3] Mechanisms such as face-to-face, telephone, or e-mail communication are used for direct internal communication. As well as, proven practice is meetings in the workplace, publishing corporate newspapers, individual conversations and more. [2]It should also be noted, that there are various barriers to the transmission of information that may arise from the sender. This happens when the message is vague, unstructured, and conveyed in an appropriate way. This can lead to misinterpretation and distortion of the content. This result may arise even if linguistic and cultural differences are not taken into account.

Types of Internal Structural Communication

Organization's internal structural communication can be divided into both formal and informal. Formal communication follows hierarchical structures, established rules, and norms. The formal channel of communication, which is related to the labor process, is

defined and implemented by the governing body of the organization itself. It provides employees with a variety of information, messages, announcements, changes, and feedback. All other types of information, personal or social type, are transmitted through informal networks. Informal groups are formed within the organization based on common interests or other similar common social preconditions and in turn contribute to the creation of a healthy organizational atmosphere. Internal structural communications can be vertical or horizontal depending on the type of relationship:

during vertical communication, information messages are transmitted from the upper tier to the lower tier. In such cases, the subordinates are mainly given specific tasks, and information through the control ring. An example of this is the case when a director issues specific information to employees about organizational change. However, when we talk about vertical communications, we must not forget that in addition to downward communication, there is also communication in the opposite direction, when the message is transmitted from the subordinate link, in the direction of the control ring. Through ascending communication, the top management of the organization is given the opportunity to receive direct feedback from users, learn about identified problems, receive general information about ongoing processes in the lower echelon, and so on. Consequently, the specificity of the vertical communication between the superior and the subordinate depends on the specific organizational goals and requirements. [2] As we know any kind of organization consists of different divisions and departments, therefore for their overall organizational success it is important to have constant communication and coordinated cooperation. The relevant means to ensure this is horizontal communication, which is a prerequisite for the formation of an equal and equal relationship in the organization.

External Structural Communication

External structural communication refers to the communication between the organization and the environment around it. During external communication, the organization is presented to a wide audience, as well as directly to the target audience. It is in the process

of interaction with various organizational structures or people that the reputation and image of the organization is formed, which can bring a lot of positive results in the long run. For this reason, the organization has to cooperate with various private or state structural units on a daily basis, communicate with existing or potential customers, communicate with partner organizations, etc. At the same time, external communication and internal communication are closely related to each other, as external communication is a kind of link between the environment and the internal spaces of the organization. [2]By establishing communication with various members of society or government agencies, the organization receives a wealth of feedback or information, which it uses to promote organizational success and internal structures. Gathering information and constantly integrating with the outside world is vital to the organization as it is the only way to balance customer needs and requirements.

Types of External Structural Communication

External structural communication Like internal structural communication, can be both formal and informal. [3]Informal communication, especially when it comes to organizational negotiations, dissemination of information messages, etc. Email communication is actively used as it shortens the communication time and gives us a guarantee that the message has really reached the addressee. Of course, the form of formal communication with the environment depends on the specifics of the message itself, for example, if an organization wants to spread information about a new product or service offering, it may also use mechanisms such as advertising, releases, and blogs. There is another form of formal communication, such as conference meetings. It is important that business meetings are pre-arranged and scheduled in advance. It is necessary to write in advance the schedule of the meeting, as well as the competence and relevance of the persons present at the meeting. It is necessary to have a predetermined meeting schedule and everything to be organized as much as possible in order for all this to further emphasize the organizational image. As for informal communication, it means communication between those who are not directly involved in the control of the organization, which

means indirect communication of employees with the outside world. For example, employees gain different experiences and gain new knowledge on a daily basis, exchanging innovations, diversifying their knowledge, and when they discuss this in the organization's external environment, it uniquely reflects the company's reputation as informal external communication. It should also be noted that some managers use informal communication methods to find out what employees think honestly and this information is obtained through feedback. In addition, some employees inadvertently use informal communication methods to inform managers of their attitudes without submitting a written form or face-to-face conversation. Ultimately, informal communications include conversations between people, such as discussing any non-informal topic, which aims to share information in an unplanned, random manner.

Conclusion

Any kind of communication for a public or private organization is a definite determinant of success. From the description of the internal and external structural communication presented in the article, we can boldly say that there are two concepts of different meanings. Internal structural communication determines the proper formulation of the organization's action plan, defines the organizational structure, creates a healthy atmosphere, takes relevant actions based on internal feedback, and etc. Especially when the range of programs and tools in today's digital world helps to improve communication between company employees, and these processes are a prerequisite for the successful operation of the organization with the outside world, as external structural communication involves interaction with any entity or organization outside the organization.

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'Georgian Way' of Policy Advocacy:

Non-state Actors' Influence on Public Policy in Georgia

A Comparative Analysis of Policy Advocacy under the United National Movement's and Georgian Dream's Governance

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Abstract: Georgia has often been the target of interest for public policy scholars, however, the 'Georgian way of policy advocacy', its peculiarities in modern Georgia, one of the post-Soviet country, is less explored. The research article aims to examine the relationship between the success of policy advocacy in Georgia initiated by non-state actors and the factors contributing their success. Thus, the article presents 16 cases of policy advocacy during 2003-2019, under governance of leading parties: The United National Movement and the Georgian Dream and provides the comparative analysis on advocacy achievements, opportunities and challenges.

According to the key findings of research, the consistency of undertaken actions, sound strategy and argumentation, heterogeneity of the advocacy group as well as a high level of internationalization are important elements for achieving success by non-state actors during the advocacy process. However, the mentioned elements are often not the ultimate determinants for getting the intended results. The main factors of success in Georgia turned to be a so-called 'window of opportunity' and its timely application for reaching the targets. The study also confirmed that in order to achieve a positive dynamic in the advocacy process, the influence of so-called 'policy entrepreneur' was essential under the rule of the both political parties.

In contrast to the world trend, another interesting point was the linkage of advocacy success to the changing of status-quo. Namely, as research data confirmed, the most of Georgian cases of policy advocacy were successful, where the coalition was in favor of changing the status-quo.

Key Words: Policy Advocacy, Window of Opportunity, Non-state actors, Policy Entrepreneur, Status-quo power.

Introduction

The Public Policy studies have extensively reviewed the processes of drafting the policy agenda and its implementation. The various policy researchers provide the comprehensive analysis of how this or that particular issue appears on the agenda of the ruling party, how the state policy changes, what methods and mechanisms are used in the political process to discuss particular points, *etc.* (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1983; Downs 1972; Kingdon 1984).

The issue of engagement of non-state actors in the process of public policy development and the policy implementation is extremely actual for Georgia as for the post-Soviet country being on the path of democratic development for the last decades. The EU – Georgia Association Agreement, signed with the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and the Member States (2014), among other commitments, also defines the obligations for Georgian Government to pursue a participatory, accountable, transparent public policy development process in the country. It should be noted, that the pre-election programs of Georgian Dream, the current ruling party - (Parliamentary elections of 2012, 2016) also emphasize the importance of participatory, open governance policy by active engagement of the civil society. GD had a vivid commitment to support the non-state actors' participation in shaping the policy agenda as well as the decision-making process. Thus, there is a great interest from practitioners, from the national and international scientific community towards exploring the non-state actors' participation in the process of public policy development.

Despite of a number of scholarly articles and researches on Georgian practice of the policy advocacy, there are some uncompleted, less studied topics that need further research. Among them, there is a particularly interesting how advocacy processes and their outcomes change under the rule of different political parties. Consequently, the said comparative analysis will make a significant contribution to a better understanding of the policy advocacy trends in Georgia and enrich the existing studies from different prism.

Thus, the purpose of the article is to present a key findings of comparative analysis concerning the degree of success of policy advocacy initiated by non-state actors and the

dependence of policy change to particular factors. It examines the composition of the advocacy coalition, its quantitative and structural forms, advocacy strategies and argumentation, the level of internationalization and the role of the policy entrepreneur in the advocacy process at different periods of UNM and GD's governance in Georgia.

Literature review

Scientific literature offers a variety of definitions for public policy. This article applies Thomas Dye's definition, according to which **public policy** is "*anything that a government chooses to do or not to do*" (Dye, 1972, p.2). Focus on this definition derives from the fact that the article applies the term 'public policy' to those actions of the Georgian government that are implemented in response to advocacy efforts of non-state actors for changing the existing policies or maintaining the *status-quo*.

Although Dye refers to a government as the executor of public policy, he highlights the major role that **non-state actors** play in the process of policy implementation. The term 'non-state actors' may be applied to businesses, CSOs, trade unions, as well as diverse groups that take interest (are stakeholders) in specific policies (Howlett & Cashore, 2014).

The term used in this article non-state actors covers the above-mentioned groups that participate in public policy development and implementation processes and conduct conscious and targeted activities to maintain or change the *status-quo*. The team of authors applies the blanket term **'policy advocacy'** (hereinafter advocacy) to [the unity of] actions performed by non-state actors to achieve the desirable public policy outcomes.

The term 'advocacy' is frequently used in discussions of policy changes in diverse research papers (e.g. Baumgartner et al, 2009; Jenkins, Leicht, and Wendt, 2006). Notwithstanding the absence of a single and universally agreed formal definition of advocacy, the term always refers to actions implemented by an individual group to achieve their policy goals.

The article defines advocacy as targeted and deliberate activities that are implemented to change concrete public policies or maintain the *status-quo*.

All authors usually highlight various details and characteristics while discussing the success of an advocacy process. Young and Quinn (Young & Quinn, 2012) examine differences and

meanings of advocacy strategies. They also distinguish four types thereof [advocacy strategies]: 1) grassroots activism; 2) media campaign; 3) lobbying; 4) Advising. Authors strongly believe that if diversified, several types of strategies are in place, there is a greater chance that the government takes into consideration the position of the advocacy group (Young & Quinn, 2012).

The theory of advocacy coalition framework (AFC) developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith suggests that the degree of internationalization may also be a variable to determine the success of an advocacy campaign. **Internationalization** is defined as a potential impact international actors may have on internal policy making processes. For this article, internalization is measured in terms of the following three indicators: (1) **international dimension** (2) **international obligation/commitments,** and (3) **search for the best practice.**

Interestingly, Kingdon suggests a model of 'window of opportunity' as an opportunity for advocates and supporters of new proposals to achieve desired policy outcomes (change) or advance issues of their choice on the policy agenda (Kingdon, 1995). While describing a policy change, the author focuses on the connection of three major streams: 1) problems 2) politics and 3) policies. In Kingdon's view, the alignment of the above-mentioned streams creates a window of opportunity, while the actors who advocate for the implementation of specific changes are referred to as 'policy entrepreneurs.' Vitally important characteristics and resources for policy entrepreneurs include the following: 1) ability to make a statement and be heard (make one's proposals properly heard). They should have the right position of power for making relevant decisions, expertise, and an ability to talk to politicians concerning the specific topics; 2) negotiation skills and having a good network of persons with political power, which includes mastering a combination of political know-how and technical expertise; and 3) persistency or consistence of behaviour when all possible platforms and outlets are employed in the advocacy process.

Diversity of theories about **public policy change** clearly demonstrates that the scholarly circles have not yet come to an agreement on this issue. Some researchers believe that policy change can be assessed against the *status-quo* change (Beland & Waddan, 2012).

Others tend to measure the change of policy course by the fulfilment of demands of non-state advocates of a policy (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).

Incremental model proposed by Charles Lindblom agrees with the opinions of the former group of researchers and the definition of policy change as a cumulative effect of periodically made minor changes (Deegan, 2017).

Authors Beland and Waddan also note that policy change is more related to *status-quo* modification rather than to its fundamental change. Modification is evidenced in institutional terms on the one hand (the degree of impact that institutional changes make), and, on the other - in wide economic, social, and political environments. In their opinion, changes are usually incremental and prompted by the above-mentioned factors (Beland & Waddan, 2012).

As opposed to the aforementioned view, the theory of **punctuated equilibrium,** developed by Baumgartner and Jones, highlights that political processes, notwithstanding their usual stability and incrementalism, still undergo major changes as authorities bow to pressure from non-state actors from time to time (James *at al* 2006). Moreover, they claim that a long-running advocacy campaign executed and sustained by advocates of change, if successful, will finally result in radical reversal of policy and not merely incremental changes (Macharashvili *et al*, 2015).

Although advocates and supporters of Punctuated equilibrium view change as a radical alteration to the *status-quo*, they actively discuss dividing the achieved changes in three major categories: *'major', 'moderate'/incremental and 'zero'* changes (Baumgartner *et al*, 2009). Based on this categorization, the level of policy change directly correlates with the success of policy advocacy process.

Methodology

In analyzing advocacy processes during the rule of the United National Movement (UNM), the authors of the article use the key findings of the publication by Georgian scholars: Dr. Nani Macharashvili, Ekaterine Basilaia and Nodar Tangiashvili, who studied the public

policy, policy communication and public opinion formation issues under the research project *'Policy Advocacy Success in Georgia: The Role and Limitations of NGOs in Influencing Public Policy'* (Macharashvili et al, 2015). The authors of the present article share the basic methodology and the format of study applied by the above-mentioned scholars. They rely on their approaches in studying the factors of advocacy processes and their implementation during the rule of UNM. While analysing the Policy Advocacy in the period of the Georgian Dream's (GD) Governance, the authors use the key findings of their own research project, conducted under the Social Sciences PhD Programme of the Georgian Institution of Public Affairs (GIPA, 2019-2020). Both studies applied the qualitative research methods including the case studies, in-depth interviews, focus group and secondary literature analysis. In total, the article presents comparative analysis of 8 cases of policy advocacy during the UNM's authority and analysis of 8 cases with high-publicity features, conducted during the GD's governance. The first eight cases (UNM) refer to different policy areas such as **human rights, media, political parties and the electoral system.** Selection of cases during UNM can be characterized by levels of the policy changes, i.e.: in 3 of them the advocacy process ended with a major change, in 3 cases actors achieved only incremental changes, and in 2 cases there was a zero change. As for the selection of the cases during GD's period, it was accomplished from 4 thematic groups including **human rights, health-care, cultural heritage, and civil society**. Each thematic group had 2 types of cases with different outcomes of policy changes, which is - one case with successful and another one with failure or the less successful results.

The authors raise the following research questions:

1) What is the relationship between the success of policy advocacy in Georgia, initiated by non-state actors (1) and the factors (2) such as: a) the composition / structure of the advocacy group; b) strategy and argumentation; c) Internationalisation.

2) What were the similarities and differences between advocacy processes and their outcomes during the governance of different ruling parties, i.e.: UNM and GD.

Within the Article, **the policy advocacy is defined as an independent variable**. It's operationalised by the structure of non-state actors interested in change / or maintenance

of *status-quo* (composition, size; thematic diversity), by the strategies used in advocacy (lobbying, advise, grassroots activism, media campaign) and argumentation, as well as the internationalisation component (the mode and quality of international actors' engagement). **The policy change is defined as a dependent variable** and degree of policy change to meet the requirements of non-state actors is used as a measurement of the policy advocacy success. Thus, the following types/levels of policy change are determined and applied:

Zero change – characterize the outcomes obtained through policy advocacy by non-state actors, where there is a complete failure of the advocacy group to succeed, there is no change in the *status-quo* and the advocacy group does not achieve the set goals and objectives at all.

Moderate / incremental change - describes the results achieved on the basis of the policy advocacy process initiated and implemented by non-state actors, during which the advocacy group had only partial satisfaction with the required changes.

Major change – refers to the result achieved on the basis of the policy advocacy process initiated and implemented by non-state actors, during which the coalition and its individual members achieved the vast majority or full package of the requested changes.

Analysis

Policy Advocacy Processes Initiated by Non-state Actors During the Ruling of the United National Movement

As mentioned above, when analyzing advocacy cases during the rule of the UNM, the article mainly relies on the survey conducted in 2015 by N. Macharashvili, E. Basilaia and N. Tangiashvili in which 8 specific cases of policy advocacy are discussed by non-state actors (For a brief description of the cases, find Appendix 1).

There are two distinguished phases of policy advocacy by the non-state actors during the rule of the UNM - (1) 2003-2007 and (2) 2007-2012, where the success of the advocacy process was defined by different characteristics. During the first period, public policy-

making was rigid and the government was less open to alternative ideas; as for the second phase, as a result of the political crisis of 2007, the government, due to the threat of losing control, used to pay more attention to the opposite political discourse and the parties. According to the authors, the most important **intermediate variable during both periods was the political context.** It should be noted that by the case analysis covering the both periods, it was revealed that the process of advocacy in support of the *status-quo* is not more likely to succeed, as it is common in policy theory (Macharashvili et al, 2015).

The analysis of advocacy cases during the governance of UNM demonstrated, that **well-arranged structure of advocacy and heterogeneity of groups were characteristics of successful advocacy processes.** When advocacy was limited in the number of participating organizations or individuals and had a very narrow technical focus, the government was less responsive to pressure, than when the coalition brought together many local and international organizations and government officials. **However, according to the authors, as a result of case analysis, desired outcome can be achieved regardless of the size of the policy advocacy group.** In all eight cases discussed in the study of Macharashvili and co-authors, the parties involved in the advocacy process were **heterogeneous.** However, this factor was important in 5 cases, and only two of them had the significant policy changes (On granting LEPL status to religious organizations and LGTB-friendly Criminal Code of Georgia), whilst three of them resulted incremental changes ("Must Carry / Must Offer", Political Union of Citizens and amendments of the Electoral Code).

The study also explores if an **advocacy strategy** has the influence on the successful completion of the process. According to the authors, consolidated and better coordinated groups that **use different advocacy strategies** can achieve better results than non-consolidated groups that operate with different strategies (Macharashvili et al, 2015). The study of thematic cases has shown that **strategy and argumentation** have an **additional effects** on the success of policy advocacy. This has been confirmed by two cases where policy advocacy has failed (Philanthropy, Charity and Social Partnership Bill and Volunteers Bill and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages).

Accordingly, the study concludes that *"It is difficult to demonstrate that strategy, let alone argumentation, is a decisive factor"* for reaching success (Macharashvili et al, 2015, p.160). Most cases have confirmed that the **quality of internationalization** has a significant impact on the outcome of the policy advocacy. The international obligations and the international dimension were highlighted in the specific cases. The analysis of the research revealed that, *"if NGO share policy sides with powerful international actors, they are likely to be successful; If NGOs do not share policy sides with powerful international actors, they are less likely to be successful"* (Macharashvili et al, 2015, p. 162). However, it should be noted that the study presents several cases when the desired results were not achieved despite the high level of internationalization ("Must Carry / Must Offer", Political Union of Citizens and amendments of the Electoral Code, Philanthropy, charity, the processes of European Charter about the Public Partnership and the Regional or Minority Languages).

The study of advocacy processes conducted under the rule of the UNM, has revealed that in most cases gradual and incremental changes were resulted in the major policy changes. Out of 8 cases 5 were finally successfully completed, i.e.: 1) Juvenile Justice, 2) Granting LEPL status to religious organizations, 3) Must Carry / Must Offer, 4) Law on Political Union of Citizens 5) Amendments to the low on the Electoral Code. In two of the said cases (Juvenile justice, granting LEPL status to religious organizations) the major policy changes were achieved step by step - from zero changes to incremental changes, and then to major changes. In 3 cases ("Must Carry / Must Offer", Law on Political Union of Citizens, Amendments to the Electoral Code) zero policy change was transformed into incrementalism and still remained active on the political agenda.

In one case (an amendment to the low on Electoral Code) that represents the example of complex policy changes, the policy advocacy process exhibited double incrementalism. One case (LGTB-friendly Criminal Code of Georgia) had a very short process of advocacy, resulting directly in a major change.

According to the authors, the changes were achieved in five cases applying so called "layering" type of the incremental change (Juvenile justice, granting the status of LEPL to religious organizations, "Must Carry / Must Offer", law on political unions of citizens,

change of the Electoral Code of advocacy processes). In three cases, the theory of punctuated equilibrium was relevant. The case that ended directly with a major change (LGTB-friendly Criminal Code), as well as the remaining two cases ended with zero change (philanthropy, the processes of European Charter about the Public Partnership and the Regional or Minority Languages) were in compliance with the theory of punctuated equilibrium (Macharashvili and etc, 2015).

Accordingly, it is legitimate to use the theory of punctuated equilibrium to the policy-making process during the rule of the UNM.

Policy Advocacy Processes Initiated by Non-State Actors under the Rule of Georgian Dream

Based on the analysis of eight (8) individual cases of advocacy studied by the authors of this article, it may be assumed that the process of policy advocacy has displayed heterogeneity during GD's governance. At the same time, it is also noteworthy that many of the processes discussed here had been initiated during the rule of UNM.

Appendix 2 offers a short description of the particular advocacy cases (examined here) during GD's time in power along with the factors that influenced their success or failure.

Analysis of the cases reveals that the following factors have significantly contributed to the success of policy advocacy by non-state actors under GD's rule, i.e.: **heterogeneity of an advocacy group, multiplicity of actors, their role/functions clarity, employed human, financial, and technical resources.** With the exception of one case (advocacy for the conservation and rehabilitation of Gudiashvili Square), multiplicity of engaged stakeholders and heterogeneity characterized all advocacy groups. Two of these cases (advocacy process for hepatitis C virus (HCV) elimination and the domestic violence related legislative change) were completed with major outcomes and assessed as successful advocacy processes; two more cases (advocacy for approving legislative changes for humane drug policy and gender quotation system) led to incremental changes, however, the involved parties and stakeholders evaluated them as unsuccessful; one case (Sakdrisi protection process) resulted in zero change, which may be solely attributed to the failure of the advocacy process.

It is also notable that in several cases, heterogeneity of advocacy groups proved to be an important challenge during the advocacy process. Multiplicity and heterogeneity of stakeholders, to some extent, hindered the establishment of common strategy as well as the development of solid and compelling arguments during the advocacy campaigns for drug policy decriminalization and Sakdrisi protection. In the two latter cases, coalitions were based on core values related to the immediate issue, and despite the fact that they had agreed on policy change, they failed to develop a common strategy and consistent argumentation for their advocacy campaigns. Besides, in two cases (advocacy processes for adopting the law on volunteering and state grant programs), multiplicity of participants could not be maintained. Namely, the one organization stood out as a prominent leader, while others in the group mainly limited themselves to supporting statements.

Analysis of the cases confirmed that the **heterogeneity of an advocacy group, multiplicity of actors, their role/functions clarity, employed human, financial, and technical resources** have been the **important though not crucial factors** in ensuring the success of policy advocacy initiated by Non-State actors during GD's ruling period.

The case studies demonstrated that the success of policy advocacy processes under GD's rule was largely caused by the **efficient usage of various** advocacy **strategies.** The analysis of these successful cases revealed that advocates used diverse strategies at various stages, i.e.: civic activism, member mobility, media mobilization, meetings with representatives of legislative and executive bodies/authorities to secure increasing support, preparation of various recommendations and particular, targeted policy papers.

It is also notable that at particular cases the flexible approaches were employed by the advocates. They used to **alter the initially selected strategy,** if it failed to produce desirable outcomes at a particular stage, **in response to various phases/requirements of the advocacy process**. For example, advocates of Gudiashvili Square conservation and rehabilitation changed the lobbying method that was chosen for the first stage of advocacy, when it did not bring specific desirable outcomes, and, instead, they actively engaged civil society and media outlets in the process. It is also notable that all advocacy campaigns placed special focus on media mobilization except for two cases of advocacy for the reform of state grant programs

and approval of law on volunteering. The latter two did not employ media campaign based on the argument that the issue would be of no interest to wider audience.

In four out of six studied cases, the advocacy processes with planned strategy and solid argumentation resulted in major changes (advocacy processes related to law on volunteering, Gudiashvili Square conservation and rehabilitation, HCV elimination, and legislative change related to domestic violence); it was evidenced, however, that **a conscious strategy**, particularly selection of a leading strategy and solid **argumentation** of an advocating group are **important and influential,** though not **exclusive and sole factors contributing** to the success of an advocacy process.

In the examined cases, except for the advocacy for conservation and rehabilitation of Gudiashvili Square, the **international actors** were actively engaged in the processes, and the advocates often used the best international practices. In three examples of successful cases (advocacy processes related to law on volunteering, HCV elimination, and legislative changes related to domestic violence), internalization proved to be influential, while in one of them (advocacy for supporting legislative changes related to domestic violence) the international obligations committed by the government assisted to open the so called 'window of opportunity' for advocates. Namely, during the introduction of the legislative changes necessary for the ratification of 2014 Istanbul Convention, the advocacy group members raised the issue of sexual harassment, which was not included in the initial package of changes. Similarly, the advocates of state grant program reform also found a 'window of opportunity' when Georgia began the elaboration of a new Action Plan (AP) for the platform of Open Governance Partnership (OGP). In parallel to this, international organizations voiced frequent criticisms of the government, underlining insignificant and non-ambitious nature of commitments implied by the AP, which helped to highlight and bring forth the reform issue to policy agenda.

Internationalization proved an important supporting factor in advocating the implementation of HCV elimination National Programme. Intense engagement of international actors as coalition members, partners, and experts who were involved in the monitoring activities, positively influenced the advocacy process. It is important that, in this

case, internationalization proved positively influential not only on the successful finalization of the process in general but also on the development of a unified, sound, and coherent strategy as well as the attraction of respective required resources.

The four cases of unsuccessful advocacy (advocacy processes for state grant programs, Sakdrisi protection, legislative changes for humane drug policy and gender quotation) used the three mechanisms of internationalization, however, the desirable outcomes were never achieved. For example, internationalization factor actively operated at all three stages of advocacy for humane drug policy reform as evidenced by sharing best practices, responding to international obligations of protecting human rights, availability of resources (financial, expert / human, technical) mobilized from international foundations/donors. Notwithstanding the efforts, the first stage of advocacy (2004-2011) resulted in zero policy change, the second stage (2012-2014) was marked with incremental changes, whiles at the final stage (2015-2019), incremental but not major outcomes were achieved.

Accordingly, cases studied for GD's period demonstrate that **internationalization may positively impact advocacy outcomes but cannot determine the overall success of the process.** Analysis of in-depth interviews with advocacy group members, conducted as part of the examination of the said eight cases, revealed that they characterized the **GD government, especially, during their first term of governing cycle, as having greater degree of openness and acceptance than UNM.** However, it is also remarkable that experts participating in the research described the increasingly **negative trend** in GD's communications with non-stateactors, which became particularly noticeable during their **second term in power.**

In the four successful cases (advocacy processes related to law on volunteering, conservation and rehabilitation of Gudiashvili Square, HCV elimination, and legislative change related to domestic violence), the opening of the so called 'window of opportunity' was a key driver of significant alterations. These particular cases were related to 2012 parliamentary elections and change of the government (UNM was replaced by GD as the ruling party) as a major factor to predict the opening of a 'window of opportunity'. It is also notable that all four cases of successful advocacy processes were initiated during the rule of

UNM, and the advocates efficiently used opportunities emerging from government change to complete the advocacy processes with desired fundamental outcomes.

The absolute majority of experts and respondents participating in the research agree upon the great significance of the personal factors of engaged decision makers. Support provided by a governmental representative with strong will and relevant power to advocate for changes as well as the involvement of an active 'political entrepreneur' with good governmental connections are positively reflected on the overall success of the process. Experts also highlight the challenges and difficulties, which advocates face due to the frequent changes in the concerned public entities' relevant personnel (staff).

To summarize, it can be argued that a conscious strategy, argumentation, heterogeneity of policy advocating groups as well as high level of process internationalization have been important in ensuring success of advocacy campaigns under the GD's rule. However, it should be noted that these factors may cause the mere incremental changes and fail to determine the overall success of the advocacy process. Based on the cases examined, **major factors contributing** to the efficient policy advocacy include **the subjective component of the political context, the engagement of a powerful political entrepreneur, and the usage of 'window of opportunity'.**

A Comparative Analysis of Advocacy Processes under the Georgian Dream and the United National Movement

Periodization of successful advocacy opportunities and Political Factors: Based on the studied cases, the analysis of advocacy processes covers period of 2003-2012 for UNM and 2012-2019 for GD. The success of the advocacy process for most of the cases during the rule of both governments was caused by the existing political context. Macharashvili and co-authors conclude that the **political context** was the most important intermediate variable during the UNM.During the **first cycle** of the UNM rule (2003-2007), the public policy-making was rigid and can be characterized as **closed/non-collaborative** towards the non-state actors' participation in the policy processes. The UNM's **second cycle** (2007-2012) commenced with a political crisis where the government realized the danger of losing its

control, and became **more receptive to the advocacy processes** offered by Non-State actors (Macharashvili, , et al. 2015). By studying the advocacy cases during the GD's period, unlike the UNM, showed that **GD expressed greater readiness to cooperate with non-state actors in the first election cycle (2012-2016).** Moreover, during the **second cycle** of its governance (2016-2020), while backed by high legitimacy from society/voters, the **collaboration with civil society/non-state actors was decreased gradually**. Also, the main difference between these two periods was the changes in the rhetoric of the authorities. Similar approach was typical within the UNM's rule as well. During the less acceptance period of the non-state actors' positions, the UNM representatives claimed that the civil activists were controlled by their political opponents. The same rhetoric was revealed during the Georgian Dream's second cycle of rule. At certain points, the high-level governmental officials were discrediting the civil society representatives, making emphasis on specific thematic issues and initiating the active discussions on their political affiliation to opposition parties. Overall, in the context of policy advocacy campaigns, both governments actively accused the non-state actors as politically bias.

Composition and structure of the advocacy group: The analysis of the studied cases revealed that the heterogeneity of the advocacy group and the high number of members during the rule of both governments had certain significance in the successful implementation of the process. There have been cases where the advocacy process has been initiated by a particular homogeneous group. However, during the process they were transformed into heterogeneous groups, which contributed to the partially successful completion of the advocacy ("Must Carry / Must Offer"). It should also be noted that in several cases the heterogeneity of the advocacy group led to the absence of a unified coalition that was reflected in non-consolidated strategy, tactics and argumentation, which ultimately had a negative impact on the final result of advocacy process (Philanthropy, Charity, the Law on Public Partnership during the UNM and the process of protecting of Sakhdrisi during the GD).

By the experts, interviewed in the study, it is confirmed that the fragmentation of advocacy processes has a negative impact on the advocacy success. In addition, the consistency of the

policy change by the non-state actors and limitation of resources as well as their high reliance on the donor organizations are significant challenges.

To summarize, the heterogeneity of the advocacy group, the variety of stakeholders, human, financial and technical resources are **important but not crucial factors for the success** of policy advocacy initiated by non-state actors during the rule of both governments.

Advocacy strategies: A comparative analysis of advocacy processes during the UNM and GD's periods, revealed **that grassroots activism was stronger and more frequent during the GD's period,** while **lobbying** was more effective during the UNM's period. By experts' view, during the UNM period, due to the rigid, repressive political context, the society as well as the other non-state actors had a fear of taking part in the street demonstrations, which showed that this advocacy strategy was less applicable. This attitude changed during the GD's period and, consequently, advocacy coalitions began to use street demonstrations intensively. Particular emphasis was made on the activities targeting strategic communication with wider society.

It was important for advocacy groups to use different strategies for achieving the success during the rule of both parties, and often to change those strategies when needed. Based on the studied cases, consolidated and even better coordinated advocacy groups that use different advocacy strategies could bring better results than groups that operated with a restricted strategy. However, it should also be noted, that during the rule of both governments, although the strategy and argumentation are important factors in terms of the success of policy advocacy and accompany the advocacy process, still, **they can only have some influence on the policy advocacy but not entirely determine its final results.**

Internationalization: Internationalization has been identified as an important factor in the success of policy advocacy during the UNM's period. At that time, the effect of internationalization outweighed the following factors such as the structure of the coalition, strategy, and argumentation (Macharashvili, et. al., 2015). **Internationalization is also important for the GD's period, however, less significant than for the UNM's period.** Moreover, the focus group revealed that the UNM's political team was more dependent on

international stakeholders (including due to the financial interests), which led to a high-level influence of internationalization on advocacy outcomes. The policy changes stipulated by the international commitments were significant for both parties. However, in both cases, there was more superficial implementation of international agreements and just 'putting the ticks' in the action plans while being executed.

It is true that there were cases during the rule of **both governments** when the involvement of international organizations did not lead to the successful completion of the advocacy processes, but the studied cases also confirmed that a high level of **internationalization was an important contributing factor for final success of the advocacy process.**

Personal factor: During the rule of both governments the high importance of the **personal factor** was revealed for achieving success of the advocacy process. Mentioned refers to the engagement of the persons being in power in the advocacy process by the governmental bodies, who had the desire of change and at the same time would actively lobby or pursue the policy changes. It is also actual for the Non-State actors with different political affiliations.

Influence of interest groups: Experts participated to the Focus group disscussions underlined, that during the UNM and as well as GD's periods, the existence of strong financial or political influential interest groups, e.g. businesses, and the alignment of their interests to the goals of advocacy processes have been identified as a hindering factor. Also, one of the disruptive factors during the governance of both parties was incompatibility between the interests of law enforcement agencies on the one hand and advocacy group on the other (e.g. changes in local self-government in the Electoral Code). The fear of losing a power as well as the impact on the voters was also influential for changing the attitudes towards the advocacy process (e.g. decriminalization of drug policy, etc.).

The level of the policy change: The cases discussed in the article show that the majority of successful advocacy processes in the case of both governments **are mostly characterized by incremental changes, which gradually are resulted into the major changes.** It is obvious, that there are some cases when the advocacy process ended with a major change in a short period of time, but mostly, success is determined by the consistency of the process and the

achievement of incremental change at all levels. Consequently, **the explanation of the success of the advocacy process in both periods is in compliance with the theory of punctuated equilibrium.**

In addition, the comprehensive analysis of discussed cases show that the main factor for the success of the policy advocacy process was **the political context, the personal factor and the opening of the 'window of opportunity'.** The focus group also revealed that the lack of institutional memory was one of the major challenges, as the frequent rotation of the public servants and high-level decision makers in Georgia's public entities often leads to the initiation of the advocacy processes from the scratch.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis of advocacy cases under the United National Movement and the Georgian Dream's governance revealed that **internationalization** was more important for the success of the advocacy process during the UNM's period, but **opening the 'window of opportunity'** and using it successfully were more relevant during the rule of GD. Study revealed the importance of the **personal factor**, as well as the significance of the **strong policy-makers' engagement** and their active, persistent, consistent and continuous participation in the advocacy processes are in compliance with the global trends.

As opposed to the 'S*tatus-quo* Power' concept in the public policy theory, the explored 16 cases showed that the advocacy processes in Georgia **were mostly successful whilst advocating the *status-quo* change.** Particularly, 10 cases out of 16 ended with some success. 5 out of 6 studied successful cases during the UNM's period as well as 4 out of 4 studied successful cases during the GD's periods were in favor of changing the *status-quo*. Accordingly, **90% of reviewed successful cases (i.e. 9 out of 10) advocated for a change of the *status-quo*.** In Georgia, as a post-Soviet country, political processes are often seen as transforming from the Soviet legacy to Western values, while maintaining the *status-quo* is perceived as a "bad" and/or "harmful" experience that hinders the country's development. According to the authors, the desire to terminate all ties with the past of the Soviet Union

leads to the trust and support of society and political organizations for change. Disruption of old connections and old practices is associated with the progress of the country in the Georgian political context, thus, it increases the probability of successful completion of the *status-quo* change advocacy processes. As a result, it can be said that during both, the UNM and the GD' rule, advocacy processes initiated by non-state actors had a chance **to be more successful when advocacy coalitions / groups supported *the status-quo* changes which represents a significant deviation from the mainstream**.

Based on the findings outlined in the article, the authors can also assume that there are some links between the success of advocacy campaigns in favor of changing the *status-quo* and the post-Soviet experience. This assumption requires further research of advocacy processes in other post-Soviet countries.

For future research, the authors of the article recommend to conduct an in-depth study of the *status-quo* change cases and explore the linkages with the probability of success of advocacy processes in post-Soviet regions. It is also important to analyze in Georgia the issue of personal influence, so called policy entrepreneur on the successful advocacy process and additionally examine the possible connections between the success of advocacy and different thematic focuses.

To conclude, the Georgian way of policy advocacy is a process where the success of advocacy process is not often determined by the consistency of the actions, the strategy or the argumentation, the heterogeneity of the advocacy group or the high-level of internationalization. The mentioned factors are definitely important influential aspects in most cases, however, the key point for success is to know how to use the **'window of opportunity'** that generally arises in the Georgian political reality during the governmental changes or the fear of losing the political power. In addition, **the policy entrepreneur** has its important role in the success of the processes and is a person who along with the willingness of the policy-change possess the relevant know-how, expertise, resources, connections, access to the potential alternatives for effective decision-making, as well as the levers for influence.

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Conflict of Interest

None

Supplementary Files

- Appendix 1 - *Brief description and characteristics of advocacy cases studied during the rule of the United National Movement*
- Appendix 2 - *Short description and characteristics of individual cases of advocacy under the rule of Georgian Dream*
- Published copy of the extended research report *'Policy Advocacy in Georgia: Opportunities for external actors to influence the formation of the public policy agenda and its implementation in the period of the Georgian Dream's governance'*. The joint research project was conducted in the period of 2019-2020 and the printed copy of report is kept in the GIPA's library/repository).

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Strengthening the EU's Defence Cooperation

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Abstract

In an expeditiously changing world, security challenges have become more intricate, multifaceted and complex. The 21st century is an epoch of strategic competition and multisided relations. The influence and rate of occurrence of hybrid security threats are constantly rising and deepening. World is in era of transition, characterized by creating new dynamics by emerging players along with significant shift of geopolitical and economic power, and currently, global attention is drawn to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which is the consequent catalyst for the EU states, obligating them to take more responsibility and improve security and defence. Russia does not use force only to dominate on Ukraine, but this war aims to reverse and strike down western dominance - it is a big threat-economically, militarily, and politically. In an international competition, other powers are challenging the European countries' ability to protect their interests and values that was the motivation for the idea of collective security building called "strategic sovereignty". For this reason, both defence and security fields are essentially important for the European Union. The EU leaders have long been trying to improve common defence

policy - the European Union External Action Service in 2011, and later in 2016, the EU Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker called for a common defence fund, a "European headquarters." In March 2022, the EU council approved the Strategic Compass. The Compass gives the European Union an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030 (EU, 2022. French President Emmanuel Macron urged Europe to invest in its own collective security framework in the face of Russian military moves on the bloc's doorstep - "Europe needs to finally build its own collective security framework on our continent." We argue about the prospects of collective security and the fact that it may now be time for the EU member States to take the necessary decisions.

Key words: security challenges, hybrid security threats, collective security, strategic sovereignty, defence policy, the Strategic Compass.

Introduction

We, human beings, tend to over-rationalize the past, over-dramatize the present and underestimate the future. Now if you look at the post-cold war era, we will see that in the beginning it was unipolar, which was driven by the undisputed superpower of the world - the United States, and at the same time, it was partially ideology-driven as well as identity-driven. That was the time when Francis Fukuyama, one of the greatest academics and intellectuals, coined the phrase at the end of history - a belief that all 200 nation-states in the world would start transitioning towards the best combination of governance that is liberal democracy, the social market economy, and globalization, and this was a genuine belief. That's why there is increasing acceptance that the European Union is becoming an important factor in foreign and security matters (Smith, 2005). A significant factor in the rising importance of the EU security activities derived from the Russian-Ukrainian war (Michael Merlingen, 2008). Inside the EU, they also have to accept to pay a price to stop this outrageous and unprovoked war: the future of European security and their democracies depends on it. The price to pay is the price of freedom.

The EU's toolkit for maintaining international security and peace includes diplomacy, humanitarian aid, development cooperation, human rights, climate action, economic

support, and trade regulations. These various tools are put together in a certain way to match the unique circumstances of each crisis or emergency. The EU's so-called Integrated Approach, as outlined in the EU Global Strategy, is a customized, multifaceted strategy constantly updated to changing circumstances (European Union, 2016). When it comes to encouraging security and advancing European interests and values, all of these strengths - collectively known as Europe's soft power - are beneficial but Defence is a vital part of the EU's distinctive toolbox and is essential to safeguarding European interests both now and in the future. Because of this, a more stable basis has been created to further progress and reinforce Europe's defence cooperation.

When the UK, France and Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, the concept of a common defence policy for Europe first emerged. In 1948, the EU countries have been trying to improve security and defence, but crucial steps were taken when they were necessity. It was obvious that the EU needed to address its duties in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent wars in the Balkans (Brussels Treaty. Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, 1948). It is essential to acknowledge that the EU has always been trying to enhance defence and security. The Western European Union Council had already approved the conditions for the deployment of military units in 1992, but the "Petersberg Tasks" was now included in the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam. For the Union to comment on foreign policy issues with "one face and one voice," the position of "High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy" was established (Nicolaidis, 1999).

After the Treaty of Amsterdam, there was another important moment in relations between the countries of the EU. Member States reiterated the Union's readiness to build autonomous action capabilities, supported by effective armed units during the 1999 European Council in Cologne. The "Berlin Plus Agreement," which granted the EU access to NATO resources and capabilities under specific restrictions, was a significant advance. The Lisbon Treaty, which become valid in December 2009 and served as a fundamental factor in the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy, is another significant treaty (CSDP) when it comes to the EU defence cooperation.

Several years ago, in December 2017, when the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was established, it has brought defence cooperation between the participating European Union Member States to a different level. To create a more cohesive European capacity landscape, a collaboration between the participating EU Member States will gradually transition from isolated projects to plan and impact-based cooperative activities. It is a framework and systematic procedure for progressively strengthening defence cooperation to deliver the necessary capabilities in order to carry out both the most difficult missions and consequently increase security for the EU residents. There are two other crucial initiatives: the European Defence Fund, which will provide financial support for certain collaborative projects, and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which will assist Member States to better identify the opportunities for new collaborative initiatives. The concept of a European army is as old as the European Union and the unity of European countries. The idea of developing European defence regularly appears in the discourse of European leaders as a result of increasing security issues either in the international arena or on the internal European political agenda, but the European Union has still been hesitant to make risky international commitments.

According to economists, the war in Ukraine is the third asymmetric shock, experienced by UN in the last two decades after the 2008 financial and economic crisis and the following Eurozone crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine is indeed having a much greater impact on neighboring countries due to the influx of refugees and their heavy dependence on Russian gas. With the invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin is forcing the EU to urgently rethink many elements of their internal organization and worldview. They must rise to this challenge to defend their security and democratic values. To handle the wider impact of the war against Ukraine, the EU needs to bolster European economic resilience, end its energy dependence on Russia and further strengthen the European defence.

According to analyses by Eurobarometer, a large percentage of the EU residents desire increased security, stability, and a coordinated EU response towards the existing dangers. The EU citizens expect the EU to gradually reduce its dependence on Russian

energy sources (87%), and they strongly support a common security and defence policy (81%). The survey also confirms the overwhelming support for the EU's response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine (59%). Along with their international partners' expectations that Europe should be able to respond to crises rapidly and effectively, the recently increased degree of desire to cooperate in the domain of defence is a clear answer to this demand by European citizens.

In other words, the European Union must be able to defend its security interests and shoulder its full amount of responsibility as a guarantor of international security. Among the current processes adopting the "Strategic Compass", which is a 2030 action plan to strengthen the EU's security and defence policy, it also responds to the requiremants of the European Union residents. The work on the Strategic Compass began nearly two years ago, but due to the increased dynamycs of security problems and the war in Ukraine, the working version of the document was significantly updated, highligting the European Union's collective military ambitions.

The "Strategic Compass" is an overall assessment of the EU's strategic environment, including threats and challenges. For the first time in the EU history, concrete and practical proposals with a well-defined implementation schedule are documented aiming to strengthen the EU's ability to act decisively in crises as well as to protect both its security and citizens. The Compass encompasses all aspects of security and defence policy and is built on four pillars: act, invest, partner, and secure. When a crisis emerges, the EU should be prepared to respond quickly and forcefully, with partners or alone. The EU will establish a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops for different types of crises, will be ready to deploy 200 fully equipped CSDP mission experts within 30 days, including in complex environments, will conduct regular live exercises on land and at sea, and enhance military mobility (https://www.eeas.europa.eu/ 2022).

A variety of considerations influenced the Member States' decision to cross the Rubicon as well as gave the Union independent military capability. There is a revival of war in Europe, as well as a decreased American readiness to provide security and defence assurances to Europe, which is more essential in geopolitical terms than it was during the Cold War.

Many continental European nations have sought to confirm the EU's role as a global political player. (Michael Merlingen, 2008).

In the new millennium, the EU has gained prominence in security and defence issues. The Member States provided the union with a new institutional framework and major operational capabilities by creating and expanding the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy). Their goal in promoting international security and stability via preventative action and crisis management in civilian and military operations has been realized. To increase its capacities, the EU had been developing and implementing foreign and security policies.

The debate over European security and the role of the EU, as well as its strategic partners, is raging. The recent NATO summit in Madrid was a success for the Transatlantic Alliance in terms of both strategic unity and concrete decisions. The summit reemphasized NATO's collective defence mission, including plans to strengthen the alliance's presence on the eastern flank as well as to increase the overall number of high-readiness forces. All leaders underlined their determination to support Ukraine in defending itself against the Russian aggression, until full sovereignty is restored.

The debate over the division of geopolitical responsibility and burden between NATO and the EU has a long history (Michael Merlingen, 2008). Since the end of the Cold War, it has been clear that the development of a long-term and effective security and defence relationship between NATO and the EU is as necessary as it is unavoidable. The two organizations are linked in many ways, including strategic vision, a sense of responsibility, membership similarities, and vulnerability to security threats and challenges. Budgetary constraints bind NATO and the EU together; member governments cannot afford to maintain two separate security and defence organizations. It would also be counter-productive (Competition? 2006). However, in terms of practical cooperation, the results are mixed, and the overall result is neither cooperation nor competition, but dysfunction.

Both defence and security policy are two of the most important aspects of sovereignty, and this notion has been perceived for centuries. The initial reluctance of the EU states to grant the EU such a powerful tool is surprising. We believe it is worthwhile to

analyze the possibility of establishing a unified European army from today's perspective. **The** EU is rising as a significant security and defence actor. Russia's invasion of Ukraine with its widely spread devastation, tens of thousands of deaths, millions of refugees, possible war crimes, and narrowly avoided nuclear disaster is forcing European nations to rethink how to maintain their collective security. This makes the concept of European "strategic autonomy" and collective defence as important as it has never been since it refers to the EU's increased ability to operate independently and with preferred partners on defence and security issues. Between February and April, the European Council approved successive assistance measures under the European Peace Facility totaling €1.5 billion. The ability of the EU's 27 members to quickly agree on these key decisions demonstrates that when there is a shared understanding of the threat, the concept of European defence becomes concrete and effective **(Pezard, 2022).**

This situation creates all of the necessary conditions and the greatest environment for the formation of a European army. In the context of establishing a unified European army, in addition to the organizational and logistical difficulties that can be overcome in the future, it is vital to emphasize the political level, because it determines the goals and circumstances of using the army as a policy tool. In 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said: "We, Europeans, truly have to take our fate into our own hands." It is worth noting that the statements of European leaders, particularly of Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, are broad in scope. More specificity is required to gain support for the European army. In order to implement the idea we need to define the roles of the European army, the timeline, and other requirements that are necessary before the proposal can be put into practice. To deal with the challenges of today and the future, it is essential to define the political decision-making processes for the use of military force as well as to achieve agreement on the army's mission and functions. Furthermore, an agreement is required on whether a unified European military force will be used only in response to an attack on an EU Member State or preventive measures will be permitted as well. All of these are political questions, and considering the answers must necessarily precede the formation of the army

because the possible and potential missions of the army must be taken into account during the organizational formation.

In the current geopolitical situation, the concept of a European army would be impractical, since Europeans would struggle to agree on a unified military leadership - especially France, not Germany, which is a nuclear power. France, unlike Germany, is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Furthermore, because there is no "European country," the choice to send soldiers, who risk their lives is only feasible within the framework of a national decision. The EU and NATO have 27 and 30 member nations, respectively, of whom 21 are members of both, making the concept of an EU army extremely unrealistic. Parallel effort is required to bring together conflicting perspectives on geopolitical diagnosis, security perceptions, and identification of common interests in order to move on the road of tighter military cooperation. This would ultimately pave the door for a more in-depth discussion of European goals.

Conclusion

The challenge now is to improve the EU's strategic alliance with NATO and show how the EU can assume greater responsibility for its security. It is obvious that they are two different sides of the same coin, and three significant characteristics are appearing as we move forward:

1. They necessitate more deployable and interoperable troops capable of coping with a diverse set of threats and dangers. This means that Europeans should spend more on defence and, more crucially, spend better as a group. The EU Member States' statement that they will raise defence expenditure by around €200 billion is highly positive. However, there is a risk that much of the increased expenditure may be lost, unless the share spent on cooperative development and procurement grows. The defence investment gap study delivered to the EU leaders in May indicates both the magnitude of the problem and what may be done, as the Commission and the European Defence Agency aiding Member States are moving forward with joint procurement. One important example is the rebuilding of stocks depleted by the shipment of military equipment to Ukraine. Acquiring capabilities

collaboratively not only benefits the EU's security and defence agenda, but it is also essential for NATO Allies to secure Europe from Russian threats.

2. Second, demonstrating a desire to employ the essential capabilities and serve as a security provider is just as vital as gaining them. Over the previous two decades, the EU has gathered substantial expertise in crisis management activities. What has begun in the Balkans has developed into a potent instrument, with the EU today conducting 18 missions and operations - 11 civilian and 7 militaries across three continents.

3. This gets us to the third factor: the EU's ability to adapt and learn from their mistakes. The velocity of change in the world frequently outpaces our ability to keep up. They must improve their agility and ability to apply lessons learned, including in the field of CSDP. The Strategic Compass is vitally pertinent to this debate, and it contains actual ideas as well as a timeframe enhancing their combined influence.

The overall point is simple: in a dangerous world, Europeans must assume their strategic responsibility, both within the EU and NATO and give themselves the means and agility to do so (BORREL n.d.).

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